Essays in labour regulation by Sánchez, Rafael
  
 
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap  
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/55271 
 
 
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to 
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 
 
 
 
Essays in Labour Regulation
by
Rafael Sanchez
Submitted to the Department of Economics
in partial fulllment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the
UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK
September 2012
c Rafael Sanchez
The author hereby grants to University of Warwick permission to reproduce and
to distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Department of Economics
01 September 2012
Accepted by. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Graduate School
University of Warwick
Essays in Labour Regulation
by
Rafael Sanchez
Submitted to the Department of Economics
on 01 September 2012, in partial fulllment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Abstract
This thesis consists of three empirical essays within the eld of labour economics. As a whole,
it explores the (un)intended consequences of labour regulation, with each chapter providing an
independent analytical contribution to a specic aspect of the eld.
Chapter 1 analyzes the e¤ect of a reduction in standard working hours on employment tran-
sitions. In this chapter, I study Chiles reduction of weekly working hours from 48 to 45, which
was announced in 2001 but implemented in 2005. This policy was innovative, compared with
those in other countries, because it isolated the reduction in working hours from other policy
changes, such as working time exibility and nancial incentives to rms. Thus, this policy is
an interesting example for other countries to study, especially those without the scal capacity
to provide such incentives, as it allows them to identify its e¤ects on employment. Our results,
which are conrmed by several robustness checks, suggest that despite the pre-announcement of
the policy, rms displayed non-anticipatory behaviour on key variables. Furthermore, we nd
that rms waited to implement the reduction in working hours until just before the deadline.
Overall, we nd that a reduction in standard hours had no signicant e¤ects on employment
transitions, although we do nd a signicant e¤ect on hourly wages (i.e., wage compensation).
Chapter 2 extends the analysis of Chapter 1 to health outcomes. This is important, as the
health e¤ects of reductions in working hours have not been addressed by the existing literature;
instead, most of the empirical evidence concerns employment outcomes, family life balance, and
social networks. Using panel data from France and Portugal, this chapter exploits the exogenous
variation of working hours coming from labour regulation and estimates its impact on health
outcomes. In this way, our contribution to the existing literature is threefold: rst, this is the
rst evaluation of health outcomes of policies that reduce working hours. Second, we avoid
the problem of endogeneity with health outcomes by using exogenous reductions of working
hours. Third, as the e¤ects on health might depend on the level of working hours, our analysis
is performed for two di¤erent countries with di¤ering weekly hour thresholds (France, 35 hours;
Portugal, 40 hours). Our results suggest a non-monotonic relationship between weekly working
hours and health outcomes. In particular, a negative (positive) e¤ect is found for young men
(women) in France, and no e¤ect is found in Portugal.
Chapter 3 (coauthored by Eugenio Rojas and Mauricio Villena) examines childcare policies
and analyzes who e¤ectively pays for childcare when it is not publicly funded. This is interest-
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ing, since in several countries governments provide and fund childcare, but in many others it is
privately funded, as labour regulation mandates that rms have to provide childcare services.
For this latter case, there is no empirical evidence on the e¤ects generated by the nancial
burden of childcare provision. In particular, there is no evidence about who e¤ectively pays for
childcare (i.e., rms or employees) and how it is paid for (i.e., via wages and/or employment).
Our study is the rst one to provide empirical evidence on the e¤ects generated by the nan-
cial burden of childcare provision. For this, we exploit a Chilean labour regulation requiring
that rms with 20 or more female workers provide and fund childcare for their workers. Our
hypothesis is that, in imperfect labour markets (e.g., oligopsonistic), rms will pass childcare
costs on to their workers. To analyze this, we exploit a discontinuity in the childcare provision
mandated by the Chilean Labour Code. Our results suggest that rms pass almost the entire
childcare cost (nearly 90%) on to their workers via lower wages (not only to female but also to
male workers) and not by altering the share of male workers within the rm.
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Introduction
There is no formal denition of a labour market institution; however, a commonly used
one is a system of laws, norms, or conventions resulting from a collective choice and providing
constraints and incentives that alter individual choices over labour and pay (Boeri and Van
Ours 2008). In this way, single individuals and rms consider the institutions as given when
making their own decisions. Because they are based on collective choice, institutions are the
by-product of a political process. Thus, they are often (but not always) established by laws
(Boeri and Van Ours 2008), which is why labour market institutions are also called labour
market regulations. Examples of labour market institutions (regulations) are minimum wages,
unions, regulation of working hours, family policies, employment protection legislation, and
unemployment benets, among others.
Labour market institutions interfere with wages and labour allocation, as they a¤ect labour
demand and/or labour supply. The e¤ects of the interference may be positive, neutral, or
negative depending, among other things, on the underlying labour market structure. In par-
ticular, if a competitive labour market is assumed, then labour market institutions reduce the
total surplus to be shared between workers and rms because they introduce a wedge between
labour demand and supply by a¤ecting either prices (e.g., minimum wages) or quantities (e.g.,
working hours regulations).
If this is the case, why should labour market institutions exist? Boeri and Van Ours (2008)
o¤er three arguments for their existence: e¢ ciency, equity, and policy failures.
Regarding e¢ ciency, Boeri and Van Ours (2008) point out that since the rst-best compet-
itive labour market equilibrium is unattainable because of imperfect information, externalities,
and labour market frictions, a second-best argument would justify the presence of these in-
stitutions. They suggest that "well-designed labour market institutions, in this context, may
remedy these failures of markets and increase the size of the pie compared with the laissez-faire
outcome".
Regarding equity, the authors suggest that labour market institutions are best suited to
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achieve some redistribution that is supported by voters by changing the allocation of the surplus
between employers and employees.
Finally, when the benets of an institution are concentrated in powerful minorities and the
costs are spread over a very large crowd of individuals, institutions are created as some small
and powerful segment of the population succeeds in imposing its will.
A. Theories
There are two broad views or strands of analysis about labour market regulations: the
distortionist and the institutionalist (see Freeman 1993). The distortionist view argues that
the existence of labour market regulations produces several undesired outcomes, such as a) a
reduced rate of job creation and higher unemployment (Blanchard and Wolfers 2000) and b) an
adverse impact on economic growth (Besley and Burgess 2004). Because of these e¤ects, this
branch of the literature supports the elimination, or at least the reduction, of labour market
regulations. These authors mainly point out that the success of economic reforms depends,
in general, on whether labour costs can vary freely in response to changes in labour demand.
They argue that labour market regulations make the labour market more rigid, which makes
any adjustment due to economic reform more di¢ cult, which in turn makes the reallocation
process slower and the outcome more ine¢ cient.
Furthermore, this strand of the literature points out that labour market regulations lead to
an increase in the cost of production, thus discouraging investments, increasing unemployment,
and creating inequity. This latter e¤ect comes from the fact that labour market regulations
protect the interest of insiders and create obstacles to outsiders, who remain unemployed since
they cannot enter the labour market, which contributes to the perpetuation of inequality (Boeri,
Helppie, and Macis 2008).
On the other side, the institutionalist strand of the literature basically argues that the
neoclassical theory is awed.1 Institutionalists argue that there are asymmetries in economic
power and information between workers and rms and suggest that workersweaker position
1The neoclassical approach is based on perfect competition and Pareto optimality.
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often leads to unfair outcomes (e.g., unemployment, hazardous working conditions). In this
sense, labour market regulations would help to balance the economic power between workers and
rms. Supporters of this branch of the literature argue that the enforcement of labour regulation
"forces" employers to shift their attention from cost cutting to productivity enhancement (Boeri,
Helppie, and Macis 2008).
In particular, Wilkinson (1992) points out that rms may compete either by (a) reducing
their unit costs by lowering their wages and labour standards or (b) increasing productivity
with innovation and technology, improved product design, and so on. These strategies are
the "low road" or the "high road" to growth, respectively. Under the former, there would be
little motivation to undertake innovations to improve productivity. Furthermore, as Wilkinson
suggests, in the absence of minimum labour standards, an economy may inevitably end up
being stuck in a vicious cycle of low wages and low productivity.
Unfortunately, and as can be inferred from the discussion above, economic theory does
not conclusively predict the e¤ect of labour market regulation, as the predicted outcome of
any particular labour market institution will depend crucially on the underlying labour market
structure that one believes best describes the real world. The classic example is minimum wage
regulations, which will always have a negative or neutral e¤ect in a competitive framework
(i.e., depending on the price elasticity). However, minimum wage regulation may have positive
e¤ects if the model that one believes represents the real world situation is a monopsonistic
labour market. In this framework, small increases in the minimum wage will have positive
e¤ects on employment.
Because of these inconclusive predictions of economic theory, any assessment of the e¤ects
of labour market regulations rests ultimately on empirical studies (Boeri, Helppie, and Macis
2008).
B. Developed versus Developing Countries and Globalization
Although labour market regulation has existed for many centuries, only since the mid-1990s
has the empirical literature started to grow. The reason for this, as Boeri and Van Ours (2008)
point out, was the 1994 release of the OECD Jobs Study, a very inuential policy report that
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attempted to explain the di¤erent employment/unemployment performance of Europe versus
the United States, which was experiencing a "job miracle". The key message of this report
was that European institutional rigidities prevented the European labour market from creating
as many jobs in the private sector, compared with the United States. Since then, several
cross-sectional studies have been performed to analyze the relationship between institutions
and labour markets.
Regarding empirical evidence, there is considerable variation across countries in terms of
how labour markets are regulated (see Betcherman, Luinstra, and Ogawa 2001). For example,
Anglo-Saxon countries typically have regulated labour markets less heavily than have countries
with civil law principles (e.g., France, Portugal, and Spain). Because of this, it is crucial to
gather vast empirical evidence from di¤erent countries and di¤erent time periods.
The necessity for empirical evidence is more urgent in the case of developing countries since,
until recently, the debate on the e¤ects of labour market regulations was conned to the context
of developed economies (see, e.g., Lazear 1990 and Blanchard and Wolfens 2000). However,
recently there has been an increase in data availability from developing countries, which allows
for empirical studies of the e¤ects of labour market regulation on several outcomes.
Furthermore, two additional events make the realization of empirical studies in developing
countries even more interesting: transition and globalization. Regarding transition, the fall
of the Soviet Union and the transition of countries in central and eastern Europe, as well
as the changes in the economic environments in China and India and the economic boom
in Latin American countries, increased interest in these regions and their experiences. For
these middle-income countries, transition processes implied a great reallocation of resources
across sectors of the economy, which led to an increase in labour market risk, challenges, and
opportunities for workers. Which labour market institutions these nations adopted have a¤ected
the dynamics of the transition and economic growth. Similarly, the progressive integration
of all economies into the international market has generated an ongoing debate surrounding
the e¤ects of globalization on poverty, inequality, and employment, in both developed and
developing countries (Boeri, Helppie, and Macis 2008). This, again, makes empirical evidence
from developing countries crucial.
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The focus on developing countries is even more interesting because of the characteristics
of the labour market in these countries versus those in developed ones. In particular, the
economies of developing countries are often characterized by weak law enforcement, a large
informal sector, underdeveloped capital markets, and informal credit and insurance networks.
These characteristics have at least two implications: rst, results from developed countries
should not directly extend to developing countriessettings without a serious reection on these
di¤erences; second, within studies on developing countries, neglecting these features can lead
to incorrect predictions and misguided interpretation of the empirical ndings (Boeri, Helppie,
and Macis 2008).
C. My Contribution
As explained above, three main conclusions can be obtained when labour market regulations
(institutions) are analyzed. First, economic theory is not always helpful in predicting the e¤ect
of labour market regulations on economic outcomes, as they depend crucially on which labour
market model one believes best describes the real world. This implies that any assessment of
the e¤ect of labour market regulations rests on empirical evidence. Second, when empirical
work is performed, it is important to acknowledge that institutions do not operate in isolation.
Third, as there are important di¤erences between developed and developing labour markets,
and most of the empirical evidence so far has been conned to developed economies, empirical
evidence is needed for developing countries.
This PhD thesis includes three chapters that focus on two labour market regulations. Chap-
ters 1 and 2 focus on working hours regulation, and Chapter 3 (coauthored with Eugenio Rojas
and Mauricio Villena) focuses on childcare regulation. Chapter 1 analyzes the employment
e¤ect of a reduction in working hours from 48 to 45 hours a week in a developing country
(i.e., Chile), which occurred in 2005. Chapter 2 extended the analysis for developed countries
(France and Portugal) but focuses on health outcomes. To the best of my knowledge, this is
the rst evaluation of the e¤ect of a reduction in working hours on health outcomes. Chapter
3 analyzes the Chilean labour regulation of childcare provision, where rms are mandated by
law to provide childcare. In particular, we present the rst empirical evidence on who bears
the nancial cost of childcare provision. To identify the causal e¤ects in the rst two chapters,
16
I use changes in labour regulation that allow me to use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach,
whereas in Chapter 3 we use a regression discontinuity approach that exploits a discontinuity
in childcare regulation.
In this latter chapter my contribution was the proposition of the idea, the development of
the econometric approach, the literature review, the parametric estimation and the obtention
of the access to the data used.
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Chapter 1
Do reductions of standard hours
a¤ect employment transitions?:
Evidence from Chile
1.1 Introduction
Several countries such as France, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Spain, Italy and the United
Kingdom among others have implemented and/or discussed policies to reduce the (maximum)
number of standard working hours.1 Some of them are due to the European Working Time
Directive (1993) but others have made earlier reductions mainly to tackle high rates of unem-
ployment. The rationale for this policy is that a reduction of standard hours will decrease the
total usual (average) hours worked by employees for a given output and so it will therefore be
necessary to hire new workers. However, when a rm uses overtime, a reduction of standard
hours increases the marginal cost of employment relative to the marginal cost of hours leading
1The maximum number of standard working hours are dened as the maximum number of hours above which
employers have to pay overtime. For simplicity, we follow the convention in this literature and we will therefore
refer to the maximum standard working hours as standard hours, "basic hours" or "normal hours". This may
be misleading since it could be the case that, because of contractual characteristics, some employees are paid
overtime even when they work less than the maximum number of standard hours. For example, in a country
with a maximum standard working hours of 48, individuals might work: (a) 48 normal hours and zero overtime
or (b) 45 hours plus 3 hours of overtime.
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to a negative e¤ect on employment and an increment in overtime hours. Therefore the demand
of hours by rms, before the reduction of standard hours, will be crucial for the nal e¤ect on
employment (Calmfors and Hoel 1988 and Hamermesh 1993, among others).
Furthermore, the overall e¤ect a reduction of standard hours has on employment will also
hinge on the reaction of monthly earnings. If monthly earnings remain constant and usual
hours decrease due to the reduction of standard hours then hourly wages will increase. Firms
will then substitute capital for labour with a negative e¤ect on employment and usual hours
(Hunt 1999). Moreover, if rms adjust the level of output, there will be an additional non-
positive scale e¤ect to be added to the previous e¤ects. Given this ambiguity in the theoretical
predictions, the e¤ect a reduction of working hours has on employment remains an empirical
question.
Previous literature has pointed out that a change in standard hours may also a¤ect the
composition (mix) of employment.2 In particular, Hart (2004) shows that a reduction of stan-
dard hours increases the relative cost of full-time workers, causing rms to increase the share
of part-time workers which might attenuate the substitution towards hours.
Unfortunately there are few studies with micro-econometric evidence about the e¤ect of
working hours on employment, almost all of which are for Europe (see Hunt 1999, Steiner and
Peters 2000 among others) and none are for developing countries. Furthermore, the empirical
evidence presents some caveats. The rst being that most of the studies analyze work sharing
policies derived from collective bargains, which cause them to use instruments to control for
endogeneity of standard hours and therefore rely on the validity of the instrument. Fewer
studies have used changes in regulation to assess the impact of reductions of standard working
hours on employment (Crepón and Kramarz 2002 and Chemin and Wasmer 2009); The problem
is that even these studies are unable to identify the nete¤ect of the policy due to a lack of
data or the negligible magnitude of the policy change.3 A third problem of previous literature
is that, in general, reductions of standard working hours are jointly implemented with other
2Share of part-time workers on total employment of the rm.
3"Net" refers to the direct e¤ect of the reduction of working hours once controlled for the indirect e¤ect of
wages.
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policies such as higher exibility (e.g. Portugal) and/or nancial incentives (e.g. France) and
therefore it is di¢ cult to isolate the pure e¤ect the reduction of standard working hours has on
employment.
This study exploits a variation of standard hours given by a change in Chilean regulation
regarding the maximum number of standard hours per week, to study the e¤ect on employment
transitions for those people a¤ected by the policy. Specically, in September of 2001 the Chilean
Parliament approved a labour reform which included a compulsory reduction of the maximum
number of standard hours from 48 to 45 hours per week.4 The whole reform took place in
December 2001 excluding the reduction of hours which became compulsory on the rst of
January of 2005. The pre-anouncement of the reduction of working hours clearly complicates
our identication strategy, however, as we show below, there is no signicant anticipation from
rms. Furthermore, we apply several robustness checks and results do not signicantly vary.
The separation of the reduction of standard hours from the rest of the reform gives us a
policy change on working hours not present in other studies. This policy was innovative as it
isolates the reduction of working hours from other policy changes and also gave time for rms
to adjust. These characteristics, makes this policy interesting for other countries as it would
allow them to see its e¤ects on employment.5
Additionally, this kind of policy should be of particular interest for less developed countries,
as in general they do not have the scal capacity to fund policies such as those implemented in
rich countries (where all of the previous literature focuses). Furthermore, this policy change is
also interesting for Latin American countries due to their labour market similarities, which are
less heavily regulated relative to European ones. In particular this policy change was followed
closely as most of Latin American countries su¤ered from persistent high unemployment after
the Asian crisis in the late 90´s.
This study uses the EPS Panel (Encuesta de Proteccion Social) , which includes information
4One of the arguments stated for the reduction of standard hours was the high level of unemployment in
Chile due to the e¤ects of the Asian Crisis (1998-2000) and the low productivity of Chilean workers due to long
working hours. Other reasons were the negative e¤ects on health and family (social) life of long working hours.
Dirección del Trabajo (Undersecretaryship of labour), Temas Laborales No11 (2002).
5See the debates in Argentina 2006, Brazil 2010, Colombia 2009, Mexico 2004, Peru 2002 and Venezuela 2007.
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on weekly usual (average) hours, monthly earnings, employment and type of contract (among
others) before and after the change in policy. Hence, we have extended the analysis of Crepón
and Kramarz (2002), since they do not have data on usual hours and hourly wages before the
policy change which are limitations we do not have.6 Similar to the French case, this study does
not analyze the overall e¤ect on employment but instead it focuses on those employees a¤ected
by the reduction of standard working hours (i.e. study the excess of employment destruction
and not net job destruction). Specically, this study uses a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach
(DD) to study whether workers are a¤ected by the reduction of working hours (i.e. employees
who worked 46-48 hours before the policy change) and lost their jobs more often than those
not a¤ected by the policy.7 We also extended the analysis to those who were working overtime
(i.e. those who worked 49-60 hours).
This study is organized as follows: Section 1.2 explains the implications derived from theo-
retical literature. Section 1.3 presents empirical evidence at the macro and micro level. Section
1.4 summarizes the institutional framework of the policy change in Chile. Section 1.5, presents
the description of the dataset and the key variables. Section 1.6, introduces the identication
strategy, the methodology we use to evaluate the policys e¤ect and the results. Section 1.7,
presents a sensitivity analysis and section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Evidence: Labour Demand and Working Hours
Theoretical literature on labour demand recognizes the distinction between hours of work and
number of workers (employment) since they are not in general perfect substitutes. The main
reason for this is due to the existence of setup costs which means that workersproductivity
has increasing returns for small values of hours worked and beyond a certain threshold fatigue
will start a¤ecting workersproductivity and then productivity will have decreasing returns.
Furthermore, the distinction between hours of work and employment becomes more important
6These variables are crucial since as Kramarz et al (2008) pointed out . . . .the impact of a compulsory
reduction in working hours on employment hinges on the reaction of wages.
7Because they were working below the new standard (i.e. those who worked 44-45 hours before the change in
policy).
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since the cost of labour is not a linear function of its duration due to, for example, costs of
hiring and ring, existence of overtime premium, etc.
The theoretical literature which analyzes the e¤ect of reducing working hours on employment
started with Rosen (1968) and was further extended by Ehrenberg (1971) and Calmfors and
Hoel (1988) among others. They focus on the demand side of the labour market and implicitly
assume that wages are given and that labour is homogenous. These studies show that, in a
setup where rms minimize costs given a particular level of output, the e¤ect of a reduction in
working time will depend on the starting situation of the rm. In general, Calmfors and Hoel
(1988) show that the case where employment increases requires very specic circumstances. It
will only happen if the rm was already at the standard level of hours and if after the reduction
of standard hours, it is still optimal to equalize usual hours to the new standard ones. This
is the model that supporters of work sharing have in mind. But the contrary would happen
if rms were already using overtime, since in this case a reduction of standard hours would
act as an increase in the xed cost per worker while maintain the marginal cost of overtime
unchanged; hence rms are induced to substitute employment for longer hours.
Calmfors and Hoel (1988) then extended the model by assuming that rms maximize prots
instead of minimizing costs, which means that output is no longer xed. The authors conclude
that the probability of having an increase in employment under prot maximization is even
lower than before (with cost minimization). This is because to the previous substitution e¤ect
we have to add a non positive scale e¤ect as a result of the non positive e¤ect of higher labour
costs on output prices and output demand (known as scale e¤ect).
Hitherto we have considered a reduction in working hours under a competitive model taking
the hourly wage as given which is the so-called direct e¤ect on employment. If there is an
increment in hourly wages8 (i.e. wage compensation), labour demand theory suggests that,
ceteris paribus, employment should decrease due to the substitution towards capital which is
the so-called indirect e¤ect on employment. Hence, the more negative the standard working
time elasticity of the hourly wage (w0T ) the less likely it will be to have a positive e¤ect
8This could take place since wage-earners should resist a cut on income and, therefore, demand higher hourly
wages.
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on employment9 . Thus it will be crucial to consider the e¤ect of wages since a reduction
in standard hours with constant labour costs (i.e. with full wage compensation) will make it
impossible to increase employment.10
Hart (2004) highlighted that another indirect e¤ect on employment may also exist, specif-
ically an e¤ect on the mix of employment. Hart shows that, in a case with two groups of
individuals, part-time workers and full-time workers where the former ones work less than stan-
dard hours while the latter ones work overtime, a reduction of standard hours has two e¤ects:
rstly, it leads to overtime-employment substitution among full time workers but secondly, it
leads the rm to increase the ratio of part-time to full-time employees due to a higher relative
cost of the latter ones. This e¤ect may serve to mitigate a tendency to increase average overtime
hours given the shortened standard work week.
Recent developments suggest that by relaxing the perfect competitive market assumption
by allowing for monopsony power, a reduction of standard working hours might improve em-
ployment (Marimon and Zilibotti 2000) depending on the magnitude of the reduction of hours.
Without an upper hourly limit a monopsony that maximizes its prots subject to a labour
supply constraint will choose longer work duration as well as lower wages than the competitive
case (see Kramarz et al. (2008) for more details). If an upper hourly limit is introduced the
e¤ect on employment will be ambiguous depending on the level of the upper limit relative to
the monopsony use of hours. With an upper hourly limit above the monopsony hours there will
be no e¤ect on employment. If the upper hourly limit decreases slightly (to a point that lies
between the competitive and monopsony level) then employment levels will increase.
Therefore, and to summarize, the theoretical e¤ect of a reduction of standard working hours
has on employment is ambiguous and remains an empirical question.
9Ceteris paribus. Although, if there is substitution from hours to employment when there is an increment in
wages the sign of the wage elasticity of employment (Nw0) will be positive. Nevertheless, we implicitly assumed
that it is negative. This is supported by empirical evidence (Hamermesh 1993).
10Kramarz et al. (2008) pointed out that standard hour reduction can also have two further benecial e¤ects
on employment. The rst one is that average labour productivity is larger when the duration of work is shorter.
The second one refers to the reorganization of the production process. This is because a cut in standard hours
may induce signicant reorganization in the production process leading to a more intensive utilization of capital
and thus higher employment.
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1.3 Empirical Evidence
Empirical evidence regarding the e¤ects of reductions of standard hours on employment is scarce
and it concentrates on European experiences. The leading examples are Germany and France
which represent examples of the two main approaches to reduce standard hours: by bargaining
agreements (Germany) and by legislation (France).
In the case of (West) Germany, Hunt (1999) uses industry level variation in reductions of
standard hours. She uses a xed e¤ect estimation approach to study the e¤ect of the reduction
of standard hours on employment. In her preferred specication she does not include wages
as a covariate since it might be jointly determined with employment in the collective bargain.
Therefore, she obtains the gross e¤ect of the reduction of standard hours. Her ndings are that
a reduction of 1 standard hour decreases employment by 3.8%, but this is not signicant. Once
she includes a proxy for wages11 the point estimate becomes smaller and remains insignicant.
Since the e¤ects a reduction in standard hours has on employment are likely to di¤er by skills12
Steiner and Peters (2000) use industry-level data and separate by unskilled, skilled and highly
skilled workers. They show that, given wages, the direct employment e¤ect of a reduction in
standard working hours is negligible for all three groups. Nevertheless, once wage adjustment
is taken into account, the net e¤ect on employment on average becomes negative and especially
strong for unskilled workers.
Due to di¤erent theoretical predictions on the employment e¤ect generated by a reduction
of standard working hours for rms with and without overtime workers, Andrews et al. (2005)
specied a model with di¤erent types of rms. These di¤erent types of rms are dened
by the proportion of workers who work overtime in each rm13.They use plant-level data (IAB
Establishment Panel) in a rst di¤erences estimation approach to study the e¤ect the reduction
11She uses the index of bargained monthly wages rather than actual monthly wages.
12This is mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the direct e¤ect (holding hourly wage constant) may di¤er because
the possibility of substitution di¤ers by skill groups. Secondly, the indirect e¤ect of the reduction of standard
hours, due to wage compensation, may also di¤er by skill groups since the wage elasticity of labour demand is
likely to di¤er by skill groups as well.
13Therefore there are three types of rms. Those rms where every worker works zero overtime. Those rms
where every worker works positive overtime and those rms where a proportion of workers work overtime.
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of standard working hours has on employment (without controlling for wages due to a potential
endogeneity problem). Also, they instrumented standard hours by Industry level standard
hours to deal with potential endogeneity problems. They could not nd a signicant e¤ect on
employment, except in small plants in the East German non-service sector (a positive e¤ect of
2%). They argue that one of the possible explanations might be a lower increment in hourly
wages in East Germany.
Usually all the aforementioned studies face the di¢ culty of standard hours endogeneity due
to the bargaining process with unions which is in turn the reason for the use of instruments.
An alternative way would be to exploit the change in legislation as an exogenous variation in
standard hours. This is interesting since many countries have used legislation to vary standard
hours. The oldest evidence from countries where a change in legislation was applied comes from
time series studies. For Japan, Brunello (1989) uses a Monthly Labour Survey to estimate an
equation system for demand and supply of hours and employment. He nds that a reduction
of standard hours has a signicant negative impact on employment and a positive e¤ect on
overtime. There is a problem with this kind of approach since the reduction of standard hours
might be confounded with the e¤ect of another variable trending down. Additionally, there is
a problem of endogeneity between hours and employment since the author does not utilize the
exogenous shock given by Japanese law.
The most studied country in reference to reductions on standard hours is France, which has
experienced two rounds of work week reductions, in 1982 and in 1998 (Aubry I )-2000 (Aubry
II ) respectively. Each of them with di¤erent characteristics (designs) and, most interestingly,
di¤erent consequences due to these being di¤erent policy designs of the policy. The main
di¤erence between the reform of 1982 and 1998-2000 is that in the latter monthly labour costs
remain relatively constant whereas an increase can be seen in the former.
The only empirical evidence studying the employment e¤ects of the reduction of hours from
40 to 39 per week in 1982 has been carried out by Crepón and Kramarz (2002). They use
an unexpected change in policy as a quasi-experiment. They used a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
approach which compares the di¤erence in the behaviour of the treatment group (those who
work 40 hours before 1982, then extended to include those who work overtime up to 48 hours)
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with the di¤erence of the behaviour of the control group (those who work 36-39 hours before
1982).They conclude that those individuals in the treatment group in March 1981 have 3-4%
higher probability (depending on the specication) of not being employed in 1982 than obser-
vationally identical workers who, in 1981, were working 36-39 weekly hours. Their analysis
neither includes hourly wages, which are crucial to understand the e¤ect of the reduction of
working hours, nor usual hours, which are more appropriate than actual hours in order to avoid
noise from short run shocks. Due to the lack of information on hourly wages and usual hours
before 1982 they decided to use a second identication strategy which uses information post
policy change including both variables since there are no data limitations after the implemen-
tation of the policy. They conclude that those workers employed 40 hours in 1982 have at least
(i.e. a lower bound) a 4% higher probability of losing their jobs more often than those already
employed under the new standard workweek. Finally, Crepón and Kramarz (2002) show that
employees who work 40 hours and earn the minimum wage have a 7.7% higher probability of
losing their jobs than identical employees who work 39 hours.
With respect to the 1998-2000 reforms in France (Aubry I and II ), Askenazy (2008) points
out that the problem of Aubry I and II is that statistical ex-post evaluation of the impact of
the reduction of working hours is extremely di¢ cultwhich is mainly due to selection problems.
Selection comes from the fact that in 1998 it was announced that a reduction of hours would
begin in 2000 and also that nancial incentives were introduced (payroll tax subsidies) and
exibility to motivate the adjustment of hours to a maximum of 35 per week. Askenazy (2008)
points out that the general consensus regarding the Aubry I and Aubry II laws is that they
have generated a positive net e¤ect on employment. Nevertheless, there is no agreement on
what happened. That is, whether the cause of the positive net e¤ect on employment was
the reduction of standard hours, the reduction of labour costs or the increment in exibility.
Specically, Askenazy (2008) argues that . . . selection bias may be too important to allow
conclusions to be reached.
Despite the mentioned complications, Kramarz et al. (2008) use several panel datasets
to study the e¤ect of the reduction of hours due to the Aubry laws on economic outcomes
(i.e. employment, labour productivity, and capital productivity among others). They found a
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positive e¤ect on employment, although they point out that their analysis is not fully causal.
Specically, they recognize that they do not have instruments that a¤ect the decision to reduce
working hours without having an impact on economic outcomes.
A di¤erent conclusion is reached by Estevão and Sá (2008) who use the French Labour Force
Survey and exploit the time di¤erence of the application of Aubry I (by rm size) to set up a
quasi-experiment which studies the e¤ect of the law on workers welfare. Specically, they use a
di¤erence in di¤erence approach, where large rms (i.e. with more than 20 employees) are used
to construct the treatment group and small rms to construct the control group. They nd
that the Aubry I law had no aggregate e¤ect on net job creation. There are some caveats in this
study: rstly, they focus on the e¤ects of the Aubry I law and since this law includes nancial
incentives they do not identify the e¤ect of the reduction in hours. Secondly, the control group
and the treatment group are a¤ected in di¤erent magnitudes by the policy, which violates one
of the assumptions of the di¤erence in di¤erences approach.
Chemin and Wasmer (2009) obtain similar results. They use a triple di¤erence (DDD)
approach based on a particular characteristic of the FrenchAlsace-Moselle local legislation.
These regions have a slightly di¤erent labour law than the rest of France. Specically, they
have 2 extra public holidays, which were included in the non worked time once the reduction
to 35 hours took place in France. Hence, the reduction on hours was less stringent than in the
rest of France. The authors nd no signicant di¤erence on employment between this region
and the rest of France. However, the authors pointed out that their result might be due to the
fact that 2 days maybe is a too short time frame to nd signicant di¤erences.
A recent study by Raposo and Van Ours (2010) analyzes the case of Portugal where in
December of 1996 a new law on working hours was introduced which gradually reduced the
standard workweek from 44 hours to 40 hours and also increased exibility for rms.14 They
use a longitudinal data set (Quadros de Pessoal) which matches rm and employee data to study
how this mandatory working hours reduction a¤ected employment destruction and earnings of
14This exibility implied that the reduction was implemented taking into account that the normal workweek
could be dened on a 4 months average. It was also allowed to increase the maximum number of hours with 2
hours per day if the total did not exceed 10 hours per day and 50 hours per week.
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workers involved. They nd that a reduction in working hours did not lead to increased job
loss for workers directly a¤ected (although they do not separate the reduction of working hours
from the increase in exibility). They also nd that hourly wages increased, keeping monthly
earnings approximately constant for workers who were a¤ected by the new law. On a very
recent companion study Raposo and Van Ours (2009) extend their previous analysis to the
study of the reduction of standard hours on overall employment. Here, they nd the reduction
of working hours on overall employment has a positive e¤ect through a fall in job destruction
and no e¤ect on job creation. They argue that their results might be explained by increased
exibility in the use of the standard workweek which made it easier for rms to cope with the
reduced standard hours.15
To the best of our knowledge the only non European microeconometric study carried out so
far has been done for Canada by Skuterud (2007). He uses the Canadian Labour Force Survey
data and a triple di¤erence approach to analyze the reduction of the standard workweek from 44
to 40 hours in the Canadian province of Quebec during the period of 1997-2000. The peculiarity
of the Canadian case is that, unlike the European worksharing experiences presented above,
the Quebec policy contained no suggestion or requirement that rms provide wage increases
to compensate workers for lower hours. One important characteristic of this study is that
it includes actual hours instead of usual (average) hours. As several authors point out, this
may generate that what is being captured is the e¤ect of the economic conditions or irregular
(or unusual) overtime during that time period instead of (or in addition to) the e¤ect of the
reduction of standard hours. Despite this, the author nds that the reduction of weekly hours
worked had failed to raise employment at either the provincial level or within industries where
hours of work were a¤ected relatively more often.
Finally, Kapteyn et al. (2004) use aggregate panel data for 16 OECD countries. They nd
that the direct e¤ect a reduction in standard hours has is a positive one on employment but
that the upward indirect e¤ect of wages makes the nal e¤ect on employment insignicant.
The problem is that by aggregating data from countries with very di¤erent implementation
15Notice that in the case of Portugal and France, overtime rates are not constant. This makes it more likely
that the reduction of standard hours generates a positive e¤ect on employment than in the constant overtime
cost case.
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processes of work sharing policies it is di¢ cult to disentangle the pure e¤ect of the reduction
of standard hours.
1.4 Institutional Framework of the Chilean Labour Reform
The new socialist government which started in March of 2000 sent a new labour reform to the
Parliament during its rst year. A year later, in 2001, during the discussion of the reform the
possibility of a reduction in standard hours was introduced. Finally, on the 5th of October of
2001, the labour reform was published in the O¢ cial newspaper. The main adjustments and/or
changes in the Labour Codecan be classied into 6 categories. Those are:
1. End of contracts (separation of workers) and layo¤ costs.
2. Exceptional distribution of the working time in some industries.
3. Over time hours.
4. Collective Bargains.
5. Working privileges, Management limiting nes, higher penalties and more supervision
from the Ministry of Labour.
6. Duration of the working week.
This reform began operating almostfully on the 1st of December 2001. The reduction of
the number of weekly working hours (last category) was the only part of the reform which did
not immediately apply.16 It was announced that the reduction of hours was to be implemented
by the 1st of January of 2005 (as explained below). This (three year) window was established
to give time for companies to adjust, although as we will show below, most of the adjustments
took place during the last year. This three year gap between the rst ve changes and the sixth
one is important since it allows us to isolate the reduction of standard hours from the rest of
16To see the description of the other elements of the labour reform see the appendix.
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the reform, which means that the reduction of standard hours is not contaminated by the joint
implementation of other policies such as in the case of Portugal and France (Aubry I and II ).17
In reference to the duration of the maximum standard working week, the reform pre-
anounced a reduction in the upper limit from 48 to 45 hours per week. This reduction will
be compulsory throughout the entire country from the 1st of January of 2005.
This constraint will not apply to: independent workers (self-employed), workers who have
more than one employer, CEOs, managers and all those people who work without direct superior
supervision; Also, it will not apply to those who work from their homes or in a place chosen freely
by themselves, insurance salespersons, travelling salespersons and all those that do not work on
their jobs premises. All those who work on shing boats, those that work mainly outside the
rm dependencies and those that work by using long distance technologies are also excluded.
Finally, for people who work in hotels, restaurants or clubs (except the administrative, laundry
and kitchen sta¤) will not apply when the daily ow of customers is low and when they have
to be available for customers.18
As part time work is dened as jobs that can not be more than 2/3 of the hours of a full
time job, the reduction from 48 to 45 hours means that from the 1st of January 2005 part time
workers can not work more than 30 hours (the limit was 32 hours before this date). The reform
was explicit in the sense that it pointed out that this reduction must not a¤ect workers who
work intramarginal hours before the reform (i.e. for example 40 or 45 hours).19
The reform stated that working hour adjustments have to be made under agreement between
employer and employee. If there is no agreement, then employers can unilaterally modify
working hours without a¤ecting their weekly distribution.20 Despite the fact that labour reform
clearly species the reduction of working hours it was ambiguous about the adjustment of wages.
It specically says:
17Although this three years gap may generate anticipation e¤ects. As we will see below, the data suggest that
this e¤ect is not signicant. We will discuss this point extensively in the next section.
18Notice that these exemptions also applied when the maximum were 48 hours per week, hence it is not altered
by the reform.
19Res. de la Dirección del Trabajo 4338/168
20 It cannot alter lunch time or the maximum number of work hours per day (10 hours).
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Employee and employer have to make an agreement about monthly earning
in order to adjust it to the reduction in working hours, nevertheless the legislator
believes that a proportional reduction on monthly earnings as a consequence of less
working hours it is not desirable. It also states that: if there is no agreement
between employer and employee, then the employer has to maintain the employees
monthly earning irrespective of whether it is xed, variable or a mixed.21
To clarify this issue, in September 2004 (i.e. before the mandatory reduction of working
hours) the Undersecretaryship of Labour pointed out that the reduction of monthly earnings
is against the law given that the objective of the long adjustment window (3 years) has been
to allow companies to reduce the impact on their costs (due to the maintenance of earnings)
by increments in productivity and readjustment of the production process"22. This rigidity in
earnings could be important since, as we saw in the theoretical model, it might increase the
likelihood of a negative e¤ect on employment levels even with high increments in productivity.23
As it was explained above the reform was not clear about earnings until September 2004,
but as we will see below rms do seem to follow the advice of the Undersecretaryship of Labour.
1.5 Description of the Data
1.5.1 General Description of the EPS Panel
To study the e¤ect of the reduction of working hours on employment transitions we use the
EPS Panel24, which has 3 waves so far (2002, 2004, 2006). When individuals are interviewed
for the rst time, they are asked about their labour market activities since January 1981 or
since they were 15 years old, whichever occurred last (i.e. this includes employed, unemployed,
21Res. de la Dirección del Trabajo 4338/168. Own translation.
22Report 4338/168, September 2004, Ministry of Labour. Own translation.
23As Kramarz et al. (2008) pointed out: . . . .reduction in standard hours with full wage compensation appear
to be detrimental to employment even if the productivity gains are huge
24Panel de Encuesta de Proteccion Social.
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looking for a job for the rst time or inactive). They also reported the initial and nal month
and year for every spell.
The population of reference for the survey are all those who were a¢ liated since January 1981
until august 2001 (registered in the administrative les of each AFP and the INP and who were
also available in the system in august of 2001).25 Then, the Microdata center of the economics
department of the University of Chile selected an historic sample of all the individuals a¢ liated
to the system in 1981 or after, giving a sample size of 17,246 people for the rst wave. This wave
was carried out between June and December 2002 and included economic, socio-demographic
information of individuals such as usual working hours (but not monthly earnings). Subsequent
waves updated the population of reference to include new a¢ liated and non a¢ liated members
of the population (who were not included in wave one). The second wave was carried out
between November 2004 - May 2005 and included information on monthly earnings and usual
hours since January 2002. Similarly, wave three included information on monthly earnings and
usual hours since January 2004. As a summary, the time line of the data and the problem
under study are shown in Figure 1.
1.5.2 Evolution of Usual Hours, Hourly Wages and Employment
An advantage of the EPS Panel relative to the Crepón and Kramarz(2002) study is that we do
have data on monthly earnings and usual hours since January 2002 (i.e. before the policy was
implemented in January 2005). Unfortunately there was a pre-announcement of the reduction
of standard hours in December 2001 when the labour reform was introduced.26 The fact that
we only have full data from January 2002 onwards implies that we may have some anticipation
for the policy in the sense that rms might have reduced hours or changed their policy on
wages or employment during 2001-2002. Although this is not likely, due to the long period of
25Where: AFP is Administradora de Fondo de Pensiones (Private pensions management funds) and INP is
Instituto Nacional de Prevision (i.e. National Institute of Pensions). A¢ liated is dened as: all those people
with at least one contribution to the pension system. 94% of dependent workers are a¢ liated to the pension
system irrespective of the type of contract (i.e. part time or full time) (Superintendence of the Pension System).
26Also, it would be possible to have some change in rmsbehaviour due to the discussion of the reduction of
standard hours previous to its implementation in december 2001.
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adjustment (3 years) introduced during the discussion of the labour reform, it is important to
check the behaviour of hours, wages and employment in order to be condent that there were
no signicant variation in their behaviour.
Anticipation via usual hours
We checked the behaviour of usual weekly hours before the reduction of standard hours was
introduced (or even discussed) in the labour reform (e.g. January 2000), during the period of
optional adjustment (e.g. January 2003) and after the compulsory date (e.g. January 2005).
Figure 2 suggests that the discussion and publication of the labour reform which included the
announcement of reductions of weekly hours, did not have a signicant e¤ect on working hours
between January 2000 - January 2003 since the distribution of usual weekly hours remains the
same. The variation in the mean of usual weekly hours between January 2000 and January 2003
is negligible (around -0.02%). Similarly, the evolution of the standard deviation of usual weekly
hours decreases marginally (-0.22%). On the other hand, the comparison between January 2003
and January 2005 shows an important variation in the distribution of hours, thus the adjustment
seems to start at some point in between. To check this, we analyzed the information on usual
hours given in the second and third waves of the EPS panel (Figure 3) and we observe that there
is a declining trend in the mean of usual weekly hours for dependent workers who work 44-60
hours per week which started very slowly in mid 2003 until late 2004 when there was a sharp
drop due to the mandatory application of the reduction of weekly working hours in January
2005. The standard deviation maintains a fairly constant behaviour except in January 2005
where it su¤ered a sharp drop. Nevertheless, a few months after the compulsory reduction of
hours the standard deviation again follows a fairly constant behaviour although at a lower level
than the one before January 2005. These suggest that there might be a change of behaviour in
rms during 2003 and early 2004 but most of the adjustment seems to be held during late 2004
and the beginning of 2005.
Anticipation via earnings
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It might be the case that rms did not anticipate the change of hours between January 2000 -
January 2003, but instead modied monthly earnings or the growth rate of monthly earnings.
If this was the case, then it would imply anticipation via monthly earnings. Furthermore,
the analysis of monthly earnings is important because the reform of December 2001 was not
clear about its adjustment. Originally the law suggested that it was "not desirable" to reduce
monthly earnings, although it was not explicitly forbidden in the reform. Only in September
of 2004 the Undersecretaryship of Labour was precise about the illegality of the reduction of
monthly earnings (see the end of section 4). Therefore, if monthly earnings were unaltered and
individuals decreased the number of hours, then this implies that rms faced higher hourly
wages which might have consequences on employment (if they followed the "advice"). Also, it
could be the case that rms adjusted the nominal hourly wage (or monthly earnings) at a lower
rate than ination in order to crowd-out costs increments.27
Unfortunately, the rst wave of the EPS panel does not include information on monthly
earnings, hence we can not use the rst wave to analyze the behaviour of earnings before the
application of the labour reform in December 2001. An alternative is to use two indexes from
the Chilean National Institute of Statistics (Figure 4) that we can trace back to January 2000
to help us analyze if there were anticipation e¤ects via hourly wages. These indexes are: (a)
the nominal index of wages and (b) the nominal labour costs index. The di¤erence between the
two is that the former does not include overtime pay while the latter does.28 Both indexes show
that companies neither reduced the increment in nominal hourly wages nor reduced the nominal
hourly wages during the discussion of the labour reform in 2001. The same argument holds after
the labour reform became operative in December 2001 (and therefore the pre announcement of
the future reduction of weekly hours). Interestingly, we observed that there is a higher increment
in the hourly wage and hourly cost of labour indexes since the date of the mandatory reduction
of weekly hours (in late 2004-early 2005). Therefore, these indexes suggest no anticipation
e¤ects via hourly wages, and since there were no variations in the distribution of hours, it is
reasonable to assume no anticipation via monthly earnings.
27Assuming that ination represents the increment in the price of the rm´s output.
28These indexes are used in the national account statistics by the Central Bank of Chile and are also the
reference for transport, electricity and telecommunication tari¤s.
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When we analyzed the data on hourly wages from waves two and three we observed an
increase in the nominal hourly wage in January 2005, as can be seen in Figure 5 which gives
us a general picture that is consistent with the information obtained from the nominal labour
cost indexes displayed in Figure 4 in the sense of no major changes in hourly wages during the
three year gap, but of wage compensation in January 2005 when rms reduce hours.29
Anticipation via employment
Hitherto it seems that rms did not anticipate neither the change of hours nor the changes in
hourly wages. Nevertheless, it may be the case that rms changed their behaviour a¤ecting
employment as the result of the pre announcement of a reduction of standard hours. We
observed employment behaviour in Figure 6, where it is possible to observe that there is a
variation in the employment rate within each year.30 It seems that employment rate behaviour
does not su¤er any signicant alteration due to the pre-announcement of a reduction of standard
hours in December 2001. Interestingly, there is a small decline in the employment rate in January
2005 which may imply a negative e¤ect on employment coming from the reduction of standard
hours. We will come back to this point below.
Based on these arguments, it seems to be that there is no anticipation at least up to January
2003. Furthermore, data suggests that there are some changes in behaviour starting in mid 2003
until late 2004 when a sharp adjustment occurs in hourly wages as well as standard and usual
hours. Therefore, if we use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach, as we will explain in the next
section, we can consider January 2002 - January 2003 as if it were a pre-policy period and given
that employment, usual hours and hourly wages were not a¤ected until January 2003 we can
consider the change in policy occurred later on as if it were a quasi-experiment (i.e. exogenous
shock).
29This may suggest that rms which adjusted hours between mid 2003 - late 2004 did not give wage compensa-
tion to their employees. This may be due to the early ambiguity of the Undersecretary of Labour about earnings.
This issue was solved in late 2004 when the illegality of the reduction of earnings was explicitly announced.
30This rate is: the number of people (per month) who declare being employed over the total amount of people
who declare being employed, unemployed and inactive. It is possible to observe that January and February of
each year are months with high employment rates (due to seasonal activities like agriculture among others).
Therefore, it is important for our analysis to use the same month each year. We do not use monthly data as it
is not available for all the covariates.
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1.5.3 Methodology, Time Periods and Control Group
Denition of the pre and post-treatment period:
It could be the case that individuals employed between 46-48 hours have higher (lower) tran-
sition rates from employment to non-employment relative to similar groups (i.e. even in the
absence of the reduction in working hours those workers who work 46-48 hours might have higher
or lower subsequent unemployment probabilities). This makes the di¤erence-in-di¤erences ap-
proach a natural one to take, since the di¤erence between the control and treatment group
before the treatment is compared with the di¤erence between these groups after the treatment.
Therefore, the challenge with di¤erence-in-di¤erences is to dene a suitable control group in
order to be able to identify the e¤ect of the policy and also to specify a pre-treatment and
post-treatment period. Based on rmsnon anticipation behaviour presented in the section
above and also on the signicant di¤erence in the distribution of hours between January 2003
and January 2005 (see Figure 2), we consider January 2002 - January 2003 as the period before
the policy change.
Dening the period which covers the application of the reduction of standard hours is more
complicated. This is because, on the one hand, we can choose the start of the post-treatment
period to be very close to the treatment date (e.g. January 2004 - January 2005) but at the
potential cost of being a¤ected by anticipation e¤ects during the gap period between the pre
and post-treatment period (i.e. January 2003-January 2004). This is clear from the results
presented above (see Figure 2) where it is possible to appreciate some degree of variation on
hours during January 2003 - January 2004 which might a¤ect our estimation. In order to solve
this di¢ culty we use a one year moving window. That is, we x the pre-policy period as January
2002 - January 2003 and then we dene the post-policy period as January 2003 - January 2004
and estimate the di¤erence-in-di¤erence. If this estimation gives us a nonsignicant e¤ect of
the reduction of standard hours on employment transitions then it would imply that there
were non-signicant anticipation e¤ects. If this is not the case, then anticipation e¤ects will be
important and this method would underestimate the e¤ect of the policy change. In case of non
signicance, we repeat the procedure but now replacing the post-treatment period for January
36
2004 - January 2005 and reestimate the di¤erence-in-di¤erences. In the nal section we will
also present how robust are our results to alternatives denitions of time periods.
Denition of control group:
Apart from the denition of time periods, di¤erences-in-di¤erences methodology requires the
denition of a suitable control group in order to be able to identify the e¤ect of the policy. In
our case we took those individuals who are as close as possible to the treatment group in terms
of hours to make their behaviour as similar as possible. Thus, we chose those individuals who
worked between 44-45 hours per week as a control group and those who worked 46-48 hours a
week as a treatment group, both measured at the beginning of the pre-policy period (January
2002). For this procedure to be valid we required that individuals classied as controls remained
as such until just before the treatment kicked in (the same applies to treated individuals). As
an example, imagine an individual classied as treated because he worked 48 hours in 2002,
but then for whatever reason he works 45 hours in 2003 and the treatment occurs in 2004 and
he remains working 45 hours. The individual would be miss-classied a¤ecting our results. To
tackle this di¢ culty we checked if workers who were employed a certain number of hours which
are just above the new standard hour threshold (i.e. treated) in one year were still employed
the same amount of time in the next year. We do the same for the control group. To do this we
calculated, for those who remained employed in January 2003 (2004), what was the probability
of reporting at that time the same number of hours than that reported in January 2002 (2003).
The results are 98% (in January 2003) and 90% (in January 2004) respectively (they are very
similar for both treated and controls). While there are not signicant di¤erences for controls,
results change for treated individuals when we compare January 2002 with January 2005. For
this latter group we found that the probability of reporting, in 2002, the same number of hours
of 2005 is 37%. Thus it seems reasonable to classify individuals as treated or controls by their
weekly number of hours in January 2002.31
As can be seen from the summary statistics presented in Table 1, treated and control groups
31We also try an alternative by only keeping individuals who do not change hours between 2002-2003-2004
(i.e. excluding the 2% and 10% who report a change in hours) and results do not di¤er.
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seem to be very similar in terms of observables in January 2002 (see denition of each covariate
in the appendix). We observe that most of the variables are well balanced between control and
treatment groups. For example, the control group has 26% of females (i.e. when the dummy
of gender =1) while the treatment group has 24%. The average age of the control group is
41.6 years, while the average in the treatment group is almost the same 41.7 years. The main
di¤erences between the control and treatment group come from occupation and industry. In
particular, regarding the type of industry there are signicant di¤erences in Manufacture, Con-
struction, Financial Services and Social Services. Regarding type of occupation the di¤erences
are statistically di¤erent from zero in technicians and associate professionals, Clerical support
workers as well as craft and related trade workers. These di¤erences, suggest the importance
of controlling for the type of industry and occupation of workers.
1.6 Empirical Strategy and Estimation
1.6.1 Identication Strategy
In contrast with most European cases, where the national adjustment of working hours was
not binding32, the reduction in the Chilean case was binding, since more than 65% of non-self
employed individuals employed in the private sector were working 48 hours or more. Hence,
in this sense our case is similar to the French reduction of working hours of 1982 studied by
Crepón and Kramarz (2002).
It is true that in January 2002 the policy change was already known, but given that the data
suggests no anticipation, it can be considered as if it were unexpected. Given the unexpected
shockand that we have workers already employed 45 hours or less (i.e. below the new standard)
in January 2002, this reduction in working hours can be seen as a quasi-experiment. This
quasi-experiment will allow us to study the employment transitions of those in the treatment
group during January 2002 - January 2003 and compare it to transitions of treated individuals
during the moving window, rstly dened as January 2003 - January 2004 and secondly as
32Due to lower hours agreed by collective bargaining (see the cases of Germany, Sweden, among others).
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January 2004 - January 2005. Then, we added a control group which represents what would
have happened with the treated had they not been treated. If the control group is a valid
one, this procedure should retrieve the e¤ect of the reduction of standard hours on employment
transitions for those a¤ected and it is called di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach. In our case, this
is likely since treatment and control group have almost full common support and are also very
similar in observables.33,34
It is also possible to have more than one treatment group, therefore we can extend our
analysis by including those individuals who work 49-60 hours a week.35 These are individuals
who are treated since they were working overtime hours before the policy change was imple-
mented. The upper limit of 60 hours per week is due to the maximum legal number of hours
including overtime established by Chilean Law.36
1.6.2 Econometric Model and Estimation
If the control group is a valid counterfactual and workers in the control group (i.e. 44-45 hrs.)
have not been a¤ected by the reduction of working hours, then we can follow Crepón and
Kramarz (2002) and represent our problem in terms of potential outcomes:
NEi;t+p = NE
0
i;t+p +Dit

NE1i;t+p  NE0i;t+p

(1.1)
Where: NEi;t+p is the non employment status37 of individual i at period "t+p", specically:
NEi;t+p =1 if, conditional on being employed at the beginning of period "t+p", individual i
33For the ATT, full common support means that given X the probability of being treated is less than one,
i.e. P (D = 1 j X) < 1. This implies that for a covariate X there are treated and control individuals, not only
treated individuals. Graphs which show the support for di¤erent variables are not reported but are available on
request.
34For summary statistics see Table 1. Di¤erence-in-di¤erences does not required that treated and control
have equal unobservables (i.e. similar unobservables is su¢ cient but not necessary). It is only necessary that
unobservables change similarly over time. If treatment and controls are very similar in observable it seems
reasonable to think that unobservables may behave similarly (although this can not be concluded from Table 1).
35See for example Lechner (1999).
36Which has not been modied by the change in labour regulation under study.
37This includes unemployed and inactive status
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is not employed at the end of period "t+p", where p is equal to 0 for window January 2002 -
January 2003, 1 for January 2003 - January 2004 and 2 for January 2004 - January 2005 and
NEi;t+p =0 otherwise. Di;t=1 if the individual i is employed 46-48 hours a week before the
policy change (i.e. in the treatment group), and the superscripts represent 0 = control group
and 1 = treatment group. Equation (1.1) shows the decomposition of the non employment
status of individual i as the sum of the non employment status of individual i in the control
group plus the extra e¤ect due to the treatment (i.e. terms in bracket). The problem with the
bracket is that only one of these two variables is observable. This problem makes the individual
identication of the treatment impossible; nevertheless we can identify the expectation of the
e¤ect given that maximum weekly working hours changed, which is the so-called Average
Treatment on the Treated(ATT ):
E

NE1i;t+p  NE0i;t+pj Dit = 1

(1.2)
Where to capture (1.2) we need to assume:
E

NE0i;t+pj xit; Dit = 1

= E

NE0i;t+pj xit; Dit = 0

(1.3)
This is, that conditional on observable variables at period "t" (i.e. xit) the counterfactual in
which workers are not a¤ected by the reduction (i.e. NE0i;t+p) is independent of being a¤ected
by the reduction of hours to 45 per week (i.e. the so-called Conditional (mean) Independence
Assumption (CIA)).38 When (1.3) holds, the expectation of (1.1) given the treatment can be
represented as:
38 In the case of balanced panel data, CIA is su¢ cient but not necessary since it is too strong. The reason is
that CIA imposes that conditional on x, the treatment does not a¤ect the untreated potential outcome. In the
linear model this is equivalent to E (u0;ijx;D) = E (u0;ijx) ;where u0;i is a idiosyncratic error term. Nevertheless,
in di¤erence in di¤erences we only need that E (u0;a   u0;bjx;D = 1) = E (u0;a   u0;bjx;D = 0) , which is the
so-called common macro trend. In case of repeated cross-section or unbalanced panels we need to strengthen the
common macro trend by adding the assumption of no systematical change in composition of the groups in terms
of the untreated potential outcomes. This new assumption is redundant with balance panels since it will always
be true. These two assumptions together are equivalent to the CIA, since as Lee (2005) points out CIA rules
out systematic moves accross groups.
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E [NEi;t+pj xit; Dit] =
E

NE0i;t+pj xit

+DiE

NE1i;t+p  NE0i;t+pj xit ; Dit = 1

(1.4)
Given this framework, we use a di¤erence-in-di¤erence (DD) approach to study if there is
a specic e¤ect during the January 2003- January 2004 (and January 2004 - January 2005)
period that was not present during the January 2002- January 2003 period. We dene the
pre-treatment employment transition to be the one between January 2002-January 2003 and
the post-treatment employment transition to be a moving window (January 2003 - January
2004 and January 2004 - January 2005). In order to obtain the e¤ect of the policy change on
the employment transitions we estimate equation (1.5) for all full-time dependent workers (i.e.
not self-employed) in the private sector who work between 44-60 hours per week in January
2002.
E (NEi;t+pj xit; Dit) = x0it + sg1i + ovg2i + 1dt+p + 2g1idt+p + 3g2idt+p (1.5)
Where: g1i=1 for individuals who are in the treatment group, g2i=1 for individuals who
are in the overtime group, x
0
it is a vector of covariates which includes variables such as: age,
gender (female=1, male=0), education (6 categories), ln (hourly wage), region (12 dummies),
size of the rm (6 categories), dummies for occupation (6 categories), industry (8 categories),
unionization status (unionized=1, 0 otherwise) and the 1 year lagged weekly hours39, s is the
average impact of the reduction in working hours on employment to non employment transition
and ov measures the same but for people who were working overtime (i.e. 49-60 hours).40
39This is to make the conditional mean independence assumption more plausible (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith
and Todd (1998)). Despite the signicance of this variable in the estimation our results of the e¤ect of the
reduction of standard hours does not change if it is excluded.
40We assume homogeneous e¤ects since  represents the change in the intercept between the treated and
control groups.
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dt+p =1 if the new maximum standard hours were in place at "t+p" and zero otherwise, and
g1idt+p is an interaction term composed by the time dummy (i.e. dt+p) and the group dummy
for those working 46-48 hours (i.e. g1i). Similarly, g2idt+p is the interactive term for those
working overtime (49-60 hours): Therefore, the parameters of interest will be 2 and 3. The
estimates of the coe¢ cients of the interaction terms are presented on panel A of Tables 2a and
2b in the appendix.41
From the results of Table 2a, we observe that there are no signicant e¤ects when the
"post-policy" period is dened as January 2003 - January 2004, meaning that the change
of behaviour occurring during this period has no signicant e¤ects on employment transitions.
When we move the post-policy period window to 2004 - 2005, we observed from the rst column
of panel A of Table 2b, that the point estimates are positive but insignicantly di¤erent from
zero. Nevertheless, it is interesting that when the hourly wage is excluded, and we therefore
allow for an increment in hourly wage, the point estimate of the e¤ect of a reduction of standard
hours on transitions to non-employment almost doubled (1.0 and 1.3 percentage points for the
standard and overtime group respectively). Thus, even though the e¤ects of hourly wages are
as predicted they are not strong enough to make the point estimates signicant.
The overtime group has a wide range of hours since it includes individuals with 49 hours to
individuals with 60 hours per week. This broad range might give imprecise results because the
analysis above uses the interaction between the post-treatment indicator (i.e. d) with a binary
indicator of the treatment group and therefore it assumes that, within groups (standard and
41For our estimations we are using those individuals who are employed at the begining of each transition period,
which means that we are using the data as repeated cross sections. This implies that some individuals will appear
twice in the sample used in the analysis. This may generate non independent observations for those individuals.
A solution to this would be to use clustered standard errors (at the individual level). Also, in DD framework,
the use of (group*time) dummies, when individual data is used, poses the same problem encountered when using
macro data in microeconometric regressions, known in the literature as the Moulton problem. Moulton problem
often generates downward-biased standard errors. In our case, the concern is that observations for individuals
on the same group of hours in a given point in time might be correlated. Bertrand et al. (2004) have noted that
matters can be further complicated if there is correlation over time within the groups. In our case, this would
occur if the idiosyncratic error of individuals on the same group of hours were correlated over time. As noted by
Angrist and Pischke (2009) the debate on how to deal with these issues (when there is a small number of groups)
has not reached a consensus. This is because, the best practice in cases where the presence of only a small
number of groups or time periods advises against the adoption of standard errors clustered at the group*time
level (to address the Moulton problem) or at the group level (to tackle serial correlation within groups). Given
such uncertainty, prominence is given to the concern that the use of repeated observations on individuals are
very likely to generate correlation over time and therefore standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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overtime), the e¤ect of the reduction of hours would be the same irrespective of the number of
hours worked. This means that the e¤ect would be the same if individual i works 49 hours or 60
hours per week. Therefore, following Stewart (2004) we can apply an alternative estimator, the
so-called "gap" that in our case becomes "hour gap". This gap should capture the di¤erence
between the hours of individual i in period t with respect to the new standard in period t+1.
Formally:
GAP =
8<: hit   St+p if St+p < hit0 else
9=; (1.6)
Where hit is individuals i usual hours at time t, St+p is the relevant new standard at
time t+p. The idea is to replace the overtime group dummy (g2it) for the gap in equation (1.5).
Results are presented in the third and fourth columns of Table 2a and 2b. The estimated e¤ects
for Table 2a are not signicant and the point estimates are almost zero. In Table 2b results
are not signicant (although point estimates are larger than those presented in Table 2a) but
with the same sign than those analyzed before. It is especially interesting that the reduction of
the point estimate in the overtime group (from 0.8 to 0.2 percentage points with hourly wages
and from 1.3 to 0.3 percentage points without hourly wages). These are consistent with the
interpretation of the coe¢ cients when the gap is used. In these cases the interpretation is by
"unit gap" which in our case is by "overtime hour". In any case, results are very small and not
signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Furthermore, because the employment e¤ect may di¤er by skill levels we re estimate equa-
tion (1.5) and (1.6) but excluding highly skilled workers. This means that we restricted the
sample to those workers with less or equal studies than full high school. Results are presented
in panel B of Tables 2a and 2b. They suggest that the reduction of hours does not a¤ect
employment transitions (i.e. for Table 2b there is an insignicant positive e¤ect of between
0.8 - 1.3 percentage points depending on whether we are or are not maintaining xed hourly
wages). Similarly, for overtime workers, estimates suggest an insignicant e¤ect on employment
transitions (i.e. an insignicant positive e¤ect between 1-1.5 percentage points depending on
the inclusion or exclusion of hourly wages).
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Table 2b displays the results obtained when we move the window to January 2004 - January
2005 and reestimate equation (1.5) and (1.6). Results from Table 2b are very similar to those
discussed in Table 2a and basically suggest no signicant e¤ects. They are also not signicant
when we exclude highly skilled workers. Given these results and for brevity, hereafter we will
only report results based on the periods January 2002 - January 2003 and January 2004 -
January 2005.42
1.6.3 Hourly Wages and Monthly Earnings
As pointed out throughout this study, the e¤ects of hourly wages as a source of the so-called
indirect e¤ect is important in order to estimate the impact of a reduction of standard hours on
employment transitions. This is because when weekly hours are reduced and monthly earnings
are held constant, hourly wage increases inducing a substitution e¤ect towards capital. This
means that because of the impossibility of a downward adjustment of the monthly earnings, the
treatment indirectly a¤ects employment transitions via hourly wages. Nevertheless, it could be
the case that the transmission mechanism of the indirect e¤ect is not hourly wages, or at least
not hourly wages alone. It could be the case that changes on monthly earnings are a¤ecting
employment transitions. To study this we re-estimate equation (1.5) but now replacing the
logarithm of hourly wage for the logarithm of monthly earnings. Results are presented in Table
3 in the appendix.
By comparing the estimates of the rst and second column of Table 3 we observe that the
point estimates are almost the same in the case when we control for monthly earnings with
respect to the case when we do not control for it. This suggest also that there are no e¤ects on
employment transitions coming through monthly earnings.
One further complication may be the potential endogeneity of wages and employment tran-
sitions. If this is the case, then our estimates will be biased. A solution would be the use of
an instrument which has to be correlated with hourly wage but not with employment transi-
tions. Finding such an instrument is not easy and the consequences of a bad instrument can be
42Results for periods January 2002 - January 2003 and January 2003 - January 2004 are available upon request.
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worse than the solution. The endogeneity of wages seems less likely due to the non-anticipation
behaviour on hours, employment and hourly wages analyzed above. Also, in our favor is the
evidence of strong wage rigidity in Chile (Cobb and Opazo 2008) which makes the existence of
endogeneity less likely between wages and employment transitions.43 Furthermore, in our favor
is the fact that the expected point estimates coe¢ cients behave as expected when hourly wages
are included in regression (1.5) and also that monthly wages seem not to have an impact on
points estimates of employment transitions.
1.6.4 Part-Time workers
A very tempting alternative to potentially explain the low magnitudes of the point estimates
above would be Harts proposition about change on the mix of employment. Recalling that
in a simple model Hart (2004) shows that with two types of workers (full time and part time)
where the latter work less than standard hours while the former works overtime, a reduction
of standard hours will have two e¤ects: rstly, it leads to overtime-employment substitution
among full time workers. Secondly, leads the rm to increase the ratio of part time to full
time employees due to a higher relative cost of the latter ones (i.e. a change on the mix of
employment). Therefore, a change in the mix of employment (by varying the mix of part
time and full time workers) may serve to mitigate a tendency to reduce employment given the
shortened standard work week.
The inconvenience comes from the labour reform itself. This is because part-time employ-
ment is dened in the Chilean Labour Code as up to a proportion of the full time standard
employment workweek. Specically, it says that part-time employment is dened as up to 23
of the maximum standard workweek, which was equivalent to 32 hours before the reduction of
hours and 30 hours afterwards. Hence, Harts point is weakened here since there is a reduction
for both groups, full-time with overtime as well as part-time.44 Therefore, we should not expect
43Cobb and Opazo (2008) point out that "the average length of time that it would take for the whole economy
to adjust its wages is just over nine quarters, with some di¤erences between economic sectors".
44 It is also true that while full-time workers faced a 3 hours cut, part-time workers faced a 2 hours cut, hence
we could exploit that variation on the magnitud of the policy, but unfortunately there are few people working in
that range of hours.
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a big e¤ect of the mix of employment on overtime transitions to non employment. Despite the
small number of people working in the 30 - 32 hour category it is possible to argue that the
proportion of individuals working 30 and 32 hours does not change between 2002 and 2005. For
example, 1.42% and 0.17% of the individuals working in the private sector were working 30 and
32 hours respectively in January 2002. In January 2005 the proportions were 1.38% and 0.18%
respectively. This suggests no important movements between full-time and part-time workers.
Therefore, all our results suggest that there are no e¤ect of the policy change on employment
destruction. These results combined with employment creation and overall employment data
suggest that the policy change did not a¤ect employment transitions. These can be concluded
as from the data we observed that job creation did not change signicantly. In particular, for
unemployed individuals in year t, the probability of being employed in year t + 1 is 19.6% in
2003, 18.9% in 2004 and 20.1% in 2005. A similar pattern is present for the overall employment
level.
1.6.5 Checking the Assumptions
In order to identify the e¤ect of the policy change on employment transitions we introduced
two assumptions. The rst one is that workers in the control group must not have been a¤ected
by the reduction of the working hours. The second assumption is that there are no interactions
between the group dummies and the time e¤ects in the absence of the policy change. We
checked both assumptions here.
Checking the validity of the control group:
In order to test the rst assumption we follow Crepón and Kramarz(2002) idea but extended
by the use of usual hours (instead of actual hours). We estimate the change in usual hours
between t and t +p for those workers in the control group who were still employed at t +p.
Then, if the assumption holds we should not expect to nd signicant di¤erences in changes of
usual hours during the period January 2004 - January 2005 with respect to the period January
2002 - January 2003. This should not be true for workers in the treatment groups. This test
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assumes no employment e¤ects since it uses individuals still employed after the transition, which
is consistent with what we have found in our estimations above. Therefore, we estimate the
following cross-sectional models for January 2002- January 2003 and for January 2004 - January
2005:
E

Hourst+pi;t j xi;t; Di;t

= x
0
it + cg0i + sg1i + ovg2i (1.7)
Where Hourst+pt is the change of usual hours between t and t+p, and x
0
it is a vector of
controls which includes the same variables than in equation (1.5) except for the intercept which
is excluded here.45 The other three variables ( gki; where k = 0; 1; 2) are dummies equal to one
for 44-45, 46-48 and 49-60 hours respectively and zero otherwise. The estimates are presented
in the rst two columns of panel A of Table 4a in the appendix.
Estimates suggest that in the rst period there are no signicant variation in usual hours,
which seems to support our ex-ante exploration of the distribution of usual hours described
above. Nevertheless, estimates for the second period seem to suggest that there are signicant
e¤ects in the standard and overtime groups at 1% and 10% of signicance respectively. These
negative variations on usual hours might have happened even in the absence of the reduction of
standard hours, hence we extended the model in (1.7) to try to estimate if there was a signicant
e¤ect in January 2004 - January 2005 that can not be found in January 2002- January 2003.
In order to do this we estimate (1.8):
E

Hourst+pit j xit; Dit

= x
0
it + sg1i + ovg2i + 1dt+p
+2g1idt+p + 3g2idt+p + 4g0idt+p (1.8)
45Otherwise the three group dummies will sum up to one which generates multicollinearity if an intercept is
included.
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Where gkidt+p (k = 0; 1; 2) represents the interaction variable between the post treatment
dummy (dt+p) and the respective group dummy (gki). x
0
it does not include a constant and the
base category are those workers in the control group in January 2002 - January 2003. Estimates
are presented in the last column of Table 4a and suggest that the change of usual hours in the
period January 2004 - January 2005 is not signicantly di¤erent from the change of usual hours
during the period January 2002- January 2003 for the control and overtime group whereas
for the standard group the estimates suggest that the change of usual hours it is di¤erent and
signicant at 1% respectively. This suggests that our control group was not a¤ected while the
opposite happened with our standard group. For the standard group, usual hours decreased by
almost the same amount as the statutory reduction of 3 hours (i.e. 2.86 - (-0.09) = 2.77).
Panel B of Table 4a presents the results of the estimation of equations 1.7 and 1.8 when
the dependent variable is the variation (change) of ln(hourly wages) for the control, standard
and overtime groups. Results suggest no signicant changes on ln(hourly wages) for any of the
three groups during January 2002 - January 2003, but results suggest a signicant increment on
ln(hourly wage) for the standard and overtime groups for January 2004 - January 2005. Once
POLS is estimated in column 3, only the e¤ect for the standard group remains signicant.
Specically, for the standard group, hourly wage increases by 1.9% (i.e. 0.031 - (0.012) =
0.019). Thus, a decrease of one hour per week, from the original 48 hours (i.e. a 2% reduction)
generated a 1.9% increment in hourly wage, which is in line with our ndings in Figure 5
suggesting wage compensation. This result implies that monthly earnings for individuals in the
standard group remained close to the same after the reduction in hours. We can also observe
from panel B of Table 4a that the results also suggest no signicant spillover e¤ects on hourly
wages of the control group.
The fact that results for the standard group are as expected with respect to the reduction
of usual hours and increments in hourly wages but not on employment seems peculiar. One
possible explanation for the non signicant e¤ect on employment might be the long period of
adjustment given by the government to rms (almost 3 years), which might have allowed rms
to adjust their production process or the productivity of workers. Another reason might be that
the di¤erence in skills between employed and unemployed makes substituting the lost hours of
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the former with jobs for the latter more di¢ cult (this can be reinforced by high severance
payments as in the Chilean case).
To further investigate the validity of our identication strategy, we run a falsication test.
We exploit the fact that independent workers were explicitly excluded from the policy change.
In particular, we reestimate equation (1.8) but instead of restricting the sample to a¤ected
occupations we have now restricted it to una¤ected occupations. Our falsication testresults
suggest no signicant e¤ects (as expected).46
Furthermore, we estimate a triple di¤erence DDD in order to analyze the robustness of our
ndings. To carry out this, we built an "a¤ected occupation" (AOit) dummy, which equals 1 if
the individual belongs to any of the occupations included in our baseline model (i.e. occupations
a¤ected by the policy change) and 0 if independent workers. The a¤ected occupation dummy
was also interacted with group dummies, year dummies and (gidt): The coe¢ cient of interest
will be the one in front of (gidtAOit). This coe¢ cient measures the relative decrease in working
hours for a¤ected versus una¤ected occupations for workers above 45 hours in the moving
window (i.e. years (2003-2004) and (2004-2005) respectively). The relevant coe¢ cients are
statistically insignicant for 2003-2004 but signicant and very similar to those found in our
baseline model for 2004-2005. In particular, the coe¢ cient for the DD standard working group
in the period 2004-2005 relative to 2002-2003 was -2.92 hours (see panel A, column 2 of Table 4a
or column 4 of Table 4b) and in the DDD model the coe¢ cient in front of the triple interactive
term is -2.51 hours (see column 6 of Table 4b). These same pattern holds for changes in hourly
wages as suggested in Table 4c.
Checking the common macro trend:
The second assumption is that there are no interactions between the group dummies and the
time e¤ects in the absence of the policy change (i.e. common macro trend). The usual method
to test this is to use a pre-treatment period. In our case, we can do that but at the cost of
sacricing the model with hourly wages. We can use equation (1.5) in a period where there is
46See results in columns (2) and (5) in Table 4b and Table 4c for hours and hourly wages respectively.
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no pre-announcement of reductions of standard hours. A candidate would be a pre-treatment
period like January 1999 - January 2000 and January 2000 - January 2001. Since we do not
have hourly wages for this period we estimate equation (1.5) but excluding the logarithm of
hourly wages from vector x. Estimates are presented in Table 5a in the appendix. Results from
the rst column of Table 5a show that both interactive terms are not signicantly di¤erent
from zero, therefore the assumption of zero interaction terms in the absence of the reduction of
standard hours is well supported by the data.
To further investigate if workers above 45 hours evolve on systematically di¤erent paths or
not from workers below 45 hours, we carried out a falsication exercise, where we reestimate our
baseline model of equation (1.5) but instead of restricting the sample to a¤ected occupations we
have now restricted it to una¤ected occupations (baseline and falsication test results for the
period 2002 - 2003 and 2003 - 2004 are presented in column (1) and (2) of Table 5b respectively
and similarly in columns (4) and (5) are presented the results for period 2002 - 2003 and 2004 -
2005). Our falsication testresults suggest no signicant e¤ects (as expected as no di¤erences
were expected between individuals in una¤ected occupations).
Finally, and similarly to the previous section, we use a triple di¤erence approach based
on a¤ected versus non-a¤ected occupations, where independent workers are considered as non-
a¤ected. In the same way as before, we built an "a¤ected occupation" (AOit) dummy, which
equals 1 if the individual belongs to any of the occupations included in our baseline model
(i.e. occupations a¤ected by the policy change) and 0 if independent workers. The a¤ected
occupation dummy was also interacted with group dummies, year dummies and (gidt): The
coe¢ cient of interest will be the one in front of (gidtAOit). In columns (3) and (6) of Table 5b
we present the results of the triple di¤erences-in-di¤erence analysis. As can be seen the relevant
coe¢ cients are statistically insignicant.
1.7 Robustness
It is important that our results do not depend on any specic construction. In order to analyze
the sensitivity of our estimations we modify the underlying specication in several ways. Special
50
attention is given to the denition of time periods, control group and model of estimation. Also,
potential problems with measurement error are analyzed.
1.7.1 Denition of Control Group
The analysis of employment transitions has been carried out by comparing a treatment and a
control group, where the latter has been dened as those individuals who work between 44-45
hours per week in January 2002. The advantage of this narrow range is that we make the
control group as similar as possible to those in the treated group (in terms of unobervables)
and therefore it is expected that individuals in the control group respond to shocks in similar
ways as individuals in the treatment group. Nevertheless, there is a trade o¤, since widening the
control group range also has some advantages: rstly, it increases the number of observations
and therefore increases the precision of the estimation (ceteris paribus). Secondly, it diminishes
the problem created by potential missclasication of hours. Thirdly, it reduces the impact of the
threats to the identication strategy such as spillover e¤ects and substitution between groups.
We re-estimate equation (1.5) with di¤erent denitions of the control group. Results are
presented in Table 6 in the appendix. In all the cases, as before, the point estimates are not
signicant. We also observe that the e¤ect of hourly wages are as expected in all cases, this
is increasing the magnitude of point estimates when they are positive, although they remain
insignicant.
1.7.2 Denition of Time Periods
To analyze the robustness of our results with respect to the denition of time periods, we
investigate the sensitivity of our results when the denition of pre and post policy periods are
modied from January to February and March of the respective years. Results are presented
in Table 7. In particular, in the rst two columns we present results when January is replaced
by February and in the last two January is replaced by March. In either case, results are not
signicant. Therefore, our estimate seems to be robust to the denition of the time period.
51
1.7.3 Model specication
All estimations presented so far have used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) mainly due to its
simplicity (and the potential need for instrument). Furthermore, the model is saturated and
as Wooldridge (2002) points out, in saturated models OLS is a good approximation when most
of the covariates are discrete, which in our case are. Nevertheless, it is well known that OLS
has some problems when the dependent variable is a dummy47 and binary models have been
proposed for these cases. Therefore, we re estimate equation (1.5) but now using a probit
model. Results for the marginal e¤ects are presented in Table 8 in the appendix and suggest
that OLS results are similar to those obtained with probit.
1.7.4 Measurement error
The EPS panel used in our study, as with every survey data, might be subject to measurement
error. Furthermore, using self reported employment histories may aggravate the problem. This
is especially important for hours of work, since on the one hand, measurement error in this
variable could lead to misclassication of individuals into hours groups and thereby to a dilution
of the estimated e¤ect on employment transitions. On the other hand, it will a¤ect hourly wages,
since they are constructed as a combination of monthly wage, weeks and hours. Finally, the
EPS panel does not have a direct question on overtime which may lead to misclassication of
individuals into hours groups.48 All these measurement error e¤ects will bias our estimates.
Therefore, this section attempts to measure the magnitude of this potential bias by using
sensitivity analysis.
Our rst analysis deals with the misclassication coming from the fact that the EPS panel
does not have a direct question of overtime. This would generate a downward bias on our results,
giving us a lower bound of the e¤ect of the policy change on employment transitions. To test
47These problems are: a) the predicted probabilities may lie outside the range [0; 1] :b) non normality of the
error term and c) heteroskedasticity.
48For example, someone who report 48 hours a week of usual hours might imply: (a) 48 normal hours and
zero overtime or (b) 45 hours plus 3 of overtime. This is important since in the rst case the individual will be
classied to the treatment group and in the latter case to the control group.
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how important this e¤ect is and based on CASEN 200049, we observe that the probability
of working overtime is a¤ected mainly by industry category. In particular, workers in mining
and transport sectors have a higher probability of working overtime hours. This is in line
with ENCLA 200250 which shows that the mining and transport categories have the longest
workweek. Therefore, if we do have an important misclassication due to the lack of a direct
question of overtime, we should expect our results to change by excluding workers in the mining
and transport categories, since they should have higher probabilities of misclassication. Results
are presented in Table 9 in the appendix and suggest that estimates do not change when we
exclude workers in the mentioned categories, hence it seems to be that misclassication is not
a signicant problem in our case. Furthermore, distributions of usual hours in January 2003
and January 2005 in Figure 2 show high peaks at the legal maximum of standard hours (48
and 45 respectively). Hence, it is likely that responses do not include overtime.
Our second analysis exploits the accuracy of the measure of hours by region. This is because
some regions in Chile have a very high proportion of workers with special distribution of hours,
which are not only concentrated in the mining and transport sectors but also in services related
to them. Antofagasta and Atacama regions concentrate a high proportion of the mining industry
(which has a special distribution of hours), and therefore most of the services there are related
to the mining sector. For example, they can concentrate weekly hours in 4 days of 12 hours
each and then 3 day of holidays, or in a more extreme case, employees can work 20 days in
a row and then have the proportional rest days, but the average has to be 48 hours per week
(before January 2005, or 45 hours after January 2005).51 This variation of hours may introduce
noise in the measure of weekly hours. Therefore, we exclude these two regions to obtain better
measures of hours. Results seem to be robust to this specication since they suggest that by
excluding regions that have more noise, in terms of measure of weekly hours, results do not
signicantly vary.
49CASEN 2000 (Encuesta de caracterizacion social) is a cross-section data carried out at the end of 2000. It
includes one question about normal (standard) weekly hours agreed with the employer or dened in the contract
and another question on actual weekly hours. Therefore, it is possible to know who is working overtime.
50Encuesta Laboral.
51Observatorio Laboral 7. Septiembre 2002
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1.7.5 General equilibrium e¤ects
The e¤ect of a reduction of standard hours on employment transitions has been analyzed from
a partial equilibrium perspective which basically assumes that individuals that are not directly
a¤ected by the policy are indeed not a¤ected at all. This is in line with most of the policy
evaluation literature, since it is a reasonable assumption when policy interventions have small
scale (e.g. small training programs) and allow researchers to avoid time consuming specication
of general equilibrium models which sometimes require many more assumptions. Nevertheless,
when the intervention has a larger scale, like changes in regulation (e.g. changes of the minimum
wage, reduction of standard hours or massive training programs among others.) which a¤ect a
broader range of the population, then the support for a partial equilibrium approach weakens.
In our case, a reduction of standard hours to 45 per week a¤ected (treated) all workers
above that threshold. If there are externalities to this policy, then it might a¤ect those below
the threshold or those above the threshold but in jobs not a¤ected or those individuals who were
not employed at that time. In the rst case, we checked potential e¤ects on individuals below
the threshold when we check the assumption that the policy change do not a¤ect the control
group, and we could not nd any signicant e¤ect. This is supported by the policy change that
explicitly mention that individuals with less (or equal) hours than the new threshold should
not be a¤ected. In the second and third cases, if there are externalities then they should be
reected somehow on earnings (or hourly wages) and therefore should be internalized by the
inclusion of it. Furthermore, if spillovers and substitution e¤ects were important in our case
they should have a¤ected our results when the control group range was broadened, which did
not happen. Hence, we do not claim that there are no general equilibrium e¤ects but it seems
to be that if they do exist then the e¤ects should not be highly signicant.
1.8 Conclusion
Many countries around the world have implemented or discussed worksharing policies like
reductions of the maximum number of standard weekly hours, usually as a way of decreasing
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high rates of unemployment. Despite its popularity, theoretical evidence concludes that the
e¤ect of a reduction in standard hours on employment is ambiguous and therefore remains an
empirical question.
The scarce micro-econometric evidence can be grouped in studies which analyze reductions
of standard hours derived from collective bargains and those derived from changes in regulation.
The rst group usually exploits panel data methods where the dependent variable is employment
and one of the covariates is standard hours. Since standard hours are usually jointly determined
with employment, instruments for standard hours are needed. An alternative approach has been
the use of changes in legislation. Most of the evidence of this approach su¤ers from simultaneity
problems since in general a reduction of standard hours has been jointly implemented with
higher exibility and/or nancial incentives which do not allow for di¤erentiating the e¤ect of
each policy. The only exemptions have been the reduction of 40 to 39 hours in 1982 in France
studied by Crepón and Kramarz (2002) and the reduction of 44 to 40 hours in the Canadian
region of Quebec. The problem with both of them is the lack of crucial variables like hourly
wages and/or usual hours.
We exploit a variation of the labour regulation in Chile which includes a reduction of the
maximum standard hours from 48 to 45 hours per week to study the e¤ect of the reduction of
hours on employment transitions. The characteristics of the labour reform allow us to have a
reduction of standard hours that is not jointly implemented with other policies. Also, relative
to Crepón and Kramarz (2002), the advantage of our data (EPS Panel) is that the EPS Panel
includes information related to the employment history of individuals, which includes hourly
wages and usual hours before the implementation of the reduction of hours. A major issue is
the potential anticipation e¤ects due to the fact that there was a pre-announcement just before
the initial period considered in our study. We checked the behaviour of crucial variables to
support this hypothesis and all of them suggest no anticipation e¤ects. This is supported by
the results obtained when robustness checks were carried out.
The Chilean case is interesting for other countries as it would allow them to see the e¤ects a
reduction of working hours has on employment in a period of high persistence of unemployment.
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Our results suggest no signicant direct e¤ects of the reduction of standard hours on em-
ployment transitions (i.e. no e¤ect on excess job destruction). These e¤ects remain insignicant
when the indirect e¤ect from hourly wages is allowed and these ndings are robust to several
specications. We also nd that individuals a¤ected by the reduction of standard hours work
less hours and get higher hourly wages (i.e. wage compensation). These results combined with
no signicant variation on job creation and overall employment suggest that there is little sup-
port for work-sharing policies as a job-creation strategy. Results for Chile are in line with most
of the evidence from European countries and Canada.
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1.9 Appendix
Table 1: Summary Statistics in January 2002
Control Treatment Di¤erence
Mean Mean Mean Std. Dev.
Gender (Female=1) 0.26 0.24 0.02 (0.011)
Age (years) 41.63 41.69 -0.03 (0.017)
Union (unionized=1) 0.17 0.14 0.03 (0.018)
Schooling 1 (No education) 0.02 0.02 0.00 (0.001)
Schooling 2 (pre school) 0.36 0.35 0.01 (0.007)
Schooling 3 (rst level) 0.01 0.02 -0.01 (0.006)
Schooling 4 (handicapped) 0.31 0.30 0.01 (0.008)
Schooling 5 (second level A) 0.13 0.14 -0.01 (0.007)
Schooling 6 (second level B) 0.07 0.09 -0.02 (0.011)
Schooling 7 (college and Postgrad.) 0.10 0.09 0.01 (0.007)
Firmsize 1 (1-2) 0.03 0.04 -0.01 (0.006)
Firmsize 2 (3-9) 0.17 0.16 0.01 (0.015)
Firmsize 3 (10-19) 0.09 0.10 -0.01 (0.012)
Firmsize 4 (20-49) 0.17 0.13 0.04 (0.021)
Firmsize 5 (50-99) 0.11 0.13 -0.02 (0.013)
Firmsize 6 (100-199) 0.10 0.10 0.00 (0.012)
Firmsize 7 (200-499) 0.10 0.12 -0.02 (0.013)
Firmsize 8 (500+) 0.23 0.22 0.01 (0.016)
Occup. 1 (Technicians & associate prof.) 0.21 0.15 0.06 (0.015)
Occup. 2 (Clerical support) 0.24 0.17 0.07 (0.014)
Occup. 3 (Service & sales) 0.11 0.12 -0.01 (0.012)
Occup. 4 (Skilled agricultural & related) 0.02 0.03 -0.01 (0.007)
Occup. 5 (Craft & related) 0.18 0.24 -0.06 (0.016)
Occup. 6 (Plant & machine operators) 0.09 0.11 -0.02 (0.012)
Occup. 7 (Elementary occupations) 0.14 0.18 -0.04 (0.015)
Observations 970 2,666
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Table 1 (cont.): Summary Statistics in January 2002
Control Treatment Di¤erence
Industry 1 (Agriculture, Hunting & related) 0.06 0.10 -0.04 (0.110)
Industry 2 (Mining & Quarrying) 0.01 0.02 -0.01 (0.006)
Industry 3 (Manufacturing) 0.21 0.26 -0.05 (0.017)
Industry 4 (Electricity, Gas & Water) 0.01 0.01 0.00 (0.003)
Industry 5 (Construction) 0.09 0.12 -0.03 (0.012)
Industry 6 (Commerce, Hotels & Restaurants) 0.25 0.22 0.03 (0.017)
Industry 7 (Transport & Communications) 0.05 0.05 0.00 (0.008)
Industry 8 (Financial Intermediation) 0.08 0.05 0.03 (0.001)
Industry 9 (Public, Social and Personal Services) 0.24 0.17 0.07 (0.015)
Region 1 (Arica and Tarapaca) 0.04 0.02 0.02 (0.011)
Region 2 (Antofagasta) 0.05 0.03 0.02 (0.011)
Region 3 (Atacama) 0.03 0.02 0.01 (0.006)
Region 4 (Coquimbo) 0.03 0.05 -0.02 (0.011)
Region 5 (Valparaíso) 0.11 0.09 0.02 (0.012)
Region 6 (OHiggins) 0.03 0.05 -0.02 (0.011)
Region 7 (Maule) 0.03 0.05 -0.02 (0.011)
Region 8 (Bio-Bio) 0.09 0.11 -0.02 (0.012)
Region 9 (Araucanía) 0.03 0.04 -0.01 (0.008)
Region 10 (Los Lagos) 0.05 0.07 -0.02 (0.011)
Region 11 (Aysén) 0.01 0.01 0.00 (0.002)
Region 12 (Magallanes) 0.01 0.01 0.00 (0.003)
Region 13 (Metropolitana) 0.49 0.43 0.06 (0.039)
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Description of the Chilean Labour Reform of December 2001
1. In reference to the separation of workers and layo¤ costs, before the reform there were 3
ways of terminating the contract between a company and an employee:
a) Due to business (or economic) reasons: these include the modernization or rationaliza-
tion of the company, lower productivity, change in the economy or in the market and the
lack of appropriate employee skills. By terminating the contract in this way the employer
has to pay severance payments of 1 month (30 days) per year worked with a maximum of
11 years.
b) Due to causes that can not be attributable to the employee: among these are the em-
ployees death, agreement between employer and employee, employees resignation, end
of the job or service that originated the contract.
There is no severance payment in this case.
c) Due to causes that can be attributable to the employee: these include damage to the
companys property, violence against a peer and/or superior, skipped some of his/her
contractual duties and so on.
There is no severance payment in this case either.
The reform basically incremented nes when rms invoke a wrong cause for terminating an
employee.52The reform also modied the procedures by which severance payments were paid.
This is, before the reform, there were no specications on how indemnizations had to be paid,
so worker and employer could negotiate how to do it. The reform stated that indemnizations
in all the above cases have to be paid at once, when the contract ends or it can be paid in
52 If the employer could not accredit the causes that originated (a) (in case the employer states (a)) the court
could increment severance payments by 20%. The reform increased this ne by another 30%. It also eliminated
the lack of the employeeappropriate skills as a cause of invoking (a), hence if the employer res the employee
anyway, the reform states that the employer has to increase the payment by 50%. Before the reform, in case of
wrongly invoking (b) the court could increment the indemnization by 20%. The reform increased it to 50%. The
same will happens if the company does not specify any of the above alternatives of terminating the contract.
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installments (including readjustments due to interest). It also states that if severance payments
are not paid as stipulated above, the court can increase them in 150%.
Finally, the reform incorporated that if the employer res a worker due to practices against
unionization, then this layo¤ will not be e¤ective. Furthermore, the company will have two
options: rstly, reincorporate the red worker or secondly, if the worker does not want to
return to the company then the employer has to pay the severance payments per year to the
worker plus an additional severance payment equivalent to 3 to 11 months per year worked
depending on the court decision.
2. In reference to the exceptional distribution of the working time in some industries, before
the reform of 2001, the Ministry of Labour (by the direct authorization of its Undersecre-
taryship of Labour) allowed the possibility of establishing an exceptional distribution of
the work and leisure time di¤erent from those allowed by law given the particular charac-
teristics of the job (this is very important in the mining industry and salmon sheries since
those activities are usually located far from urban centers or have some peculiarities).
The modication established by the reform is that the authorization given by the Under-
secretaryship of Labour will last only 4 years (so now it has a limit), the same will occur with
the renewals and it also has to be authorized by the employees. If all that happens, then the
Undersecretaryship of Labour mightcarry out the renewal (i.e. completely discretional).
3. With respect to over time hours, before the reform, overtime hours had to be agreed
on between employer and employee with the only requisite that it had to be explicitly
specied in the contract or in a posterior document. The overtime premium was 50%
of the hourly wage. The reform did not change the direct cost of the overtime. The
premium remained at 50% of the hourly wage. Nevertheless, the reform stated that over
time hours can only be agreed for a particular or temporal necessity of the company and
that they have to be specied in a document and the maximum period of the agreement
can not be superior to three months, although renewal is possible.
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4. In reference to changes in the collective bargaining relationship, the reform made the
replacement of workers on strike more expensive. This is because before the reform
employers could replace workers on strike from the rst day only if the employers last
o¤er ensured the existing benets adjusted by the ination of the contract duration. If
not, then the employer could only replace workers after 15 days of strike. Also, employees
that have to go to strike when the majority of workers decided it could choose to return to
work after 15 days since the beginning of the strike. The reform added that the employer
can replace workers on strike (as above) but only if it pays them (workers on strike) a
bond of 4 UF53 per replaced worker.
5. In this category we include modications on working privileges, nes that limit the man-
agement of the rm, higher nes and better supervision from the Undersecretaryship of
Labour (with 300 extra labour agents).
a) In reference to work privileges, the reform creates a privilege of 40 days for those workers
who participated on the assembly that generated the union.54
b) With respect to the nes that limit the management of the rm, the reform modies
the law that regulate business management in the sense that it makes it more rigid.
This is because it was added that any alteration made to the legal identity, division
of the company or loosening of individual and collective labour rights (i.e. wage and
indemnization per year of service among the former ones and the right to unionize and
collective bargaining among the latter) will constitute a subterfuge to avoid labour and
pension obligations(and then a ne like that presented in (c) have to be applied).
c) With respect to the increment of nes, before the reform there were nes of between 1-10
UTM55 depending on how big the fault was plus 0.15 UTM per worker a¤ected by the
53UF means Unidades de Fomento. The UF was determined by law in its origin and is indexed to the
monthly rate of ination (the UF currently has a value of around 21 pounds).
5410 days before the assembly and 30 days after the assembly.
55UTM means Unidades Tributaries Mensuales. Similar to the UF but its value is around 37 pounds (also
indexed by ination).
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fault (this applies to any fault which does not have a specied ne in any other part of the
law). The reform increased these nes to 1-20 UTM, but if the employer has more than
50 workers then the ne increases to 2-40 UTM, and if he has more than 200 workers it
will increase to 3-60 UTM.
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Description of Variables
Dependent Variable In our specication, the dependent variable (NE ) is a dummy:
8<: = 1 if individuals are not employed at the end of the transition period= 0 if individuals are employed at the end of the transition period
9=;
for example for the cross section January 2002 - January 2003: NE=1 if, conditional of
being employed in January 2002, individual i is not employed in January 2003 and NE=0 if,
conditional of being employed in January 2002, individual i is employed in January 2003. The
same denition applies for period January 2004 - January 2005.
Covariates
Gender: dummy variable which is:
8<: = 1 if Female= 0 if Male
9=;
Age: Age of individual i.
Schooling: We construct seven categories (s) based on years of education. These categories
are: s=1 if individual i has no education, pre-school education or kindergarten, s=2 if individual
i has 1-8 years of education (rst level), s=3 if individual i has special education (handicap), s=4
if individual i has 9-12 years of education (Scientic-Humanist -second level), s=5 if individual
i has 9-12 years of education (Technical-Professional -second level), s=6 if individual i has a
degree from a Technical-Professional Institute (third level), s=7 if individual i has a degree
from a University (or M.A., Ph.D.) (third level). Then we create one dummy per category.
Region:
We include dummy variables per region. Chile had 13 regions until 2006. Currently there
are 15 regions due to a sub-division of two of the former (Region de Los Lagos and Region de
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Tarapacá). Given that during the analysis period Chile experienced the transition from having
13 regions to 15, we reclassied those who reported any of the two new regions as part of the
respective older regions.
Occupation:
We construct dummy variables per occupation category. We follow the International Stan-
dard Classication of Occupations (ISCO) of the International Labour Organization (ILO).
These are the major groups: 1. Managers, 2. Professionals, 3. Technicians and associate pro-
fessionals, 4. Clerical support workers, 5. Service and sales workers, 6. Skilled agricultural,
forestry and shery workers, 7. Craft and related trades workers, 8. Plant and machine opera-
tors, and assemblers, 9. Elementary occupations and 10. Armed forces. For the purposes of our
analysis, we drop the rst two categories as well as the last one, since they were not a¤ected
by the labour reform, That is why in table 1, occupation only has 7 categories (from 3 to 9).
Industry:
We construct dummy variables per industry category. We follow the International Standard
Classication of Industry. The major categories are: 1. Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and
Fishing, 2. Mining and Quarrying, 3. Manufacturing, 4. Electricity, Gas and Water supply,
5. Construction, 6. Commerce, Hotels and Restaurants, 7. Transport, Communications, 8.
Financial Intermediation, 9. Public, Social and Personal Services.
Union: Dummy variable which is:
8<: = 1 if individual i is unionize= 0 if individual i is not unionize
9=;
Size of the rm: Dummy variables per size category. These categories are: Size=1 if
individual i works in a rm with 1-2 employee, Size=2 if individual i works in a rm with 3-9,
employees, Size=3 if individual i works in a rm with 10-19 employees, Size=4 if individual
i works in a rm with 20-49 employees, Size=5 if individual i works in a rm with 50-99
employees, Size=6 if individual i works in a rm with 100-199 employees, Size=7 if individual i
works in a rm with 200-499 employees, Size=8 if individual i works in a rm with more than
500 employees.
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Table 2a: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences and GAP estimation
January 2002 - January 2003 and January 2003 - January 2004
A High and Low skill workers
Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences Gap (per overtime hour e¤ect)
Dependent variable: NEt+p Dependent variable: NEt+p
covariates with covariates without covariates with covariates without
log(hourly wage) log(hourly wage) log(hourly wage) log(hourly wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard group 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.002
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Overtime group 0.009 0.011 0.002 0.002
(0.023) (0.023) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 5194 5194 5194 5194
B Low skill workers
Standard group 0.009 0.010 0.002 0.003
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Overtime group 0.008 0.010 0.002 0.003
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
Observations 3738 3738 3738 3738
Note: panel A displays estimates for all dependent workers in the private sector included in those occupations
a¤ected by the reduction of standard hours. Panel B, displays the estimates for all those in panel A but who have
up to a complete high school level of education only. Control variables include: age, female dummy, dummies
for educational level, occupation, industry, unionization status, size of the rm, region and two group dummies
(i.e. standard and overtime). It also includes the logarithm of hourly wage, a time dummy and one year lagged
weekly hours. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level) are given in parenthesis.
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Table 2b: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences and GAP estimation
January 2002 - January 2003 and January 2004 - January 2005
A High and Low skill workers
Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences Gap (per overtime hour e¤ect)
Dependent variable: NEt+p Dependent variable: NEt+p
covariates with covariates without covariates with covariates without
log(hourly wage) log(hourly wage) log(hourly wage) log(hourly wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard group 0.005 0.010 0.002 0.006
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Overtime group 0.008 0.013 0.002 0.003
(0.025) (0.025) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 5084 5084 5084 5084
B Low skill workers
Standard group 0.008 0.013 0.002 0.006
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Overtime group 0.010 0.015 0.002 0.004
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Observations 3698 3698 3698 3698
Note: panel A displays estimates for all dependent workers in the private sector included in those occupations
a¤ected by the reduction of standard hours. Panel B, displays the estimates for all those in panel A but who
have up to complete high school level of education only. Control variables include: age, female dummy, dummies
for educational level, occupation, industry, unionization status, size of the rm, region and two group dummies
(i.e. standard and overtime). It also includes the logarithm of hourly wage, a time dummy and one year lagged
weekly hours. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level) are given in parenthesis.
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Table 3: Estimation with Monthly Earnings instead of Hourly Wages
Pooled OLS estimation
January 2002 - 2003 and January 2004 - 2005
Dependent variable: NEt+p
covariates with covariates without
log(monthly earnings) log(monthly earnings)
(1) (2)
Standard group 0.009 0.010
(0.019) (0.019)
Overtime group 0.012 0.013
(0.025) (0.025)
Observations 5084 5084
Note: the sample includes all full-time dependent workers in the private sector. Control variables include:
age, female dummy, dummies for educational level, occupation, industry, unionization status, size of the rm,
region and two group dummies (i.e. standard and overtime), it also includes the logarithm of monthly earnings,
a time dummy and one year lagged weekly hours. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level) are given
in parenthesis.
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Table 4a: Variation in UsualHours and Log(Hourly Wage) during Transition Periods given
Employment at the End of the Period
A Var. in usual hours between Var. in usual hours between Pooled OLS
January 2002 - January 2003 January 2004 - January 2005
given employment in given employment in
January 2003 January 2005
(1) (2) (3)
Control group -0.19 -0.25 -0.09
(0.51) (0.52) (0.39)
Standard group -0.23 -2.92*** -2.86***
(0.50) (0.51) (0.38)
Overtime group -0.54 -0.89* -0.26
(0.50) (0.50) (0.39)
B Var. in ln(hourly wages) between Var. in ln(hourly wages) between Pooled OLS
January 2002 - January 2003 January 2004 - January 2005
given employment in given employment in
January 2003 January 2005
Control group 0.021 0.034 0.012
(0.028) (0.028) (0.014)
Standard group 0.031 0.066*** 0.031**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.013)
Overtime group 0.033 0.056** 0.020
(0.029) (0.029) (0.016)
Observations 2080 1824 3904
Note: for the rst two columns of panel A control variables include: age, female dummy, dummies for
educational levels, occupation, industry, size of the rm, region, unionization status, three group dummies
(control, standard and overtime, thus we drop the intercept) and the logarithm of hourly wage. For the third
column of panel A control variables are the same than for the rst two columns plus the inclusion of a time
dummy and the interactions of all the group dummies with the time dummy. Robust standard errors are
reported in parenthesis for the rst two columns and clustered standard errors (at the individual level) are given
in parenthesis for the last column. For panel B, the covariates are the same except the logarithm of hourly
wage which is excluded since in panel B the dependent variable is the variation on the logarithm of hourly wage.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01.
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Table 4b: Falsication Test and Triple Di¤erence by MovingWindow for Hours
Dependent Variable: Change in usual hours (Hourst+pi;t )
Jan. 2002-Jan.2003 and Jan. 2003-Jan. 2004 Jan. 2002-Jan.2003 and Jan. 2004-Jan. 2005
Occupations Occupations DDD Occupations Occupations DDD
Coe¢ cient A¤ected Una¤ected A¤ected Una¤ected
of: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Standard
Group
gi1dt -0.23 -0.21 -0.16 -2.92*** -0.41 -0.77
gi1dtAOit - - -0.03 - - -2.51***
Overtime
Group
gi2dt -0.54 -0.44 -0.38 -0.89* -0.55 -0.70
gi2dtAOit - - -0.10 - - -0.34*
Obs. 2,080 1,902 3,982 1,824 1,713 3,537
Table 4c: Falsication Test and Triple Di¤erence by MovingWindow for Wages
Dependent Variable: Variation in ln(hourly wages) ( ln(Hourly wages)t+pi;t )
Jan. 2002-Jan.2003 and Jan. 2003-Jan. 2004 Jan. 2002-Jan.2003 and Jan. 2004-Jan. 2005
Occupations Occupations DDD Occupations Occupations DDD
Coe¢ cient A¤ected Una¤ected A¤ected Una¤ected
of: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Standard
Group
gi1dt 0.031 0.020 0.024 0.066*** 0.012 0.017
gi1dtAOit - - 0.011 - - 0.054***
Overtime
Group
gi2dt 0.033 0.022 0.013 0.056** 0.016 0.021
gi2dtAOit - - 0.011 - - 0.040**
Obs. 2,080 1,902 3,982 1,824 1,713 3,537
Note for Table 4b and 4c: control variables include: age, female dummy, dummies for educational levels,
occupation, industry, rm size, unionization status, region, three group dummies (control, standard and overtime
group, but no constant term), 1 year lagged weekly hours, a time dummy and interaction of all the group dummies
with the time dummy. Furthermore, for the appropriate model it also includes the a¤ected occupation dummy
plus its interaction with group and time dummies and the triple interactive terms. Control group results are
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not reported as they were all insignicant. Clustered standard errors at the individual level are given in
parenthesis.*p<10%, **p<5% and ***p<1%.
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Table 5a: Falsication Test for January 1999 - January 2001
Pooled OLS estimation
January 1999 - January 2000 - January 2001
Dependent variable: NEt+p
Standard group 0.001
(0.017)
Overtime group -0.003
(0.020)
Observations 5568
Note: control variables include: age, female dummy, dummies for educational levels, occupation, industry,
rm size, unionization status, region, two group dummies (standard and overtime group), 1 year lagged weekly
hours, a time dummy and interaction of all the group dummies with the time dummy. Clustered standard errors
at the individual level are given in parenthesis.
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Table 5b: Falsication Test and Triple Di¤erences-in-Di¤erence by MovingWindow
Dependent Variable: Non Employment in period t+p (NEt+p)
Jan. 2002-Jan.2003 and Jan. 2003-Jan. 2004 Jan. 2002-Jan.2003 and Jan. 2004-Jan. 2005
Occupations Occupations DDD Occupations Occupations DDD
Coe¢ cient A¤ected Una¤ected A¤ected Una¤ected
of: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Standard
Group
gi1dt 0.007 0.019 0.009 0.005 0.017 0.009
gi1dtAOit - - -0.012 - - -0.013
Overtime
Group
gi2dt 0.009 0.026 0.012 0.008 0.022 0.011
gi2dtAOit - - -0.017 - - -0.014
Obs. 5,194 4,509 9,703 5,084 4,442 9,526
Note: control variables include: age, female dummy, dummies for educational levels, occupation, indus-
try, rm size, unionization status, region, two group dummies (standard and overtime group), 1 year lagged
weekly hours, a time dummy and interaction of all the group dummies with the time dummy. Furthermore,
for the appropriate model it also includes the a¤ected occupation dummy plus its interaction with group and
time dummies and the triple interactive terms. Clustered standard errors at the individual level are given in
parenthesis.*p<10%, **p<5% and ***p<1%.
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Table 6: Di¤erent Denitions of Control Group
Control group dened as (43-45 hours) Control group dened as (42-45 hours)
Dependent variable: NEt+p Dependent variable: NEt+p
covariates with covariates without covariates with covariates without
Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard group 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.006
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Overtime group 0.009 0.012 0.007 0.011
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Observations 5100 5100 5193 5193
Control group dened as (41-45 hours) Control group dened as (40-45 hours)
Dependent variable: NEt+p Dependent variable: NEt+p
covariates with covariates without covariates with covariates without
Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage)
Standard group 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.013
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
Overtime group 0.009 0.014 0.011 0.019
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
Observations 5249 5249 5319 5319
Note: control variables include age, dummies for education, occupation, industry, size of the rm, union-
ization status, region, logarithm of hourly wage, one year lagged weekly hours, 2 group dummies (standard and
overtime groups) and the interaction of all the variables with the time dummy. Clustered standard errors at the
individual level are given in parenthesis.
73
Table 7: Di¤erent Denitions of Time Periods
February 2002 - 2003 and February 2004 - 2005 March 2002 - 2003 and March 2004- 2005
Dependent variable: NEt+p Dependent variable: NEt+p
covariates with covariates without covariates with covariates without
Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard group 0.004 0.008 0.006 0.010
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Overtime group 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.009
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 5073 5073 5080 5080
Note: control variables include age, female dummy, dummies for school, occupation, industry, size of the rm,
region and unionization status, one year lagged weekly hours, group dummies (standard and overtime group)
and interactions of all the previous variables with the time dummy. Clustered standard errors at the individual
level are given in parenthesis.
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Table 8: Marginal E¤ects of the Probit Estimation
Probit
Dependent variable: NEt+p
covariates include covariates do not include
Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage)
(1) (2)
Standard group 0.005 0.011
(0.020) (0.020)
Overtime group 0.009 0.015
(0.023) (0.023)
Observations 5084 5084
Note: control variables include age, female dummy, dummies for education, occupation, industry, size of the
rm, unionization status, region, group dummies, logarithm of hourly wage, a one year lagged weekly hours and
the interactions between all previous variables and the time dummy. Clustered standard errors at the individual
level are given in parenthesis.
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Table 9: Exclusion of Some Industries and Regions
No mining nor Transport sector No Antofagasta nor Atacama regions
Dependent variable: NEt+p Dependent variable: NEt+p
covariates with covariates without covariates with covariates without
Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard group 0.007 0.012 0.006 0.010
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Overtime group 0.009 0.014 0.011 0.016
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
observations 4607 4607 4724 4724
Note: covariates include age, female dummy, dummies for education level (and type), occupation, industry,
size of the rm region, logarithm of hourly wage, group dummies, a one year lagged weekly hours and the
interactions of the previous variables with a time dummy. Clustered standard errors at the individual level are
given in parenthesis.
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Categories one to five of the reform, (1st of December)
Figure 1 Time Line of the Reform and Data Waves
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Chapter 2
Does decreasing working hours
improve employeeshealth status?
2.1 Introduction
It is important to understand how reductions in working hours a¤ect workershealth, as several
institutions have suggested this kind of policy. In particular, throughout the 20th century, the
International Labour Organization (ILO) strongly supported the reduction of working hours
specically because of its potential benets to workershealth (International Labour Organiza-
tion 1990). Similarly, in 1993 the European Union implemented the European Time Directive,
which explicitly recommended that member countries reduce their weekly working hours to
potentially improve their citizenshealth.
The rationale behind these recommendations is that longer working hours may be detrimen-
tal to workershealth because they disrupt workersinternal and external recovery (especially
the latter).1 In reference to internal recovery, Spurgeon et al. (1997) suggest that longer working
hours negatively a¤ect workershealth both directly and indirectly. Longer hours are directly
harmful to workershealth because they cause stress as workers try to maintain performance
levels while facing increasing fatigue, and they are indirectly harmful because they increase
1 Internal recovery is the workers capacity to recover during working hours, and external recovery is the
workers capacity to recover outside o¢ ce hours (Taris et al. 2006).
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the length of time that a worker is exposed to other sources of workplace stress. Taris et al.
(2006) suggest that internal recovery will depend mainly on the characteristics of each job and
that longer working hours will a¤ect external recovery mainly by shortening the periods when
individuals rest.2 Working longer hours will generate a spiral, since those workers who do not
fully recover from a work day will have to invest additional e¤ort to perform adequately during
the following day, resulting in an increased intensity of negative load reactions that appeal even
more strongly to the recovery process. These e¤ects will accumulate over time, a¤ecting health
outcomes (Sluiter et al. 2003).
However, apart from these negative e¤ects that support international organizationsclaims,
longer working hours may also have some positive e¤ects, as they are positively associated with
current and future earnings and with faster rates of career progression (Francesconi 2001); since
health improves with earnings (Deaton 2003), higher earnings should increase individualshealth
status. Furthermore, the literature on promotions supports these ideas. In particular, Lazear
and Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1986) view promotion as a tournament in which promotions are
allocated to those workers who rank higher than all other workers in a group in a given period.
The probability of getting promoted provides an incentive to exert e¤ort, and, as this e¤ort
or propensity to work hard is not directly observable, rms will use indicators, such as hours
of work or overtime hours, to select workers for promotion. Thus, a mandatory reduction in
working hours for treated individuals (relative to controls) will limit the scope for competition
via hours for this group of workers.3 This negative e¤ect on the probability of promotions
(which a¤ects the future income pattern) may have a negative impact on health, as individuals
may become concerned and stressed about their future career and income. This e¤ect is in line
2This points to another open debate in organizational psychology: it is not even clear whether what causes
negative health e¤ects is the length or the organization of the working hours. The only consensus here is that
something should be done, since countries like the United Kingdom face costs of around £ 1.24 billion a year in
stress-related illnesses (Beswick and White 2003).
3Firms have two alternatives when a law that reduces standard working hours is imposed (if the employee is
not red). On the one hand, rms can reduce the treated workerstotal number of hours. On the other hand,
rms can maintain the total number of hours and pay overtime. In the former case, the probability of promotion
is negatively a¤ected by the reasons explained above, and this may negatively a¤ect health. For the latter case,
and with a heterogeneous pool of workers, rms will be more willing to pay overtime for the most productive
workers, putting extra pressure on workers to show that they belong to this group, and in this way a¤ecting their
health status. Additionally, if workers foresee that they are likely to lose their jobs because of an increase in
the marginal cost of employment relative to the marginal costs of hours, they will experience additional negative
pressure on their health status.
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with the implications derived from the e¤ort-reward imbalance (ERI) model (Siegrist 1996),
explained in more detail below. In general, the ERI model acknowledges the link between
high-cost/low-gain conditions, which are considered particularly stressful. One example of this
situation, given by Siegrist (1996), is a high-e¤ort situation associated with no prospects for
promotion.
Therefore, reducing working hours may produce a trade-o¤ between these two e¤ects, thus
having a theoretically ambiguous e¤ect. For this reason, empirical evidence is needed, which is
what I provide in this study.
To identify how reducing working hours a¤ects health is complicated, as the number of
working hours might be endogenous due to the so-called healthy worker e¤ect (Frijters et al.
2009).4 This is the main caveat of previous studies that analyze the link between health and
working hours (see Beswick and White [2003] and van der Hulst [2003] for surveys). Because
of this, we propose the rst study that analyzes the e¤ects of a reduction in working hours
on health outcomes. To overcome potential endogeneity, we use an exogenous reduction in
working hours caused by a change in regulation. Moreover, as the e¤ect of reduced working
hours may depend on the level of working hours, we analyze two di¤erent countries, each with a
di¤erent threshold of working hours: France, which reduced its standard weekly working hours
from 39 to 35 in 1998, and Portugal, which reduced its hours from 44 to 40 in 1996. Studying
two di¤erent countries with di¤erent thresholds will be useful since, in practice, the impact of
reduced working hours on health may be non-monotonic, which would be in line with a branch
of the literature that proposes the existence of potential "optimal hours".
It is important to acknowledge that we are studying only the short-term e¤ects of a reduc-
tion in working hours on health outcomes. We do not analyze the long-term e¤ects, as we face
some data constraints. For our analysis we use the eight waves of the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP) for France and Portugal, which, despite the countriesinstitutional
di¤erences, enhances comparability since the countries use a common questionnaire. The em-
pirical framework used is a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach in a random-e¤ects ordered-probit
4The healthy worker e¤ect states that individuals with better health will tend to work longer hours than those
with worse health.
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setup, which will allow us to control for individual heterogeneity as well as initial health status.
The structure of this study is as follows. Section 2.2 briey describes the theoretical back-
ground of the health e¤ects of working hours. Section 2.3 presents the existing empirical
evidence. Section 2.4 describes the institutional background of labour regulation in France and
Portugal. Section 2.5 presents the identication strategy, while section 2.6 presents the data
and the summary statistics. Finally, section 2.7 presents the results and the sensitivity analysis,
and section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Background
In this section we explain the theories that support the claims of international institutions that
reducing working hours produces positive health e¤ects. Most of the theoretical background
comes from psychology (in particular, psychological epidemiology) and sociology, as these elds
use specic models that link workplace stressors (such as longer working hours) to psychosocial
e¤ects.5 These models, which we discuss below, are the demand-control-support (DCS) model
(Karasek 1979), the e¤ort-reward imbalance (ERI) model (Siegrist 1996), and the e¤ort-recovery
(ER) model (Meijman and Mulder 1998).
Demand-control-support (DCS) model (Karasek 1979) states that mental strain results from
the interaction of job demands and job decision latitude.6 Karasek (1979) pointed out that the
combination of low decision latitude and heavy job demands (such as longer working hours) is
associated with mental strain and other illnesses.7
5The term psychosocialrefers to psychological developments during interaction with a social environment.
An important characteristic of the psychosocial e¤ects is that the individual is not necessarily fully aware of this
relationship with his or her environment.
6Decision latitude refers to decision authority or skill level. Job demands will depend on the characteristics of
the rm, while job decision latitude is probably closely related to the rms authority structure and technology.
So, this model restricts the notion of controlling objective task characteristics in terms of decision authority and
skill discretion.
7This theory suggests that failure to distinguish between job demands and job decision latitude (i.e., adding
these measures together) may generate relationships in which strain symptoms are cancelled out if, as Karasek
proposed, the opportunity to use skills and make decisions (i.e., job decision latitude) reduces the undesirable
e¤ects of job demands.
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Siegrist (1996) decides to shift the focus of analysis from control to reward by developing
the e¤ort-reward imbalance (ERI) model, which acknowledges the link between high-cost/low-
gain conditions, which are considered particularly stressful. Siegrist (1996) points out that
variables measuring low reward, in terms of low status control (e.g., lack of promotion prospects,
job insecurity) in association with high extrinsic (e.g., work pressure) or intrinsic (e.g., high
need for control) e¤ort, independently predict new cardiovascular events in some groups of the
population, such as blue-collar men. Siegrist (1996) also discusses the fact that high-cost/low-
gain conditions are likely to be avoided or dismissed to maximize ones prot, although that does
not take into account the social constraints under which individuals must make their decisions,
especially the constraints associated with low occupational status control.8 Therefore, high-
cost/low-gain conditions at work are likely to occur in those groups of the workforce that
exhibit a low level of occupational status control. However, among higher-status groups, these
conditions may also be prevalent.
Sonnentag (2001) suggests that the e¤ort-recovery (ER) model may provide a better expla-
nation than previous theories. The ER model was developed by Meijman and Mulder (1998)
and states that exerting e¤ort during work leads to specic load reactions in the individual.
These load reactions include physiological, behavioural, and subjective responses. Under nor-
mal conditions, these reactions are reversible; that is, when an individual is no longer confronted
with work demands, his psychobiological systems previously a¤ected by those demands return
to their pre-demand levels, and recovery occurs. As a result of the recovery process, fatigue and
other e¤ects of stressful situations are reduced. However, when demands do not cease, but are
continuously put on the individual, no recovery can occur. As a consequence, load reactions
accumulate and result in negative e¤ects, such as impaired well-being and health problems.
Thus, for recovery to occur, it is necessary that demands previously put on the individuals
psychobiological systems are removed and that the individual engages in a below-baseline ac-
tivity.
8For example, blue-collar workers with reduced opportunities to change jobs will not minimize their e¤ort
at work even if their gain is low. The reason for this behaviour is obvious, as the possible costs produced by
disengagement (e.g., the risks of being laid o¤ or facing downward mobility) by far outweigh the costs of accepting
inadequate benets. Thus, Siegrist (1996) points out that under dened conditions of low occupational status
control, e¤ort-reward imbalance is maintained contrary to the prediction derived from the expectancy value
theory of motivation.
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Although the e¤ects of longer (shorter) working hours may t under the general setting
of these three models (DCS, ERI, and ER), they do not explicitly link health and increases
(reductions) in working hours. In line with the predictions of the ER model, Spurgeon et
al. (1997) are more specic about the health e¤ects of longer (shorter) working hours since
they suggest that longer working hours may be detrimental to workers health by a¤ecting
their internal and external recovery. In reference to internal recovery, Spurgeon et al. (1997)
suggest that longer working hours negatively a¤ect workershealth both directly and indirectly.
Longer hours are directly harmful to workershealth because they cause stress as workers try
to maintain performance levels while facing increasing fatigue, and they are indirectly harmful
because they increase the length of time that a worker is exposed to other sources of workplace
stress. Despite the e¤ect of longer working hours on internal recovery, Taris et al. (2006)
suggest that internal recovery will depend mainly on the characteristics of each job and that
longer working hours will a¤ect external recovery mainly by shortening individualsrest periods.
Working longer hours will generate a spiral, since those workers who do not fully recover from
a work day will have to invest additional e¤ort in order to perform adequately during the
next day, resulting in an increased intensity of negative load reactions that require even more
recovery time (Sluiter et al. 2003).
In economics there are no formal models that explain the link between longer (shorter)
working hours and health. The closest one refers to the e¤ect of work-sharing on employment
transitions and assumes some links between hours and fatigue (see, e.g., Calmfors and Hoel
1988). Specically, it assumes that the link between hours and productivity is inversely U-
shaped. This is because individuals are productive with few hours and productivity will increase
up to a certain point, but after that point fatigue will start to kick in and productivity will
decrease. This suggests that the level of working hours would be important when someone
evaluates the health e¤ect of reducing working hours.
Additionally, there are some studies coming from the literature about promotions that sug-
gest that longer (shorter) working hours may also have some positive (negative) e¤ects as they
are positively (negatively) associated with current and future earnings, and with faster (slower)
rates of career progression (Francesconi 2001); since health improves with earnings (Deaton
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2003), higher (lower) earnings should increase (decrease) the health status of individuals. In
particular, Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1986) view promotion as a tournament, which
means that promotions are allocated to those workers who rank higher than all others in a
group in a given period. The probability of getting promoted provides an incentive for a worker
to exert e¤ort without needing any formal contract with the rm (Francesconi 2001). As this
e¤ort or propensity to work hard is not directly observable, rms will use indicators such as the
number of hours worked or overtime hours, for the purpose of selecting workers for promotion.
Thus, a mandatory reduction in working hours for treated individuals (relative to controls) will
limit the scope for competition via hours for this group of workers. This negative e¤ect on
the probability of promotions (which a¤ects the future income pattern) may have a negative
impact on health, as individuals may become concerned and stressed about their future career
and income. This e¤ect is in line with the implications derived from the ERI model (Siegrist
1996) explained above.
Therefore, all of the above evidence suggests that a reduction in working hours will have an
ambiguous e¤ect on health outcomes (a negative e¤ect through the promotions channel and a
positive e¤ect through the psychological channel); hence, empirical evidence is needed.
2.3 Empirical Evidence on Reductions of Working Hours
Despite the existence of studies that analyze the e¤ect of reductions in working hours on labour
market outcomes, welfare, family balance, and social networks, there is no evidence on the
e¤ect of this kind of policy on health outcomes. The only related evidence available is that
which focuses on analyzing the relationship between health and working hours (see Beswick and
White [2003] and van der Hulst [2003] for surveys and Yang et al. [2006] and Artazcoz et al.
[2007] for some newer evidence). These studies have the caveat that working hours and health
may be simultaneously determined because of the so-called healthy worker e¤ect (see Frijters
et al. [2009]). In a regression framework, with health as a dependent variable and working
hours as a covariate, this implies that if working hours decrease, then that reduction in working
hours may be endogenous; hence, some methods need to be applied in order to overcome this
potential bias on the coe¢ cient of working hours.
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Among those studies that try to analyze the link between working hours and health are
Bardasi and Francesconi (2000), Ulker (2006), and Llena-Nozal (2009). Bardasi and Francesconi
(2000) use longitudinal data on male and female workers drawn from the rst seven waves of
the British Household Panel Survey, 1991-1997, to study how nonstandard employment a¤ects
mental health.9 The authors use a mental health indicator as the dependent variable (derived
from the General Health Questionnaire [GHQ]) and a two-period lagged rst-di¤erence model
that yields estimates of the e¤ect of nonstandard employment on psychological well-being under
some strong orthogonality conditions on the process governing the dynamic path of unobservable
inputs. They nd that working long hours in Britain (>48 hours per week) has no impact on
GHQ scores; nevertheless, and as they recognize, even these estimates must be taken with some
caution because the imposed orthogonality conditions are strong.10
Further examples are Ulker (2006) and Llena-Nozal (2009), who use longitudinal data to
empirically assess how changes in labour market status and working conditions a¤ect health
(measured as SF36 scores and GHQ scores, respectively) in Australia (Ulker) and in several
countries (Llena-Nozal). The within-group estimators used in both studies eliminate the bias
from the time-invariant individual unobserved heterogeneity, but that does not solve the healthy
worker e¤ect that biases their results. Llena-Nozals results suggest that negative mental health
e¤ects result from working overtime hours for Australian, Canadian, and British men; no e¤ects
exist for Canadian women, Swiss men and women, or British women; and positive e¤ects exist
for Australian women. Ulkers results show a lower general health index for those men who
work long hours.
Therefore, given that there is no empirical evidence for the e¤ects of a reduction in working
hours on health outcomes, we claim to be the rst to present such evidence. In particular, and
given data limitations, we propose that our study is the rst to analyze the short-term e¤ect of a
reduction in weekly working hours on health outcomes. For this, we use an exogenous reduction
9Notice that they analyze the e¤ect of several types of nonstandard employment on health outcomes, including
long working hours.
10Apart from the strong restrictions on the process governing the temporal path of the unobserved variables
that a¤ect health outcomes, one further caveat is that their methodology assumes that changes in working hours
occur two periods before the change in mental health, which in their own words is "arguably a long period of
time".
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in working hours coming from a change in regulation. Furthermore, as the short-term e¤ect of a
reduction in working hours may depend on the level of working hours, we analyze two di¤erent
countries, each with di¤erent hour thresholds. In this way, we are able to identify the e¤ect of
an exogenous reduction in working hours on health outcomes.
2.4 Institutional Background: Portugal and France
In Portugal, a law was introduced on December 1, 1996, to gradually reduce the maximum
number of weekly working hours from 44 to 40. The law was passed because the newly elected
government wanted to speed up convergence of the "traditionally long hours of work" in Por-
tugal to the European average (Varejao 2005). This was done in two rounds and only for
private-sector workers. The rst one applied immediately (i.e., from December, 1, 1996) and
mandated a reduction of two hours for all workers who were currently working 42 hours a week
or more and a reduction for all employees who were working 40 to 42 hours per week. The
second round started on December 1, 1997, and mandated that all workweeks should meet the
new standard of 40 hours. With respect to overtime pay, the rst hour had a premium of 50%,
and the premium increased to 75% for additional overtime hours. This was not changed by
the new law (although the activation point for overtime premiums was changed to 40 hours);
nevertheless, some exibility was introduced with the new law. The reduction took into account
that the normal workweek could be dened on a four-month average. The maximum number
of hours was allowed to increase by two hours per day if the total did not exceed 10 hours per
day and 50 hours per week (Raposo and van Ours 2010). The law explicitly stated that the
monthly wage could not decrease.
In France, in June 1998 the government passed the Aubry I law. This law had two parts.
First, it established a weekly 35-hour limit in the private sector (from a previous limit of 39
hours), to begin January 1, 2000, for rms with more than 20 employees. For rms with fewer
than 20 employees, the deadline was January 1, 2002. Besides excluding workers in the public
sector, it also excluded independent workers. Before and after the reform, overtime was paid
at a higher rate 25% for the rst eight hours above the limit of 39 hours, and 50% for any
additional overtime. The law did not change these rates, but it did shift the activation point
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for the overtime premium to 35 hours. Second, the Aubry I law also established nancial
incentives for rms (payroll tax subsidies).11 Then, in January 2000, a second Aubry law was
passed (called Aubry II) in order to introduce more detailed legal provisions regarding overtime
(e.g., it introduced exibility to the adjustment to the 35-hour limit) and in order to conrm
the limit of 35 hours per week established in the Aubry I law. As in Portugal, the law explicitly
forbade a decrease in the monthly wage.
2.5 Empirical Strategy and Estimation
To study the short-term e¤ect of a reduction in working hours on health outcomes, we use a
di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach in a random-e¤ects ordered probit, which allows us to control
for individual heterogeneity as well as for the initial health status of individuals. The treated
group is dened as those individuals whose hours are just below the old threshold and above
the new one, and the control group is dened as those individuals whose hours are just below
the new threshold.
It is crucial to include individual unobservable heterogeneity in these kind of studies since,
as Adams et al. (2003) suggest, the apparent signicant causation of some covariates on health
outcomes may be due to an unobservable persistence that is correlated with covariates and
health outcomes. Also, a sequence of repeated observations on the same individuals makes
it possible to allow for unobservable but persistent di¤erences in the way that individuals
translate their perceptions of health into survey responses. This is important, since people may
di¤er in their psychological outlook and their interpretation of survey questions (Pudney 2008).
Additionally, as health studies acknowledge, controlling for previous health is important since
results show that a large part of the e¤ects of work on mental health disappears or is reduced
after including lagged mental health, conrming the hypothesis that some of the e¤ects of work
changes are driven by some preexisting condition (Llena-Nozal 2009). Unfortunately, it will not
be correct to include a lagged dependent variable as a covariate when a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
11By granting nancial incentives to alleviate labour costs, the law encouraged rms to reduce hours by 10%
and increase the number of employees by 6% before legal deadlines were set (Askenazy 2008).
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approach is used, as we would be analyzing the change of the probability of reporting a given
level of health in period t conditional on the previous health status for the pre- and post-
treatment periods for the control and treatment groups. That would force the previous health
status to be the same in post-treatment periods between the treatment and control groups.12
Thus we estimate:
hit= 
0xit+0zit1+
0gi +  0rt + 0(gi  rt)+ 0(zit1  rt) + i+"it (2.1)
(i = 1; ::::; N ; t = 2; :::; T i)
where hit is the latent health status of individual i at time t; xit is a set of observed
variables for individual i at period t which may be associated with health and zit1 is a vector of
dummies for the individuals health status in their rst year t1 (i.e. 1994), ; ; ; ;  and  are
parameters to be estimated, i is an individual-specic and time-invariant random component
which is assumed to be distributed as N(0; 2). As is typical in a di¤erence-in-di¤erence
approach, we include a group e¤ect (gi) equal to one for those individuals treated, time e¤ects
(rt) and interactions between these two (gi  rt) and whose parameter reects the di¤erence-
in-di¤erence e¤ect. Our approach would imply that the health status of the rst period would
have the same impact on the health status of the second, third, and so on periods. To allow for
di¤erent impacts of the initial health status by year, we add interactive terms (zit1  rt) between
the time e¤ect (rt) and the health status of the initial period (zit1).Thus, our interest lies in
the coe¢ cient .13 xit and zit1 are assumed uncorrelated with "it for all t. The error term "it
is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2 and uncorrelated across
12 In particular, we would be doing a ceteris paribus analysis on the change of P(yit = jj yit 1;xit;::::), which
conditions on yi;t 1for the pre- and post-treatment periods for the control and the treatment group. Therefore,
if the policy change had any e¤ect, this latter approach would be incorrect. In the Robustness of the Results
section, we also present the coe¢ cients obtained when a lagged dependent variable is included as a control instead
of the initial health status. The results do not change signicantly for Portugal, but there are some di¤erences
for France (shown below).
13This assumes homogeneous e¤ects of the treatment, which represents the change in the intercept between the
treated and control groups. To allow for heterogeneous e¤ects, one could include interactions between the group
dummy, the time e¤ect, and xit, although that would have a degrees-of-freedom cost. Therefore, we maintain
the assumption of homogeneous e¤ects. This seems reasonable, as the interactive terms added to capture the
heterogeneous e¤ects are not signicant in the cases of France and Portugal.
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individuals and waves and uncorrelated with . We set the variance of the idiosyncratic error
equal to one and as hit is not observed, we use an indicator of the category in which the latent
indicator falls (hit). The observation mechanism can be expressed as:
hit = j if j 1 < h

it  j (2.2)
j = 1; :::::;m
where 0 =  1; j  j+1; m = 1. Given that the error is normally distributed, the
probability of observing a particular category of health status (i.e. Self Assessed Health) re-
ported by individual i at time t, conditional on the covariates, initial health status and the
individual e¤ect is:
Pit;j = P (hit = j) = 

j   0xit   0zit1   0gi    0rt   0(gi  rt)    0(zit1  rt)  i
	
(2.3)
 j 1   0xit   0zit1   0gi    0rt   0(gi  rt)    0(zit1  rt)  i	
where  f:g is the standard normal distribution function. Before the actual estimation, we
need to deal with two challenges. Firstly, the random-e¤ects ordered probit, assumes that there
is no correlation between the individual e¤ect (i) and the covariates. This seems to be very
restrictive in our setting since individual unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be correlated with
the covariates (e.g. unobservable psychological characteristics that make individuals respond
in a particular way to the health survey might be correlated with covariates as age or gender).
Since the coe¢ cients estimated by the random-e¤ects estimator are in general inconsistent under
this setting (especially when T is not very large) we can use Mundlaks (1978) parameterization.
This captures the correlation between the individual e¤ect (i) and the average of the regressors.
Thus, we use:
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i = 0 + 
0
1xi + ui (2.4)
where xi is the average over the sample period of the observations on the exogenous time
variant variables. By construction ui is distributedN(0;2) and independent of the xit variables
and the idiosyncratic error term ("it).14 Thus, i in equation (2.1) is replaced by equation
(2.4).15
Before the estimation it is important to mention that there are four further issues with the
random e¤ects ordered probit estimates. The rst refers to the usefulness of the estimated
coe¢ cients, the second refers to the di¤erence between marginal e¤ects versus average partial
e¤ects, the third to the cut-shifts points problem and the fourth and nal complication refers
to inference issues. The rst aforementioned issue refers to the fact that most of the studies
which use this approach report the coe¢ cients, which in general are not very informative. This
is true in nonlinear models as the marginal e¤ects are a function of the density of the model.
In our case, the marginal e¤ects of changes in continuous regressors are:
@P (h = 0 jW )
@W
=    W 0 
@P (h = 1 jW )
@W
=


  W 0    1  W 0  (2.5)
@P (h = 2 jW )
@W
=


 
1  W 0
    2  W 0 
@P (h = 3 jW )
@W
= 
 
2  W 0


where W is the deterministic part of equation (2.1). This makes the report of coe¢ cients
even less informative since only in the case of the higher category does the sign of the coe¢ cient
14By construction refers to the fact that once the distribution of i is dened, ui has the same distribution.
15This results in a likelihood that can be easily maximized using common software (e.g. Gllamm in STATA).
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always match the sign of the marginal e¤ect and in the lower category it is equal to the opposite
of the sign of the marginal e¤ect. But what happens in the middle is ambiguous since it will
depend on the signs of the squared brackets.
The second issue refers to the fact that marginal e¤ects are calculated at the sample mean
of the covariates, but in our case, it is unlikely that the mean of the individual unobservable
heterogeneity corresponds to an actual observation. For this reason, it has been argued that it is
better to report the average partial e¤ects (APEs, Wooldridge 2002), which is the expected value
of the partial e¤ect over the distribution of . The di¤erence between the two measures is that
the marginal e¤ect is calculated at the sample mean of each regressor while the average partial
e¤ect is calculated for each observation and then is averaged over the population distribution of
heterogeneity and computed using the population averaged parameters p which in the random
e¤ect specication are given by p =
REp
(1+2)
(see Wooldridge (2002) and Greene (2008)).16
Hence, we present below the average partial e¤ect of the estimation of relevant covariates (i.e.
those related to the treatment) for each of the probabilities (i.e. the discrete version of equation
2.5).
The third refers to a potential heterogeneity with respect to cut o¤points. This is due to the
fact that population subgroups may use systematically di¤erent cut point levels when reporting
their SAH, despite having the same level of "true health". As Contoyannis et al. (2004b)
suggest, in ordered probit models like the one used in our study, the symptoms of cut-point shift
can be captured by making the cut-points dependent on some or all of the exogenous covariates
and estimating a generalized ordered probit. The problem with this approach is that in order to
separately identify the inuence of variables on latent health and measurement error, it would
be necessary to use strong a priory restrictions on which variables a¤ect health and which a¤ect
reporting behaviour. Some attempts to deal with this issue have used vignettes (e.g. Murray
et al. 2001). Lindeboom and van Doorslaer (2004) have also used a "more objective" measure
of health to study which variables may generate cut-point shifts.17 They found signicant
e¤ects of age and gender but not for other socioeconomic variables like income, education, etc.
16where p are the population averaged parameters and 
RE are the random e¤ect parameters.
17They use SAH from the Canadian National Population Health Survey and the McMaster Health Utility
Index (HUI-3) as their objective measure.
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As we do not have objective measures of health or vignettes, we follow the approach adopted
by Contoyannis et al. (2004b) which is to split the sample by gender and age groups before
estimating our models to see if there are heterogeneous e¤ects of the covariates by subgroups.
Evidence of very di¤erent results could indicate heterogeneity with respect to cut o¤ points
(van Doorslaer and Jones 2003).
The fourth refers to inference issues. In particular, the question here is where the appropriate
test of signicance should be carried out, on the APE or on the coe¢ cient. As Greene (2008)
suggests, there is not a single answer and opinions di¤er. Greene (2008) points out that "It
might logically be argued that the overall purpose of the regression analysis is to compute
the partial e¤ects, so that is where the tests should be carried out. On the other hand, the
meaning of the test with respect to the partial e¤ects is ambiguous, since they are functions
of all the parameters as well as the data.....our preference on the methodological basis is for
the structural coe¢ cients, not the partial e¤ects". Nevertheless, Greene (2008) also points out
that "Patterns of statistical signicance for the partial e¤ects will usually echo those for the
coe¢ cients themselves". Hence, we follow Greene (2008) and thus, in order to be able to make
some inference, we will present below not only the APEs but also the coe¢ cients.
2.6 Data
2.6.1 Data Description
We use the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which is a standardized panel
survey used to interview a sample of households and persons every year in the European Union.
These interviews cover a wide range of topics concerning living conditions, including the inter-
vieweesincome information, nancial situation in a wider sense, working life, housing situation,
and health, among other things. The sample size is 170,000 individuals in the initial wave for
the 12 countries included. The ECHP had a total duration of eight years, running from 1994
to 2001. The main advantage is that information is homogeneous among countries since the
questionnaire is similar in each case. This source of data is coordinated by the European
Commissions Statistical O¢ ce (EUROSTAT).
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2.6.2 Measures of Health: SAH
One of the rst concerns in studies that analyze health is how to measure it. In our case,
given that we are using regulation of working hours as one of the covariates, we needed data
that contains both the labour and health information of individuals. Because of its wide use
in health economics models, SAH is a natural choice. Several socioeconomic surveys measure
SAH and, despite some di¤erences, it has a common frame. In the ECHP, it is generally
dened by a response to the following question: would you say that your health has on the
whole been very good/good/fair/bad/very bad? SAH is measured as a categorical variable
indicator from 1 (higher category) to 5 (lower category). Since SAH is a subjective measure of
health, it is subject to criticism, as it may be a¤ected by measurement error. Furthermore, it has
been argued that the mapping of "true health" into SAH categories may vary with respondent
characteristics. This happens when population subgroups use systematically di¤erent cuto¤-
points levels when reporting their SAH, despite having the same level of "true health".18 Despite
these caveats, SAH has been used widely in previous studies of the relationships between health
and socioeconomic status (e.g., Adams et al. 2003) and between health and lifestyle (e.g.,
Contoyannis et al. 2004a). Moreover, SAH has been shown to be a powerful predictor of
subsequent mortality (e.g., Idler and Benyamini 1997) and a good predictor of subsequent
use of medical care.19 It has also been shown that inequalities in SAH predict inequalities in
mortality (e.g., van Doorslaer and Gerdtham 2003). Furthermore, an appealing characteristic of
general health measures such as SAH is their ability to encapsulate and summarize a multitude
of health conditions. This latter point is important since, in general, objective measures of
health status are rare in survey data, and where they do exist they are often too specic to
particular health conditions (Hernandez-Quevedo et al. 2005). Therefore, in our study we use
SAH as a measure of health for Portugal and France for waves 1 through 8.
It is important to mention that because of the econometric method described above, which
18This source of heterogeneity with respect to cuto¤ points has been termed "state dependent reporting bias"
(Kerkhofs and Lindeboom 1995), "scale of reference bias" (Groot 2000), and "response category cut-point shift"
(Murray et al. 2001).
19 Its predictive power does not appear to vary across socioeconomic groups (see, e.g., Burström and Fredlund
2001).
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assumes that the top category is the one with better health, we invert SAH. In this way, SAH
goes from 1 (worse health [i.e. bad]) to 4 (better health [very good]).20
2.6.3 Covariates Used
The included covariates can be divided into three groups: socioeconomic variables, occupational
and rm-related variables, and other variables. For the rst group we include dummy variables
representing marital status (married, widowed, or divorced/separated), with single as the ref-
erence category; size of the household (the number of people living in the same household);
and two dummies to account for the number of children at di¤erent ages (<12 and <16). The
income variable is the logarithm of equivalised annual household income, equivalised by the
OECD-modied scale to adjust for household size and composition.21 We include two dummies
for the highest level of educational qualication completed (second stage [ISCED 3] and third
level [ISCED 5-7]); less than second stage (ISCED 0-2) is the base group.22
For the occupational and rm-related variables, we use three dummies for the type of work
contracts (xed-term or short-term, casual work with no contract, and some other working
arrangements), where permanent employment is the base group; occupational dummies; and
industry dummies (following the ILO categories). We include dummies to control for the level
of job satisfaction, which is in line with Datta Gupta and Kristensen (2008), who use this
variable as a proxy for job stressors.23 For the other variables, we include age as a second-order
polynomial (i.e., age and age
2
100 ).
20We merged "very bad" and "bad" categories due to small sample size of the "very bad" category.
21The OEDC-modied scale gives a weight of 1 to the rst adult, 0.5 to other persons age 14 or over, and 0.3
to each child younger than 14. For each person, the "equivalised total net income" is calculated as its household
total net income divided by equivalised household size. In this case, we use the logarithm of household income
(OEDC-modied scale), taking into account the concavity in the health-income relationship.
22The ISCED classication comes from the International Standard Classication of Education from UNESCO.
It is a seven-level scale that allows for the comparison of educational levels in di¤erent countries.
23Dummies for job satisfaction levels might be endogenous. Nevertheless, we include them in the model since
in some cases they are signicant and also because their exclusion does not a¤ect the coe¢ cient of interest.
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2.6.4 Summary Statistics and the Evolution of Health Outcomes andWeekly
Working Hours
For the French case, the sample excludes those individuals who are employed in paid apprentice-
ships or training schemes, are self-employed, or are classied as unpaid family workers. We also
exclude those who do not work in the private sector, those who work in rms that have fewer
than 20 employees, or those younger than 20 or older than 60. In the French case, we observed
that until 1998 the average of weekly working hours stays right around 42 hours (see Figure
1); nevertheless, from 1998, when the policy was implemented, weekly working hours decreased
signicantly to almost 39 hours in 2000. The declining trend increased in 1999 probably in
order to meet the January 2000 deadline that the French government set when they announced
the policy. This decline in weekly working hours coincides with an overall decline in the SAH
measure (see Figure 2), which may be due to the e¤ect of age on the sampled individuals (as
found by Contoyannis et al. 2004a). However, a break in the declining trend can be found,
with a positive and not signicant e¤ect from 1998 (i.e., when the policy was implemented).
For the Portuguese case, the estimation excludes those individuals who are employed in
paid apprenticeships or training schemes, are self-employed, or are classied as unpaid family
workers. We also exclude those individuals who work in the public administration and defense
sectors and those who are younger than 20 or older than 60. As shown in Figure 1, we observe
a drop in weekly working hours from 1996 to 1997 and from 1997 to 1998, periods when
reductions in working hours took place. Furthermore, we observe a declining trend in the SAH
measure across time until 1997, then a constant level in 1998, and a slight increase in 1999.
Afterwards, it started to decrease marginally. This behaviour might suggest a lagged e¤ect on
health (examined below).
The di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach described above requires the denition of a control
group and a treatment group and a pre- and post-treatment period. For the Portuguese case, we
dened our pre-treatment period as 1994-1996 and our post-treatment period as 1997 onwards.24
24We used these groupings because all the interviews were carried out before November 1996 and the policy
change was in place from December 1, 1996.
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For the denition of the treatment and control groups, it is important to choose very similar
groups in terms of observable characteristics, to make it more likely that the unobservable
characteristics are similar as well, since the control group should reect how the treatment
group would behave in the absence of the treatment; otherwise, we would capture the joint
e¤ect of the treatment and the di¤erence in behaviour between the two groups, making it
impossible to identify the e¤ect of the treatment. For the Portuguese case, we dene our
control and treatment group as those workers who were working 37-40 hours a week and those
who were working 41-44 hours a week, respectively, just before the policy change occurred.
For the French case, we dene the control group as those individuals who were working 30-35
hours a week and the treatment group as those who were working 36-39 hours per week before
the policy change was in place. Accordingly, the di¤erence-in-di¤erences method requires the
denition of pre- and post-treatment periods. In the French case, the interviews were conducted
almost entirely in October of each year; hence, the pre-treatment period will be 1994-1997 and
the post-treatment period will be 1998 onwards.
We present the summary statistics of the dependent variable and the covariates separately
for each country, in Table 1.25 This table suggests that most of the covariate averages are very
similar when the control and treatment groups are compared in each country. This suggests
that most variables are well balanced between the control and treatment group. This is also
true when we compare the distribution of each covariate (see, e.g., the age situation in Portugal,
presented in Figure 3).26 The main di¤erences between the control and treatment groups are
in occupation and industry. These can be observed, for example, by looking at Figure 4 and
Figure 5 for the Portuguese case.27 These results were expected, as the number of job hours
di¤ers across occupations and industries, which suggests that controlling for occupation and
industry is important for our purposes.
25 In each case, we discuss the nal sample data.
26Because of the large number of gures, the rest of the distributions are not presented but are available on
request.
27Similar situations occur for France. These gures are not included but they are available on request.
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2.7 Results
2.7.1 Portugal
We compute the average partial e¤ects (APEs) for each of the four categories of SAH, but since
the total changes of these probabilities should add up to zero (and to save space), we present
the results for the best two probabilities (very good health and good health) in Table 2 for men
and women. In each case, we also separate the results by age range.28
From columns (1) and (2) of Table 2, we observed that for men younger than the average
age (37 years), the top two health categories (very good and good health, respectively) present
negative APEs for the treated group (41-44 hours) in 1997 and 1998. This would mean that in
1997, after controlling for several covariates, those treated individuals have a lower probability
of being in the top two categories (i.e., having very good or good health), but as the  coe¢ cient
in column (3) is not signicant, these variations are not statistically di¤erent from zero. The
same results are obtained for men above the average age (columns [4] and [5]). These results
imply that the policy did not a¤ect the probability of reporting very good or good health for
this group.
These previous analyses assume that the impact of the reduction in hours is contempora-
neous, but it could be the case that the impact of the policy takes time to show up in terms of
health, as might be implied by Figure 2. For this reason we repeated the previous estimation
but replaced the group dummy in year t by its one-year lagged value. In terms of equation
(2.1). This implies the replacement of gi dened at year t by gi dened at year t  1. By doing
this, we expect to capture any e¤ect due to the implementation of the policy one year later.
The results can be seen in Table 3 for men and women, each separated by age range. In all
these cases, the e¤ects are not statistically signicant and are similar to the contemporaneous
case.
28To dene the age ranges, we used the average age of the Portuguese sample, 37 years.
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2.7.2 France
The results for men below the average age of 39 years (columns [1] and [2] of Table 4) show
negative APEs for the top two health categories for the treated group (e.g., 36-39 hours) in
1998 and 1999. The  coe¢ cients are signicant at 1% and 5%, respectively. In particular,
the treatment reduces the probability of reporting very good or good health by 23 percentage
points (13 and 10 percentage points, respectively) in 1998 and by 17.5 percentage points (11
and 6.5 percentage points, respectively) in 1999. The estimated APE across all periods results
in a detriment in the probability of reporting very good health and good health by 6.0 and 4.2
percentage points, respectively.29 As the probability of reporting very good or good health in
1997 is around 67%, the e¤ect of the policy reduces the probability of reporting very good or
good health by 14.9% on average. The results for men above the average age (columns [4] and
[5] of Table 4) show no signicant e¤ects due to the policy change.
For women, results are exactly the opposite of those obtained for men. In particular, for
women below the average age, the coe¢ cient is signicant at 5% and positive in 1998 (column
[9] of Table 4). This result implies that the policy change increased the probability of reporting
very good health by 15 percentage points and caused a combined increase of 13 percentage
points in the probability of reporting very good or good health. The estimated APE across all
periods results in an average increase of 3.8 percentage points in the probability of reporting
very good health. As the pre-treatment probability of reporting very good or good health for
this group is 64% in 1997, our result suggests that the e¤ect of the policy change generated an
average increase of around 5.9% in the probability of reporting very good health.30
2.7.3 Discussion of the Results
The discussion of the results obtained above is complicated, as there are several dimensions to
consider in particular, comparisons between the treatment and control group by country, age
29This average is calculated by adding 13.1 percentage points (in 1998) plus 11 (in 1999) plus zero (in 2000 and
2001) and dividing by 4, which equals 6.0 percentage points. A similar calculation is used to get 4.2 percentage
points.
30This includes coe¢ cients that are signicant at 5% at least.
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range, and gender. Here we present some hypotheses that might explain our results. But as we
will see, more research on this topic should be done in the future.
The Trade-o¤
The nonzero e¤ect of the policy change in France and the zero e¤ect in Portugal may be
explained by drawing on both the literature on promotions and the literature on psychological
health e¤ects. On the one hand, the psychological literature suggests that a reduction in
working hours might have positive e¤ects on health since individuals will have more time to
recover (the so-called external recovery; Taris et al. 2006). On the other hand, the probability
of getting promoted provides an incentive for the worker to exert e¤ort without the need for
any formal contract with the rm (Francesconi 2001). As this e¤ort or propensity to work
hard is not directly observable, rms will use indicators, such as hours of work or overtime
hours, in selecting workers for promotion. Thus, a mandatory reduction in working hours for
treated individuals (relative to controls) will limit the scope for competition via hours for this
group of workers. This negative e¤ect on the probability of promotions (which a¤ects the future
income pattern) may have a negative impact on health, as individuals may become concerned
and stressed about their future career and income. This e¤ect is in line with the implications
derived from the e¤ort-reward imbalance (ERI) model (Siegrist 1996) explained in section 2.31
Therefore, we may have a trade-o¤ between two e¤ects.
The di¤erences for Men across Age Ranges
As individuals in Portugal already work longer hours than those in France, it would be more
di¢ cult for them to use overtime work as a way of increasing their chances of promotion.
In other words, the scope for competition through hours is lower in Portugal than in France.
Therefore, a mandatory reduction in working hours might have more negative e¤ects on treated
relative to control men in France than in Portugal.
31The ERI model acknowledges the link between high-cost/low-gain conditions, which are considered partic-
ularly stressful for example, high-e¤ort situations associated with the lack of promotion prospects (Siegrist
1996).
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Furthermore, the promotions explanation also seems to be useful to help us explain the
di¤erence between the e¤ects found for men at di¤erent age ranges in particular, for those
below versus those above the average age (i.e., those 20-38 years old versus those 39-60 years
old). This is because, if the hypothesis about the e¤ect on promotions is true, we should expect
a more negative e¤ect on those individuals who are in the beginning or early stages of their
careers relative to those who are more settled in their jobs.
The di¤erences for Women across Age Ranges
What is more di¢ cult to explain with the promotions hypothesis are the e¤ects of the reduction
in working hours on the health status of women in France. This is because, as it was stated,
our hypothesis would suggest a negative e¤ect; however, we nd a positive one. A potential
extension to our hypothesis would be that women, and especially those below the average age
(i.e., those younger than 38 years), have already internalized that the probability of promotions
in the future might be undermined by the loss of human capital due to pregnancy. Because of
that, the negative e¤ect on the probability of promotion for those treated women relative to
the control group might be smaller than the potential positive e¤ect on health, which may give
an overall positive e¤ect.
The above hypothesis is in line with what Booth and Francesconi (2000) found. They
analyzed the di¤erence of promotion predictors by gender and found that, by comparing the
e¤ects by gender, there are "striking similarities and important di¤erences". In particular,
they found that working longer overtime hours is positively associated with the probability of
promotion. As an example, they point out that the probability of promotion for men working
part-time decreases by 6 percentage points as compared to men working full-time, while the
e¤ect for women working part-time is much smaller relative to those women who work full-
time. This implies that fewer hours of work for women have a weaker negative e¤ect on the
probability of promotions, which is in line with our hypothesis above.
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2.7.4 Robustness of the Results
Attrition
Attrition, which occurs when individuals drop out, is a typical problem to deal with when
using panel data. If these individuals are missing at random, then there is no problem since
the remaining individuals will have characteristics similar to those in the initial waves. The
problem with attrition appears when attrition is endogenous (i.e., due to variables correlated
with the dependent variable).
In our case, attrition is likely to be endogenous since healthier individuals should last longer
in our panel (i.e., individuals in worse health should drop out from the panel more often than
those individuals in better health). Due to this, Jones et al. (2006) studied the health-related
non-response in the rst 11 waves of the British Household Panel Survey and the full eight
waves of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and explored its consequences
for dynamic models of the association between socioeconomic status and self-assessed health.
They use the Verbeek and Nijman (1992) test and correct for non-response (with the inverse
probability weights method) in empirical models of the e¤ect of socioeconomic status on self-
assessed health. Jones et al. (2006) found that there is health-related non-response in the data,
with those in very poor initial health more likely to drop out; nevertheless, as they point out, "a
comparison of estimates based on the balanced sample, the unbalanced sample and corrected
for non-response by using inverse probability weights shows that, on the whole, there are not
substantive di¤erences in the average partial e¤ects of the variables of interest".
To test for the possibility of endogenous attrition, we follow the same approach. That is,
we use a variable addition test as proposed by Verbeek and Nijman (1992), which tests the
signicance of an indicator that counts the number of waves observed for each individual. The
reasoning behind this test is that if non-response is random, indicators of an individuals pattern
of survey responses (e.g., number of waves [nw]) should not be associated with the outcome of
interest (health) after controlling for the observed covariates x:32 The results of this test for the
ECHP suggest that attrition is not endogenous for France, although for Portugal it is signicant
32This means that it tests a conditional independence condition E (health j x, nw)=E(health j x).
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for men and women at 10% (see Table 5). These di¤er from the results of Jones et al. (2006),
who nd that the indicator is signicant at 1%. An explanation for this di¤erence might be
that Jones et al. (2006) use the entire sample of individuals (i.e., those older than 16 who are
employed, those who are unemployed, etc.), while in our case, and since we are interested in the
e¤ect of a reduction in hours on health outcomes, we use only those who are employed and age
20-60. This subgroup is healthier on average than, for example, unemployed adults; therefore,
the ECHP is expected to have a weaker dropout rate due to health-related reasons.33
Since the test used above may have low power (Verbeek 2000),34 we investigate this issue
further. We compare the coe¢ cients of the model with the indicator relative to the coe¢ cients
of the model without the indicator. We nd that the estimates are similar, which is the same
result obtained by Contoyannis et al. (2004a) and Jones et al. (2006) (see Table 6 for the
Portuguese case, where columns [1] and [2] show the results for men and columns [3] and [4]
for women, and similarly Table 7 for the French case). This supports the idea that, even with
endogenous attrition, its existence does not a¤ect the estimates of the variables of interests.
These results are corroborated when we compare the coe¢ cients of the balanced and unbalanced
panels for men and women in Portugal (see Table 8) and France (see Table 9). Therefore, and
similarly to previous studies, we do nd some support for no signicant e¤ects of attrition bias
on the estimates of the variables of interest.35
Alternative Denition of Control Groups
To check the robustness of our results in relation to the specication of treatment and control
groups, we present the results when slight modications are introduced to the denition of the
control group range, which can be increased or decreased and where either option has benets
and costs. On the one hand, the advantage of a narrow range is that we make the control group
33Another reason for the di¤erence between our result and the one presented by Jones et al. (2006) could be
that our model includes the initial health status and its interaction with the time e¤ect as covariates, while Jones
et al. (2006) use instead a lagged dependent variable as a covariate.
34The test may have low power because it relies on the sample of observed outcomes for health and will not
capture non-response associated with idiosyncratic shocks that are not reected in observed past health.
35This can also be done by comparing the coe¢ cients with a Hausman test. We did not, however, make such a
comparison, since the coe¢ cients are almost the same with or without the indicator and the Hausman test also
has low power (see Jones et al. 2006, 14).
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as similar as possible to those in the treated group (in terms of unobservable characteristics),
and therefore it is expected that individuals in the control group respond to shocks in similar
ways as do individuals in the treatment group. On the other hand, widening the control group
range also has some advantages: rst, it increases the number of observations and, therefore, the
precision of the estimation (ceteris paribus). Second, it diminishes the problem created by the
potential misclassication of hours. Third, it reduces the impact of threats to the identication
strategy, such as spillover e¤ects and substitution between groups.
In our case, the control group denition is modied by increasing and reducing its range
for each country. Results are presented in Table 10 and Table 11 for Portugal and France,
respectively, for some of the veried cases. For Portugal we present the case when the control
group is dened as age 36-40 instead of the 37-40 age group used above. For the French case
we present the results when the control group is dened as age 31-35 instead of the 30-35 age
group used above. As can be seen, results are very similar to those presented above in each
case; therefore, conclusions do not change with changes in the denition of the control group.
Flexibility
In Portugal, greater exibility was introduced along with the reduction in hours. Greater
exibility may involve the reorganization of work; this reorganization, rather than the reduction
in hours, may a¤ect the health of individuals. This generally depends on the type of industry
and occupation, and given that we control for both, it is less likely to be the case. In France,
exibility was introduced only in 2000; hence, it should not a¤ect our results for 1998 and 1999.
Common Macro Trend and Common Support
Results, when the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach is used, rely on the crucial assumption of
a common macro trend. In practice, this means that interactions between the group dummies
and the time e¤ects in the absence of the policy change should be insignicant, because if they
were signicant it would imply that control and treatment groups behave di¤erently when there
is no policy in place. The usual method to test this when several time periods are available
106
is to check the signicance of the interactions between the group dummy and the time e¤ect
before the policy takes place.
For the Portuguese case we can observe the interaction in 1996, which is not signicant (see
Table 2). For the French case we observe the interactions for 1996 and 1997. As can be seen
for both men and women, they are not signicant (see Table 4). All these results suggest that
there are no signicant di¤erences in trajectories between the control and treatment groups
before the policy takes place.
As the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach compares the treatment group with a control group,
the latter should represent what would have happened with those treated if they had been not
been treated. In order for this to be true, one should contrast comparable individuals. This
condition is also known as full common support. In our case, this is likely since both the
treatment and control group have full common support (see, e.g., Figures 3-5) and also are
very similar in observables.36 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that they are also similar
in unobservable characteristics.
Alternative Specication
In models where health is the dependent variable, it is typical to include a lagged dependent
variable in order to try to capture health state dependence. Unfortunately, because we are
exploiting a policy change, the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient would not capture the e¤ect
of the policy change on health outcomes of period t. This is because we would be doing a ceteris
paribus analysis on the change of P(yit = jj yit 1;xit;::::), which conditions on yi;t 1for the pre-
and post-treatment periods for the control as well as for the treatment group. That would not
be correct since, for post-treatment periods, the lagged dependent variable would be forced to
be the same between the treatment and control groups, which may not be the case. Therefore,
if the policy change had any e¤ect, this latter approach would be incorrect. In any case, since
in the health economics literature it is common to include a lagged dependent variable as a
36See summary statistics above. For the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT), full common support
means that given X, the probability of being treated is less than one, that is, P(D = 1j X) < 1. This implies
that for a covariate X there are treated and control individuals, not only treated individuals.
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covariate, we present in Table 12 the coe¢ cients for France obtained when a lagged dependent
variable is included as a control instead of the initial health status. As can be seen, results are
similar with respect to those in Table 4, which uses the initial health condition as well as its
interactions with the time e¤ect, although there are some di¤erences in the signicance level
for France. As expected, results are not signicantly di¤erent for Portugal.37
Measurement Error
The ECHP data used in our study, as all survey data, might be subject to measurement
error. This is especially important for hours of work, since measurement error in this variable
could lead to misclassication of individuals into hours groups and thereby to a dilution of the
estimated e¤ect on health outcomes. As the ECHP does not include a direct question about
overtime, we might have misclassied individuals into hours groups.38 This would generate a
downward bias on our results, giving us a lower bound of the e¤ect of the policy change on health
outcomes. To test how important this e¤ect is, we exclude those sectors with higher probability
of working overtime in France and Portugal just before the policy was in place (from the
LABORSTA database).39 This probability is mainly a¤ected by occupation (economic activity).
In particular, workers in wholesale retail trade, restaurants, and hotels and in community, social,
and personal services sectors have a higher probability of working overtime in Portugal in
1996. For France, sectors with a higher probability of working overtime in 1998 are wholesale
retail trade, restaurants, and hotels, as well as real estate, renting, and business activities.
Therefore, if we do have an important misclassication due to the lack of a direct question
about overtime, we should expect our results to change by excluding workers in these categories,
since they should have higher probabilities of misclassication. Results suggest that estimates
do not change when we exclude workers in the mentioned categories; hence, it seems that
misclassication is not a signicant problem in our case.
37These results are not included but are available upon request.
38For example, someone in Portugal who reports 44 hours a week of usual hours might imply (a) 44 normal
hours and zero overtime or (b) 40 hours plus 4 hours of overtime. This is important since, without further
information, in the rst case the individual will be categorized in the treatment group and in the latter case in
the control group. The same kind of problem might arise in the French case.
39See http://laborsta.ilo.org/.
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2.8 Conclusion
The overall theoretical e¤ect of reductions in working hours on health outcomes is ambiguous,
and therefore empirical evidence is needed. Until now there has been no such empirical evidence.
To our knowledge, we provide the rst of such evidence. The identication of the health e¤ects
of reductions in working hours in a regression framework becomes complicated, as working
hours may be endogenous due to the so-called healthy worker e¤ect. This refers to the fact
that workers with good mental and physical health are generally more likely to work longer
hours than those with fair or bad health. Furthermore, as the relationship between reductions
in working hours and health may not be monotonic, it is important to take into account the
pre-treatment level of working hours.
To overcome these caveats, we exploit exogenous reductions in working hours coming from
labour regulation for two countries with two di¤erent levels of working hours (France and
Portugal, with 35 and 40 weekly hours, respectively). To enhance comparability between these
two countries, we use the European Community Household Panel dataset (ECHP) between
1994 and 2001. One of the advantages of the ECHP is that it is a homogeneous questionnaire
that includes health as well as labour information for individuals. We nd that reductions
in working hours have di¤erent e¤ects by country, gender, and age range. In particular, we
nd no signicant e¤ects for Portugal and a signicant one for France. In France, the e¤ect
is negative for men and positive for women, and in both cases the e¤ect is signicant only for
younger individuals. Furthermore, for men (women), the results by country may imply that
the relationship between hours and health may not be monotonic, as the country with a lower
threshold of working hours (i.e., France) presents negative (positive) e¤ects of the reduction in
weekly hours, while the country with the higher threshold (i.e., Portugal) presents no signicant
e¤ects.
These results may be explained by the trade-o¤ between the psychological and promotions
hypotheses, where the latter seems to have stronger e¤ects than the former for young men in
France, while the reverse is true for young women. This opposite result may be found because
the promotion channel has weaker e¤ects on young women, who already internalize the e¤ect
of pregnancy on their promotion pattern. From our results, we conclude that reductions in
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working hours need to be more carefully applied, as there are some levels of working hours that
do not justify a legally imposed further reduction, since some groups may be worse o¤. Finally,
it could be the case that the relationship between the psychological and promotions hypotheses
might behave di¤erently when higher thresholds of working hours are investigated. That may
be the case represented by Portugal, where no e¤ects were found. However, as an extension
to further test this latter hypothesis, researchers could analyze reductions in working hours in
countries with higher thresholds of working hours.
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Table No1
Summary Statistics for Portugal and France
ECHP
Portugal France
Control Treated Di¤erence Control Treated Di¤erence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SAH 1-4 (Bad & Very Bad-Very Good) 2.33 2.33 0.00 2.71 2.81 -0.10
Weekly Hours 39.8 43.2 -3.40*** 33.1 38.7 -5.60***
ln(Household income) 14.6 14.5 0.01 12.5 12.5 0.00
Age (between 20-60 years old) 36.9 34.7 2.20 39.2 38.6 0.65
Female (male=0, female=1) 0.42 0.44 -0.02 0.79 0.38 0.40***
Children <12 1.64 1.60 0.04 1.53 1.58 -0.05
Children <16 1.80 1.79 0.01 1.83 1.83 0.00
Job satisfaction 1 (Not at all satised) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01
Job satisfaction 2 (Largely unsatised) 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00
Job satisfaction 3 (Mildly unsatised) 0.20 0.24 -0.04 0.10 0.14 -0.04
Job satisfaction 4 (Mildly satised) 0.51 0.53 -0.03 0.36 0.33 0.03
Job satisfaction 5 (Largely satised) 0.20 0.15 0.05 0.41 0.43 -0.02
Job satisfaction 6 (Fully satised) 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03
Educ 1 (3rd level = ISCED 5-7) 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.17 0.18 -0.01
Educ 2 (2nd stage = ISCED 3) 0.18 0.07 0.11*** 0.41 0.45 -0.04
Educ 3 (Less than 2nd stage = ISCED 0-2) 0.77 0.91 -0.14*** 0.42 0.37 0.05
Household size 3.81 3.89 -0.08 3.37 3.21 0.16
***p<1%,**p<5% and *p<10%
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Table 1(cont)
Summary Statistics for Portugal and France
ECHP
Portugal France
Control Treated Di¤erence Control Treated Di¤erence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
M. Status 1 (Married) 0.68 0.65 0.03 0.70 0.60 0.10***
M. Status 2 (separated/divorced & widowed) 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.08 -0.01
M. Status 3 (single) 0.26 0.30 -0.04 0.23 0.32 -0.09***
Type of Contract 1 (permanent) 0.78 0.85 -0.07*** 0.80 0.86 -0.06
Type of Contract 2 (xed/short-term ) 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.09 0.05
Type of Contract 3 (work with no contract) 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
Type of Contract 4 (other) 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
Occup. 1 (Legislators/Senior O¢ cers/Managers) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00
Occup. 2 (Professionals) 0.04 0.02 0.02*** 0.05 0.02 0.03***
Occup. 3 (Technical and associate professionals) 0.09 0.03 0.06*** 0.11 0.18 -0.07***
Occup. 4 (Clerks) 0.17 0.05 0.12*** 0.30 0.18 0.12***
Occup. 5 (Service and shopping) 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.21 0.09 0.12***
Occup. 6 (Skilled agriculture and sherman) 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01
Occup. 7 (Craft and related) 0.21 0.44 -0.23*** 0.06 0.22 -0.16***
Occup. 8 (Operators and assemblers) 0.12 0.14 -0.02 0.09 0.21 -0.12***
Occup. 9 (Elementary occupations) 0.17 0.14 0.03 0.15 0.07 0.08***
***p<1%,**p<5% and *p<10%
114
Table 1(cont)
Summary Statistics for Portugal and France
ECHP
Portugal France
Control Treated Di¤erence Control Treated Di¤erence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ind. 1 (Agric., hunting, forestry and shing) 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00
Ind. 2 (Mining and quarrying) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00
Ind. 3 (Electricity, gas and water) 0.03 0.01 0.02*** 0.02 0.02 0.00
Ind. 4 (Manufacturing) 0.23 0.45 -0.22*** 0.21 0.39 -0.18***
Ind. 5 (Construction) 0.14 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.10 -0.08***
Ind. 6 (wholesale and retail trade, etc) 0.12 0.18 -0.06*** 0.20 0.19 0.01
Ind. 7 (Hotels and restaurants) 0.04 0.08 -0.04*** 0.04 0.01 0.03**
Ind. 8 (Transport, storage and communication) 0.08 0.03 0.05*** 0.03 0.02 0.01
Ind. 9 (Financial Intermediation) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.00
Ind. 10 (R. state renting and business activities) 0.05 0.01 0.04*** 0.09 0.09 0.00
Ind. 11 (Public admin. and defense) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ind. 12 (Education) 0.10 0.01 0.09*** 0.04 0.01 0.03***
Ind. 13 (Health and social work) 0.06 0.03 0.03*** 0.13 0.06 0.07***
Ind. 14 (Other community and social activities) 0.07 0.02 0.05*** 0.14 0.03 0.11***
***p<1%,**p<5% and *p<10%
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Table 2
Average Partial E¤ects in Portugal, by Gender and Age Range, of the Hours
Reduction in Period t in IndividualsSelf-Assessed Health in Period t
Men Women
Age 20-36 Age 37-60 Age 20-36 Age 37-60
Health Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE
Good Good Good Good
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1996 0.017 0.014 0.18 0.004 0.023 0.11 0.007 0.021 0.13 0.005 0.042 0.19
1997 -0.008 -0.010 -0.10 0.002 0.014 0.07 0.001 0.001 0.01 -0.004 -0.048 -0.21
1998 -0.021 -0.016 -0.21 0.001 0.007 0.03 -0.005 -0.019 -0.11 -0.003 -0.026 -0.11
1999 -0.008 -0.011 -0.10 0.005 0.031 0.15 -0.002 -0.007 -0.04 -0.001 -0.009 -0.04
2000 -0.016 -0.023 -0.20 -0.005 -0.042 -0.19 -0.001 -0.001 -0.01 -0.002 -0.025 -0.11
2001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.02 -0.006 -0.049 -0.22 -0.001 -0.005 -0.03 -0.004 -0.037 -0.16
Obs. 4,206 3,414 2,586 1,906
ICC 0.72 0.88 0.83 0.85
Cuto¤ points as well as the estimated coe¢ cients of the rest of the covariates are not reported, but are
available on request. ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2
. The estimation is carried out
with clustered standard errors at the individual level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
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Table 3
Average Partial E¤ects in Portugal, by Gender and Age Range, of the Hours
Reduction in Period t in IndividualsSelf-Assessed Health in Period t+1
Men Women
Age 20-36 Age 37-60 Age 20-36 Age 37-60
Health Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE
Good Good Good Good
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1996 0.017 0.016 0.19 0.001 0.001 0.01 0.011 0.033 0.20 0.010 0.072 0.34
1997 -0.008 -0.013 -0.11 0.002 0.010 0.05 0.003 0.012 0.07 -0.002 -0.020 -0.09
1998 -0.023 -0.019 -0.24 0.001 0.004 0.02 -0.040 -0.015 -0.08 -0.001 -0.004 -0.02
1999 -0.009 -0.013 -0.11 0.003 0.018 0.09 -0.001 -0.001 -0.01 -0.001 -0.001 -0.01
2000 -0.013 -0.021 -0.17 -0.008 -0.065 -0.30 -0.004 -0.017 -0.10 -0.003 -0.032 -0.15
2001 -0.008 -0.012 -0.10 -0.010 -0.078 -0.36 -0.002 -0.007 -0.04 -0.003 -0.030 -0.14
Obs. 3,639 3,159 2,098 1,733
ICC 0.79 0.90 0.82 0.87
Cuto¤ points as well as the estimated coe¢ cients of the rest of the covariates are not reported, but are
available on request. ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2
. The estimation is carried out
with clustered standard errors at the individual level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
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Table 4
Average Partial E¤ects in France, by Gender and Age Range, of the Hours
Reduction in Period t in IndividualsSelf-Assessed Health in Period t
Men Women
Age 20-38 Age 39-60 Age 20-38 Age 39-60
Health Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE
Good Good Good Good
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1996 0.047 -0.003 0.22 0.093 0.052 0.61 0.043 0.005 0.24 0.014 0.019 0.13
1997 -0.030 -0.005 -0.16 0.022 0.023 0.18 0.073 0.001 0.39 0.011 0.012 0.10
1998 -0.131 -0.101 -0.93*** -0.009 -0.012 -0.08 0.153 -0.025 0.74** 0.016 0.017 0.14
1999 -0.110 -0.065 -0.72** 0.100 0.052 0.65 0.054 0.004 0.29 0.003 0.004 0.03
2000 -0.033 -0.060 -0.18 0.047 0.039 0.36 0.044 0.005 0.24 0.043 0.035 0.34
2001 -0.064 -0.020 -0.37 0.006 0.008 0.06 0.121 -0.012 0.61* 0.003 0.004 0.03
Obs. 3,876 4,585 2,214 2,204
ICC 0.49 0.56 0.56 0.66
Cuto¤ points as well as the estimated coe¢ cients of the rest of the covariates are not reported, but are
available on request. ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2
. The estimation is carried out
with clustered standard errors at the individual level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
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Table 5
Test for Endogenous Attrition for Portugal
Portugal France
Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Numwaves 0.020* 0.028* -0.012 0.018
(0.012) (0.016) (0.010) (0.014)
Clustered standard errors are at the individual level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
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Table 6
Coe¢ cients of the Random-E¤ect Ordered Probit for Portugal
in the Unbalanced Case with and without the Attrition Indicators
Men Women
No With No With
Indicator Indicator Indicator Indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1996 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.16
1997 0.01 0.01 -0.08 -0.08
1998 0.18 0.17 -0.11 -0.11
1999 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
2000 -0.14 -0.14 -0.05 -0.05
2001 -0.05 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09
ICC 0.77 0.78 0.84 0.86
Log Likelihood -5,263 -5,263 -3,261 -3,261
Obs. 7,620 4,492
ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2
. Clustered standard errors are at the individual
level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
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Table 7
Coe¢ cients of the Random-E¤ect Ordered Probit for France
in the Unbalanced Case with and without the Attrition Indicators
Men Women
No With No With
Indicator Indicator Indicator Indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1996 0.43 0.43 0.02 0.03
1997 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.14
1998 -0.48** -0.48** 0.33 0.33
1999 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
2000 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.19
2001 -0.15 -0.15 0.12 0.12
ICC 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.58
Log Likelihood -7,283 -7,283 -3,707 -3,707
Obs. 8,461 4,418
ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2
. Clustered standard errors are at the individual
level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
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Table 8
Comparison of Coe¢ cients Between the Balanced and Unbalanced Panel for
Portugal
Balanced Unbalanced
Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1996 0.19 0.24 0.13 0.15
1997 0.08 -0.19 0.01 -0.08
1998 0.27 -0.06 0.18 -0.11
1999 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.04
2000 -0.26 -0.17 -0.14 -0.05
2001 -0.13 -0.04 -0.05 -0.09
ICC 0.70 0.78 0.77 0.84
Log Likelihood -2,726 -1,403 -5,263 -3,261
Obs. 2,989 2,069 7,620 4,492
ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2
. Clustered standard errors are at the individual
level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
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Table 9
Comparison of Coe¢ cients Between the Balanced and Unbalanced Panel
for France
Group 1
Balanced Unbalanced
Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1996 0.32 0.08 0.43 0.02
1997 -0.03 0.18 0.01 0.14
1998 -0.39** 0.36 -0.48** 0.33
1999 0.07 0.15 0.03 0.03
2000 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.19
2001 -0.18 0.21 -0.15 0.12
ICC 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.58
Log Likelihood -2,711 -1,316 -7,283 -3,707
Obs. 3,289 1,645 8,461 4,418
ICC is the intraclass correlation, which is equal to
2
1+2
. Clustered standard errors are at the individual
level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
123
Table 10
Average Partial E¤ects in Portugal, by Age Group and Gender, of the Hours
Reduction in Period t in Individuals Self-Assessed Health in Period t (Control
Group Redened as 36-40).
Men Women
Age 20-36 Age 37-60 Age 20-36 Age 37-60
Health Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE
Good Good Good Good
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1996 0.013 0.011 0.13 0.002 0.014 0.07 -0.001 -0.001 -0.01 0.002 0.021 0.09
1997 -0.014 -0.019 -0.17 0.001 0.010 0.05 0.014 0.019 0.19 -0.007 -0.076 -0.34
1998 -0.023 -0.021 -0.24 0.002 0.007 0.04 -0.013 -0.031 -0.23 -0.005 -0.053 -0.24
1999 -0.016 -0.024 -0.20 0.006 0.032 0.16 -0.003 -0.004 -0.05 -0.002 -0.020 -0.09
2000 -0.016 -0.024 -0.21 -0.006 -0.044 -0.20 -0.002 -0.004 -0.04 -0.005 -0.054 -0.24
2001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.02 -0.007 -0.055 -0.26 -0.002 -0.006 -0.03 -0.005 -0.054 -0.24
Obs. 4,244 3,491 2,631 2,010
ICC 0.70 0.87 0.87 0.89
Cuto¤ points, as well as the estimated coe¢ cients of the rest of the covariates, are not reported but are
available on request. ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2
. The estimation is carried out
with clustered standard errors at the individual level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
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Table 11
Average Partial E¤ects in France, by Age Group and Gender, of the Hours
Reduction in Period t in Individuals Self-Assessed Health in Period t (Control
Group Redened as age 31-35)
Men Women
Age 20-38 Age 39-60 Age 20-38 Age 39-60
Health Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE
Good Good Good Good
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1996 0.019 -0.006 0.79 0.113 0.054 0.72 -0.009 -0.003 -0.06 0.033 0.056 0.35
1997 0.044 -0.002 0.21 0.003 0.004 0.03 0.087 -0.001 0.45 0.006 0.008 0.06
1998 -0.091 -0.043 -0.56** -0.002 -0.010 -0.07 0.130 -0.015 0.64** 0.029 0.027 0.24
1999 -0.085 -0.037 -0.51** 0.091 0.050 0.64 0.046 0.005 0.25 0.015 0.016 0.13
2000 -0.016 -0.002 -0.09 -0.015 -0.022 -0.14 0.008 0.002 0.05 0.031 0.028 0.25
2001 -0.037 -0.007 -0.20 0.061 0.163 0.81 0.160 -0.027 0.77* 0.012 0.013 0.10
Obs. 3,842 4,559 2,118 2,085
ICC 0.49 0.56 0.52 0.67
Cuto¤ points, as well as the estimated coe¢ cients of the rest of the covariates, are not reported but are
available on request. ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2
. The estimation is carried out
with clustered standard errors at the individual level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
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Table 12
Average Partial E¤ects in France, by Gender and Age Range, of the Hours
Reduction in Period t in IndividualsSelf-Assessed Health in Period t. Model with
a Lagged Dependent Variable as a Covariate.
Men Women
Age 20-38 Age 39-60 Age 20-38 Age 39-60
Health Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE Very Good RE
Good Good Good Good
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1996 0.035 -0.001 0.16 0.096 0.058 0.62 0.048 0.006 0.26 -0.002 -0.003 -0.02
1997 -0.012 -0.002 -0.06 0.034 0.035 0.26 0.066 0.004 0.34 0.017 0.018 0.14
1998 -0.127 -0.113 -0.88*** -0.010 -0.016 -0.10 0.147 -0.019 0.69** 0.025 0.025 0.20
1999 -0.081 -0.039 -0.48 0.110 0.059 0.69 0.024 0.005 0.13 0.013 0.015 0.11
2000 -0.033 -0.008 -0.17 0.032 0.034 0.24 0.036 0.006 0.19 0.050 0.039 0.37
2001 -0.077 -0.036 -0.45 -0.009 -0.014 -0.08 0.112 -0.006 0.54 0.001 0.002 0.01
Obs. 3,419 4,357 1,931 2,071
ICC 0.32 0.33 0.45 0.38
Cuto¤ points, as well as the estimated coe¢ cients of the rest of the covariates, are not reported but are
available on request. ICC is the intraclass correlation which is equal to
2
1+2
. The estimation is carried out
with clustered standard errors at the individual level. *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%.
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Chapter 3
The unintended consequences of
Childcare Regulation: A Regression
Discontinuity Approach
3.1 Introduction
Childcare policies have been publicly debated since at least the 19th century, as the Industrial
Revolution was fueled in part by the economic necessity of many women, single and married,
to nd wage work outside their homes.1 Childcare policies have been designed mainly to
strengthen the parent-child link without negatively a¤ecting parentslabour market situation.
This is particularly important in the Chilean case, as female participation in the labour market
is low (47%; INE 2011) relative to other OECD countries (57%; OECD 2010).2
1See, for example, "The History of Child Care in the U.S.," which points out that "To draw attention to
the need for child care and to demonstrate approved methods of rearing children from infancy on, . . .
a group of prominent New York philanthropists led by Josephine Jewell Dodge set up a Model Day Nurs-
ery in the Childrens Building at the 1893 Worlds Columbian Exhibition in Chicago and then went on to
found the National Federation of Day Nurseries (NFDN), the rst nationwide organization devoted to this is-
sue, in 1898" (Sonya Michel, The History of Child Care in the U.S., The Social Welfare History Project,
http://www.socialwelfarehistory.com/programs/child-care-the-american-history/).
2Actually, Chile has one of the lowest rates of female labour market participation (above only Mexico, Turkey,
and Italy) among OECD countries (OECD 2010).
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Previous empirical literature on childcare policies can be classied into two main strands.
On the one hand, there are studies that analyze the e¤ects of childcare policies on the develop-
ment of childrens cognitive abilities (see Baker, Gruber, and Milligan 2005; Berlinski, Galiani,
and Gertler 2009; Berlinski, Galiani, and Manacorda 2008; Bernal 2008; Carneiro, Löken, and
Salvanes 2009; Herbst and Tekin 2010; and Urzúa and Veramendi 2011). On the other hand,
there are studies that analyze the e¤ects of childcare policies on womens labour market par-
ticipation and employment (see Baker, Gruber, and Milligan 2005; Berlinsky and Galiani 2007;
Betancor 2011; Blau and Tekin 2003; Cascio 2006; Encina and Martínez 2009; Gelbach 2002;
Guzmán 2009; Jaumotte 2003; Schlosser 2011; and UNDP 2008).
There is no empirical evidence on who bears (i.e., pays) the nancial burden of childcare
regulation when it is not publicly funded. This is important since, if childcare is indeed paid
for by rms, legislation that mandates that rms provide childcare is a tax on female workers
in the sense that it creates a disincentive to hire female workers. However, if rms are not
paying, someone else must. Thus, the objective of this study is to present, for the rst time,
evidence about who bears the nancial burden of childcare (i.e., rms or employees). In order
to do this, we study Chilean childcare regulation in which the Labour Code establishes that
rms must bear the nancial responsibility for childcare. In particular, Article 203 states that
"every rm with more than 20 female workers, regardless of their age and marital status, has
to provide childcare facilities within rm premises so that mothers can feed their children and
leave them there while working". It also states that "it will be understood that rms fulll this
obligation if they pay the cost of a private childcare facility". This article also establishes that
the employer will have to pay for the female workerstransportation costs, in case the childcare
facility is located outside of the rm. Additionally, Article 206 states that female workers are
granted up to one hour within the day to feed their children (if the childcare facility is located
outside of the rm, there is a time extension to account for the time spent travelling from the
rm to the facility and back), which is considered a worked hour. Currently, these regulations
apply to female workers with children ages 6-24 months only (as women are granted sixth month
maternity leaves).
Therefore, Chilean regulation theoretically imposes an additional cost to rms since, after a
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certain number of female workers, rms have to bear costs such as childcare provision, potential
productivity losses for the rm due to the time spent by the female worker feeding her child,
and, on occasion, the transportation costs to the childcare facility. In order to explore whether
rms are indeed bearing these costs, we exploit the discontinuity given by Chilean regulation to
compare wages of workers just above and just below the threshold specied in the regulation,
using a regression discontinuity (RD) design (Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw 2001; Imbens
and Lemieux 2008; Lee 2008; Lee and Lemieux 2010). If wages are lower for workers just
above the threshold, it could imply that rms are transferring the costs on to their workers. If
rms do not transfer all the cost, and if men and women are substitutes, there should be an
employment composition e¤ect, as it would be more convenient to hire relatively more men.
Thus, we extend the analysis to the employment composition by analyzing it for those rms
just below and just above the threshold.
For our study we use administrative data from the unemployment insurance system, pro-
vided by the Chilean Ministry of Labour. We show that even if the rm theoretically (legally)
bears the nancial cost of childcare, workers pay most of the "childcare bill" (nearly 90% of it)
in the end, through lower wages.
Providing this empirical evidence is important, as there are several countries with systems
in which the employer is responsible for childcare provision (such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela). Fur-
thermore, learning from this evidence is also important; should those countries with mixed
systems (such as Denmark, France, and Panama) or with no legally mandated private childcare
(such as Cuba, El Salvador, and the United States) wish to modify their childcare policies, they
may learn the e¤ects of changing their systems to one with privately funded childcare, as in
Chile.
This study is organized as follows: section 3.2 describes the institutional background, its
evolution, and the economic incentives generated by it. In section 3.3 we present our empirical
strategy, and in section 3.4 we present the data and the summary statistics. Finally, section 3.5
displays our results and presents robustness checks for our estimates, and section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Institutional Background
Article 203 of the Chilean Labour Code has a long history. In 1917, it was established for the
rst time a law (No. 3,185) focused on childcare. This law established the employers obligation
to provide childcare within the rm if the rm had more than 50 female workers.
In 1931, the law was modied to lower the threshold of female workers from 50 to 20. Later,
in 1981, the law was further modied to allow rms to provide childcare by paying an external
private childcare provider (authorized by JUNJI).3
Since 1981, Article 203 has established that:
 Every rm with 20 or more female workers, regardless of their age or marital status, must
provide childcare facilities within the rm premises so that mothers can feed their children
and leave them there while working.
 Firms may fulll this obligation by paying the cost of a private childcare facility.
This article also states that if the childcare facility provided by the employer is outside
of the rm, the employer must pay the transportation costs that the female worker incurs.
Additionally, Article 206 establishes that female workers are granted up to 1 hour within the
day to feed their children (if the childcare facility is located outside of the rm, there is a time
extension to account for the time spent travelling from the rm to the facility and back), which
is considered a worked hour. Hence, all of the rms that are a¤ected by Article 203 must also
fulll the obligations established by Article 206.
Currently, Article 203 of the Labour Code a¤ects relatively few rms. However, it a¤ects a
large proportion of female dependent workers. Given the data supplied by the Chilean Ministry
of Labour, as of October 2010, only 3% of rms in Chile (around 9,300) have 20 or more female
workers. Nevertheless, these few rms employ more than 71% of dependent female workers,
3JUNJI stands for Junta Nacional de Jardines Infantiles, Chiles national organization of public childcare
centres.
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which makes the childcare costs faced by these rms quite high. Some descriptive statistics are
shown in Table 1.
Finally, it is important to mention that if rms do not fulll their obligations under Article
203, the penalty reaches 70 UTM per employee.4 Given this, the number of rms that do not
fulll their obligations is very low. For example, in 2011, only 118 rms were found to have
neglected their responsibilities, according to information provided by the Chilean Ministry of
Labour.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
The way Article 203 operates allows us to use the discontinuity generated when a rm moves
from 19 to 20 female workers since, from that point, it is mandatory for the rm to provide
childcare services (inside or outside the rms premises). This rule makes it possible to identify
the impact of this regulation on the desired outcomes.
From now on, we will refer to treatmentwhen Article 203 is activated (i.e., the rm has
20 or more female workers). In this way, let us call yi1 the variable of interest (e.g., wages) for
individual i if she receives the treatment (i.e., works in a treated rm) and yi0 otherwise. Thus,
an individual will be treated if she works in a rm with 20 or more female workers.
Let us call di the treatment variable for worker i, dened as follows:
di =
8><>:
1 if Ni  20
0 if Ni < 20
where Ni is the number of female workers in the rm of worker i. Let the outcome of
untreated individuals be dened by the following linear model:
4UTM stands for Unidad Tributaria Mensual and is a monthly ination-indexed measure. As of early May
2012, 1 UTM is equal to nearly US$81.
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y0i = +  Ni + ui (3.1)
and let the outcome of the treated individuals be dened by the homogeneous treatment
e¤ect model:
y1i = y0i + ' (3.2)
Hence, the regression model will be:
yi = +  Ni + '  di + ui (3.3)
where parameter ' is the one of interest as it captures the e¤ect of the treatment. Following
Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw (2001), the parameter of interest can be expressed as:
' =
limN!20+ E(yijNi = N)  limN!20  E(yijNi = N)
limN!20+ E(dijNi = N)  limN!20  E(dijNi = N)
(3.4)
where limN!20+ is the limit from the right of the threshold and limN!20 from the left side.
We consider a sharp regression discontinuity design, that is, only individuals that are in rms
with 20 or more female workers are treated. Thus, we can rewrite equation (3.4) as follows:
' = lim
N!20+
E(yijNi = N)  lim
N!20 
E(yijNi = N) (3.5)
Because limN!20+ E(dijNi = N)   limN!20  E(dijNi = N) = 1 by denition. In order to
allow for the existence of nonlinearities between the forcing variable (number of female workers
within the rm) and the outcomes, we consider a smooth function f(Ni) of the number of female
workers in the rm in our regression model. Additionally, we include variables that may a¤ect
the dependent variable, denoted by vector zi. Given these, we estimate the following equation:
yi = f(Ni) + '  di + z0i + ui (3.6)
where u is an error term such that E(ujd; z) = 0.
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3.3.1 Parametric versus Non-Parametric
For a model such as the one presented above, the existing literature has used two approaches for
the estimation: the parametric and the nonparametric (see Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw
[2001], Imbens and Lemieux [2008], and Lee and Lemieux [2010] for a detailed discussion).
In the parametric case, the simplest model is just to assume that f(Ni) is linear. However,
that would be too restrictive. A more general case would be to allow for the existence of
nonlinearities (i.e. f(Ni) may be not linear). To allow for this, we include polynomial functions
of Ni in the model. One of the advantages of the parametric approach is that it is more e¢ cient
when the functional form is correct. However, if the functional form is incorrect, our results
will be biased.5 Another disadvantage of the parametric approach is that it provides estimates
of the regression function over all values of Ni, while the RD design focuses on local estimates
of the regression function at the cuto¤ point (Lee and Lemieux 2010).
In the nonparametric case, kernel regressions or local linear regressions can be used. Both
are local methods, as they use data around the cuto¤ point to estimate the e¤ect of the policy
change on the desired outcome. However, kernel regression presents a boundary problem when
applied in an RD design. This is because we are estimating a point e¤ect at a boundary, which
implies that kernel regression will be a weighted average of one-sided data points that will
generate a systematic bias in the estimates (see Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw [2001] for a
formal derivation of the bias). A solution to this problem has been suggested by Hahn, Todd,
and van der Klaauw (2001), who propose using local linear regression to reduce the importance
of the bias.6
As Lee and Lemieux (2010) point out, it is advisable to use both approaches (parametric and
nonparametric) when estimating the smooth function, as neither alone presents the supreme
solution regarding functional form problems. Therefore, the econometrician should see them
more as complements than substitutes.
5For example, if the data suggest a nonlinear model when we estimate a linear one, the results might suggest
a discontinuity when, in reality, it is just a nonlinear movement of the data.
6Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001) show that the remaining bias is of an order of magnitude lower and
is comparable to the usual bias in kernel regression at interior points.
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The discrete nature of our assignment variable (number of female workers) has implications
on the specication choice. Lee and Card (2008) state that, in this case, the conditions of the
nonparametric estimation methods are not met, which implies that the model is not nonpara-
metrically identied. The reason for this, given by the authors, is that even with an innite
amount of data, there would be no data in a region in an "arbitrarily" small neighborhood
around the cuto¤ point. Consequently, they suggest that "one must use regressions to estimate
the conditional expectation of the outcome variable at the cuto¤point by extrapolation". Thus,
the parametric approach should be used for estimation.
In a more recent article, Lee and Lemieux (2010) point out that the discreteness of the
assignment variable does not introduce important econometric complications for the parametric
estimation, provided that this variable is not too coarsely distributed (as in our case).7 As
suggested by Lee and Card (2008), if the polynomial function is correct, then least-squares
inference is appropriate. However, as the true functional form is always unknown, the authors
propose a procedure for inference that explicitly acknowledges errors in whatever parametric
functional form is chosen. In this way, the authors propose at least the use of clustered standard
errors.8
Given this, we use the parametric approach as our baseline case. However, since the distinc-
tion between when a running variable is discrete and when it is continuous in practical terms
is somehow always arbitrary (since, strictly speaking, the running variable is always discrete),
we also estimate the model using the nonparametric approach.
7Additionally, Lee and Lemieux (2010) point out that the discreteness of the assignment variable simplies
the problem of bandwidth choice when graphing the data, as "one can simply compute and graph the mean of
the outcome variable for each value of the discrete assignment variable".
8Lee and Card (2008) suggest that one should not assume that the functional form "correctly" describes the
underlying regression function, since there may be a deviation between them. The authors model any deviation
of the true conditional means from the parametric function as a random specication error with an unknown
variance, which induces a within-group correlation in the error. This implies that conventional standard error
formulas understate the variablility of the least-squares estimate of the discontinuity gap. In this way, the authors
propose the use of clustered standard errors, which lead to wider condence intervals that reect the imperfect
t of the parametric function away from the discontinuity point.
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3.3.2 The Model
Our parametric specication is presented in the following equation:
yi =  +
pX
j=1
j(Ni   20)j + '  di + z0i + ui
And the estimated parameters are given by:
(^; '^; ^; ^) = argmin(;';;)
nX
i=1
0@yi      pX
j=1
j(Ni   20)j   '  di   z0i
1A2
where p is the maximum degree of the polynomial introduced in the specication, f(Ni) isPp
j=1 j(Ni  20)j , where j is a parameter that quanties the e¤ect on the outcome of the jth
power of the deviation (Ni   20). In this case the treatment is captured by the parameter '^.9
On the other hand, our nonparametric specication is estimated using local linear regressions
(see Fan 1992; Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw 2001; and Imbens and Lemieux 2008) on both
sides of the discontinuity point. Thus, the estimated parameters of this specication are:
(^
+
; b+; ^+) = argmin(+;'+;+) nX
i=1
(yi   +   +(Ni   20)  z0+i +)2K

Ni   20
h
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(3.7)
(^
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; b ; 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 ) nX
i=1
(yi        (Ni   20)  z0 i  )2K

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h

I(Ni < 20)
(3.8)
where  is a parameter that quanties the e¤ect on the outcome of the deviation (Ni 20),K
is a kernel function and h is the bandwidth. The variable I() is an index function which takes
9Where '^ is the degree to which the rm passes on childcare costs to its workers.
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the value 1 when the condition in the brackets takes place and 0 otherwise. The treatment
e¤ect is the di¤erence of the linear predictions at the discontinuity point of the right and left
local linear regressions. Hence, the treatment e¤ect for the nonparametric specication will be
given by the parameter '^ = ^
+   ^ .
The kernel function used is the triangular kernel.10 This is because, as Cheng, Fan, and
Marron (1997) demonstrate, the triangular kernel has asymptotic mean squared error minimiz-
ing properties for boundary estimation problems.11 For the selection of the bandwidth, there
are two traditional methods: (1) ad hoc methods and (2) data-driven methods such as cross-
validation (Ludwig and Miller 2007).12 We use the data-driven approach, in particular Ludwig
and Millers method (LM), for our baseline estimation.
3.4 Data and Summary Statistics
We use cross-sectional data from the Chilean unemployment insurance system from October
2010, provided by the Ministry of Labour. This database contains information about individuals
who are a¢ liated with this system, either since its origins in October 2002 or since they found
a dependent job in the private sector after that date.13
Table 1 presents the distribution of female and male workers and rms by their numbers of
female workers (fewer than 20 and 20 or more). As outlined above, we see that female workers
tend to be concentrated in rms with 20 or more female workers (almost 72% are working
in such rms), while the distribution of male workers is relatively homogeneous among these
categories. When analyzing the number of rms in both groups, we see that nearly 97% of
the rms have fewer than 20 female workers. However, this distribution of rms tends to be
inherent to the Chilean economy, in which approximately 90% of the rms have fewer than
10Where the triangular kernel is: K(u) = (1  juj)1fjuj1g .
11Other kernels could also be used; however, the choice of kernel typically has little impact in practice (Lee
and Lemieux 2010).
12More details are given in the appendix.
13This insurance system started in October 2002; currently, more than 94% of dependent workers are a¢ liated
with the system. The unemployment insurance system excludes independent and public sector workers.
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20 workers (men and women) according to information provided by the Chilean Ministry of
Labour.
Since our main focus is on fertile female workers, we examine the economic sectors in which
such women are more concentrated. Table 2 presents the distribution of fertile female workers
across di¤erent types of industries.14 As can be seen, nearly 80% of the fertile female workers are
concentrated in three types of industries commerce, nancial services, and social services.15
Hence, we focus on these industries. Given the high dispersion observed in the data, we deleted
those individuals earning the highest and lowest 5% of the wages within the sample.
In this section we present the summary statistics of the data set used. Also, in order to give
support to the validity of our estimation procedure, we present a graphic analysis of the used
variables (as suggested by Imbens and Lemieux [2008]). Table 3 presents the summary statistics
for fertile female workers (between 18 and 49 years old), separated by the size of the rm used
in our data set.16 We see that, on average, fertile female workers who are in rms with 20 or
more women earn more than their peers who work in rms with fewer than 20 women, and the
latter group is older than the former. We also see that fertile women who work in rms with
20 or more female workers tend to be concentrated more in rms that belong to the communal,
personal, and social services industry, compared with those who work in rms with fewer than
20 female workers, where a large concentration is observed in the commerce industry.
Tables 4 and 5 present the summary statistics for nonfertile female workers (between 50 and
60 years old) and for male workers, respectively, separated by the size of the rm. We observe
that the trend for nonfertile female workers is similar to that for fertile female workers, which
also coincides with the trend for men.
Finally, Table 6 presents the summary statistics of the database used in the analysis of
employment composition (share of male employment within the rm), which is carried out
14Women who work and are between 18 and 49 years old are considered fertile female workers. This denition
follows the one provided by the National Institute of Statistics (INE).
15According to our data, there are 244,585 nonfertile female workers, 81% of whom are also concentrated in
these industries (19% in commerce, 17% in nancial services, and 45% in social services).
16This separation was based only on the number of female workers; thus, no constraint was imposed on the
number of male workers.
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by rm and not by worker as before. Following Lemieux and Milligan (2008), we restrict our
sample to rms with more than ve and fewer than 35 female workers, since there are systematic
di¤erences between rms (and their workers) with six to 34 female workers and those with either
up to ve or more than 35 female workers. We see that rms with 20 or more female workers
have a slightly greater proportion of male workers within their labour force and that these
rms are more concentrated (relative to the ones with fewer than 20 female workers) in the
communal, personal, and social services industry.
3.4.1 Graphical Analysis
When an RD design is used as a method of estimation, previous literature (Imbens and Lemieux
2008; Lee and Lemieux 2010) suggests a series of tests on the variables used. The idea is that
these tests allow us to see how robust the internal validity of our design is, and thus how credible
our results could be. These tests check:
A. Whether there is a discontinuity on the dependent variables (in our case, wages and share
of male workers).
B. Whether there are discontinuities on the control variables (in our case, age and type of
industry).
C. Whether there is a discontinuity on the density of the running variable (in our case, the
number of female workers in the rm).
Test A should suggest a discontinuity on the variable of interest; otherwise our estimation
may conclude that there are no signicant e¤ects. Test B is important, as it checks whether
covariates present discontinuities. If they do, the causality claimed from the policy change is
unclear, since the discontinuity found on the dependent variable may be due to a discontinuity
on the covariates and not to the policy change. Finally, test C allows us to check whether
agents (in our case, rms and workers) manipulate the running variable. This is important
because if there were manipulation (i.e., a discontinuity in the density at the threshold), it
would imply that agents just above the threshold are not necessarily similar to those just
below the threshold, and this, as Lee and Lemieux (2010) pointed out, would mean that a
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treatment being a discontinuous function of an assignment variable would not be su¢ cient to
justify the validity of an RD design. Furthermore, discontinuous rules may generate incentives,
causing behaviour that would invalidate the RD approach. We check for discontinuities through
graphical inspection and formally test for the existence of a discontinuity of the assignment
variable by using the test proposed in McCrary (2008).17
Test A
A.1. Firms with fertile and nonfertile female workers and male workers:
In Figure 1 we observe that there is discontinuity on wages of female workers in rms with
19 female workers, relative to rms with 20 female workers. Discontinuities on wages are also
observed in nonfertile women and in men, as Figure 2 and Figure 3 show. These results suggest
that rms transfer the cost of childcare not only to fertile female workers in the form of lower
wages, but also to nonfertile female workers and male workers as well. We will explore the
magnitude of this transfer below.
Although rms tend to transfer childcare costs to their workers, the data in Figure 4 suggest
that rms with 19 female workers have a lower share of male workers than rms with 20 female
workers. This result tells us that rms are not fully transferring the childcare cost to their
employees, suggesting that there is a change in the relative cost between female and male
workers for these rms just above the threshold.
A.2. Firms with male workers only:
To further support our previous results, we apply again test A, but now only to rms with
male workers. Since Article 203 of the Labour Code applies only to rms that have female
workers, we should expect no discontinuity on those rms with only male workers. Results are
presented in Figure 5, and we observe exactly what we were expecting: there are no e¤ects on
wages when we move from rms with only 19 male workers to rms with only 20 male workers.
17For more information on McCrarys (2008) test, see the appendix.
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A.3. Firms with non fertile females only:
To further study our hypothesis, we analyze the behaviour of rms with only nonfertile
female workers (ages 50-60). If our hypothesis is true, the rm should not expect any childcare
expenditure, and so there should be no discontinuity on wages. Our results are presented in
Figure 6 and suggest that, as expected, there is no signicant discontinuity at the threshold.
Test B
Our next step is to apply test B on the covariates: age and type of industry dummies. Figure
7 presents the result for age for fertile female workers, and we nd that there are no signicant
di¤erences between both sides of the threshold. Next, in Figures 8, 9, and 10, we present for the
same group the result for percentages of fertile female workers working in commerce, nancial
services, and social services, respectively. We nd that there is no signicant discontinuity at
the threshold.
We repeat the same exercise, but now for nonfertile female workers (Figures 11, 12, 13, and
14) and for men (Figures 15, 16, 17, and 18). Results again suggest no signicant discontinuities
at the threshold.
We repeat test B for the case where the dependent variable is the share of male workers.
Results are presented in Figures 19, 20, and 21 for each type of industry dummy, and suggest
no signicant discontinuities at the threshold.
Test C
Finally, in Figure 22 we present the result for test C. We observe that there are no signicant
discontinuities on the density of the running variable at the threshold. This suggests that there
is no evidence of manipulation from the agentspoint of view. This is crucial, as Lee (2008)
formally showed that one need not assume that the RD design isolates treatment variation that
is "as good as randomized"; instead, such randomized variation is a consequence of agents
inability to precisely control the assignment variable near the known cuto¤.
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To further investigate the presence of manipulation of the assignment variable, we follow
McCrary (2008), who developed a density test.18 In particular, he suggests testing the null
hypothesis of continuity of the density of the forcing variable at the discontinuity point. Un-
fortunately, his test was developed for continuous assignment variables. However, as Lemieux
and Milligan (2008) pointed out, the discrete nature of the assignment variable does not further
complicate the analysis, as it is straightforward to implement this test by separately estimating
two local linear regressions (where we consider the fraction and log fraction of women below
and above the threshold to be dependent variables) and checking whether there is statistical
di¤erence between the predicted outcomes at the discontinuity point.19 Our results suggest that
there is no evidence of manipulation of the assignment variable, which supports our previous
graphical analysis. In particular, the p-value is 0.93 for the fraction of women and 0.90 for the
log fraction of women.
As mentioned before, the discrete nature of our data can introduce complications in the RD
analysis (Lee and Card 2008). However, Lee and Lemieux (2010) point out that the discreteness
of the running variable (number of female workers in the rm) does not introduce important
complications if this variable is not too coarsely distributed. As Figure 22 and the McCrary
test show, this seems to be the case.
Overall, tests A, B, and C support the internal validity of our identication strategy.20
3.5 Results
In this section we present the results of our estimation on wages of fertile and nonfertile women
and men working for the rm and on the share of male workers. Additionally, we present
a sensitivity analysis of our parametric and nonparametric estimates, in order to check their
18For more details on McCrarys test, see the appendix.
19We use the triangular kernel, as suggested by McCrary (2008). Following Lemieux and Milligan (2008), we
use a window of 10 female workers (i.e., from 15 to 25 female workers per rm). The weight of the observations
linearly decreases from 1 at the threshold to 0 at 15 or 25 female workers.
20Additionally, in line with Lee and Lemieux (2010), we carried out nonparametric discontinuous regressions
on the covariates. We did not nd any signicant discontinuity on the covariates, which supports our previous
results.
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robustness. In particular, we consider di¤erent kernel functions and bandwidths and falsication
tests.
3.5.1 Wages
Table 7 presents the results regarding the impact of Article 203 on fertile female workers
wages. In the table, it is possible to observe that wages, on average, decrease because of the
policy. The magnitude depends on the specication used (parametric or nonparametric). For
the parametric case, we see that the e¤ect varies depending on the degree of the polynomial
considered.21 For the linear polynomial, the e¤ect is an average reduction of nearly -3.9% on
monthly wages, whereas the e¤ect is lower for the quadratic and cubic polynomial, -3.4% and
-3.8%, respectively. For the quartic polynomial, the reduction is slightly larger than the linear
case, -4.2%. We also see that all these estimates are statistically signicant at 1%. For the
nonparametric case we see that the estimation yields -4.0% (LM), which is also statistically
signicant at 1%. It is important to mention that even after we consider di¤erent polynomial
degrees and di¤erent approaches (parametric and nonparametric), the results appear to be quite
robust.
Tables 8 and 9 present the estimates, through parametric and nonparametric specications,
of the e¤ects of Article 203 on wages for nonfertile female workers and male workers who are
in rms along with fertile women, respectively. For nonfertile female workers, we see negative
e¤ects ranging from -3.9% to -2.3% for the parametric specication, and a negative e¤ect of
-3.8% for the nonparametric specication (LM), but these e¤ects seem to be less robust than
those for fertile female workers since the estimates are only statistically signicant at 10%. For
male workers we also observe negative impacts on wages, where the e¤ect varies from -3.9% to
-2.6% in the parametric case and is 4.0% (LM) in the nonparametric one. These results are
statistically signicant at 1%.
If we consider an average rm with 20 female workers, we see that the reduction of wages due
to Article 203 (along with Article 206) is nearly equivalent to the expected childcare cost. Hence,
21As Lee and Card (2008) recommend, we use clustered standard errors at the group level in our parametric
estimations.
142
rms pass nearly 90% of the total childcare cost on to their workers. For more details about
this calculation, see the appendix. These results suggest that the rm does not discriminate
between fertile and nonfertile women and men in order to charge the childcare bill to their
workers.
In a competitive labour market, female and male workers who do not have children would
be penalized in the above setting; therefore, they would move to rms una¤ected by the policy
(i.e., those with fewer than 20 female workers) until wages equalize the gains. By observing
the data, we nd that there are relatively few rms with 20 or more female workers and that
nearly 72% of female workers work in them (see Table 1). This seems to suggest that there is
an oligopsonistic labour market because, in e¤ect, we observe lower wages for female workers in
those rms a¤ected by the policy at the margin (see Manning 2003). This market imperfection
may be one explanation for workersstickiness (immobility).
3.5.2 Employment Composition
Table 10 presents the results of the e¤ect of Article 203 on the share of male workers in the rm.
We observe no clear e¤ect on this variable, although its magnitude and signicance depends on
the specication used. In particular, when we use a quadratic or quartic polynomial, we reach
statistical signicance at 10%, and the e¤ect on the share of male workers is between 1.6 and
2.2 percentage points. For the nonparametric case, the point estimate is 2.7 (LM) percentage
points but is not statistically signicant.
These results are along the same lines as those related to wages, where the rm tends to
pass almost the entire childcare costs on to its workers, something that does not signicantly
modify the relative prices between male and female workers. This is because when rms cannot
fully transfer the childcare cost to each of their female workers, female workers become a more
expensive input relative to male workers. If some degree of substitution exists between them,
we should observe an increase in the relative share of male workers (relative to female workers)
in the rm. This latter e¤ect would not necessarily be true if rms were also transferring the
childcare cost among male workers, which is the case.
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3.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
As Imbens and Lemieux (2008) point out, estimates that are sensitive to the order of the poly-
nomial (in the parametric case) and the kernel or bandwidth specication (in the nonparametric
case) are not very credible. In this section, we perform several estimations using di¤erent kernel
functions, bandwidths, and slopes of the regression functions on both sides of the discontinu-
ity of our parametric specications, in order to check the robustness of our parametric and
nonparametric specication (the sensitivity to a di¤erent polynomial order was shown above).
Additionally, we perform falsication tests in order to validate our RD design.22
Alternative Kernels
The estimates of our nonparametric specications presented in Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10 consider
the triangular kernel. This kernel function has special properties, as shown in Cheng, Fan,
and Marron (1997). In particular, this kernel has asymptotic mean squared error minimizing
properties for boundary estimation problems. In this section we use other kernel functions, such
as the Epanechnikov and Biweight kernels, in order to test the robustness of our nonparametric
specication.23 The results of our estimations using these two kernel functions for the wages of
fertile female workers, nonfertile female workers, and male workers and the share of male workers
are presented in Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14, respectively. We see that using a di¤erent kernel
function specication does not a¤ect the estimates to an important magnitude; the estimates
using the triangular kernel barely di¤er from these ones.
We can conclude that the kernel specication chosen does not have an important e¤ect on
the estimates of our model. This result is aligned with what the related literature (Imbens and
Lemieux [2008] and Lee and Lemieux [2010], for instance) says about conditions of consistent
RD estimations.
22We performed a sensitivity analysis for the size of the window considered (e.g., rms with more than three
and fewer than 37 female workers, or rms with more than seven and fewer than 33 female workers). Our
estimates do not vary in a signicant way. The results can be obtained upon request from the authors.
23The Epanechnikov kernel is K(u) = 3
4
(1 u2)1fjuj1g and the Biweight kernel is K(u) = 1516 (1 u2)21fjuj1g.
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Alternative Bandwidths
We present estimates using di¤erent kernel bandwidths. In particular, we consider a di¤erence of
+2, +1, -1, and -2 of the optimal bandwidth calculated according to Ludwig and Miller (2007).
The results of our estimations are presented in Table 15.24 We nd that for all outcomes,
even after modifying the bandwidths, the estimates appear to be consistent. We do not nd
important di¤erences in our estimations, which suggests that our RD design is well specied.
Di¤erent Slopes on Both Sides of the Discontinuity
The model dened in section 3.2 assumed that the slopes of the regression functions (of our
parametric specications) on each side of the discontinuity were the same, which can be a strong
assumption in the case of RD designs. We present a sensitivity analysis for our estimations,
considering that these slopes may be di¤erent. The parametric model can be redened as
follows:
yi =  +
pX
j=1
j(Ni   20)j + '  di +
pX
j=1
&j(Ni   20)j  di + z0i + ui
where the main di¤erence with the specication dened in section 3.2 is the interaction
terms &j(Ni   20)j  di, which allows for di¤erent slopes on both sides of the discontinuity.
Some of the results are shown in Table 16. We see, for example, that results for fertile women
suggest that considering di¤erent slopes does not introduce major alterations of our estimates
in comparison with the original ones. Similar results hold for other groups.
Falsication Tests
In this section we present a falsication test. In particular, we estimate our baseline model
considering a di¤erent threshold, 30 female workers. If the RD design is well specied, then
24We consider the triangular kernel for these estimations.
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we would expect a lack of statistical signicance by the RD estimators. Before estimating, in
order to make a valid RD analysis, we perform McCrarys (2008) test for the density of the
assignment variable for the new threshold. Results indicate that there is no discontinuity on
this variable.
Table 17 presents the results of our falsication test. We see that the estimates are not sta-
tistically signicant for female (fertile and nonfertile) and male workers. These results show that
our RD design performs well, as changing the threshold does not yield statistically signicant
estimates.
3.6 Conclusion
Previous literature on childcare has focused on two main strands: (i) the e¤ect of childcare
policies on cognitive development of the child and (ii) the e¤ects of these type of policies on
female labour supply. Until now, there has been no empirical evidence on who bears the nancial
burden of providing childcare when childcare regulation mandates that rms must provide that
service. Thus, we present the rst empirical study that analyzes who bears the nancial burden
of providing childcare. We exploit the discontinuity generated in the Chilean Labour Code
by its Article 203, which mandates that rms with 20 or more female workers must provide
childcare. We explore its e¤ects on wages and on the share of male workers in the rm using
an RD design.
Article 203 theoretically imposes an additional cost on rms, which may result in di¤erent
outcomes depending on who actually bears the cost (i.e., rms or employees). If rms do not
transfer the cost to their workers, we should observe a disincentive to hire female workers for
treated rms, through a substitution of women for men, observing a change in employment
composition between treated versus untreated rms. If rms can transfer the full cost to
their workers, then we should observe lower wages for those a¤ected (in noncompetitive labour
markets) or in equilibrium (in competitive labour markets).
Our ndings suggest that most of the childcare cost (nearly 90%) is transferred to female
workers (fertile and nonfertile) and male workers in the form of lower wages. We also observe
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that there is no signicant change in the employment composition (relative prices between men
and women remain unaltered once the threshold of 20 female workers is reached), which is
consistent with the fact that rms transfer almost all the cost to their employees.
Overall, although the nancial burden of Article 203 is legally imposed on rms, the nal
agents who carry the burden are the workers of a¤ected rms. This result calls, then, for
consideration of the potential unintended consequences of childcare regulations.
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3.7 Appendix
Leave-One-Out Cross-Validation Bandwidth (Ludwig and Miller 2007)
The method for choosing the optimal bandwidth within the RD framework is not indis-
putable. Ludwig and Miller (2007) present an alternative method for choosing the optimal
bandwidth, which consists of a "leave-one-out" cross-validation (CV) procedure. Traditional
CV procedures may provide misleading results since they do not account for the discontinuity
at the threshold and estimate a function in the interior of the support. Ludwig and Millers
(2007) alternative considers two estimations at each side of the threshold, which centers on
boundary predictions.
The procedure is the following:
(1) Given a bandwidth h, we run separate regressions on both sides of the threshold, leaving
one observation out of the sample, considering only observations that are within this bandwidth
(i.e., the threshold minus the value of the running variable is, in absolute value, less than or
equal to the bandwidth).
(2) Using the estimates from both regressions, we compute predictions of the dependent
variable (at each side of the threshold) for the observation that was left out of the sample.
(3) We compute the di¤erence between the predicted and observed dependent variable.
(4) Repeating this exercise for each observation yields a complete set of di¤erences be-
tween the predicted and observed dependent variable. The optimal bandwidth is the one that
minimizes the mean square of this di¤erence.
148
McCrarys (2008) Discontinuity Test
The use of RD designs has become more popular in the last decade. Relatively low complex
estimation techniques and relaxed identifying assumptions have made this possible. As Lee
(2008) and McCrary (2008) point out, a core assumption of the RD design is the inability
to alter the treatment assignment rule by individuals. A clear example of a violation of this
assumption is the one presented in McCrary (2008). Suppose a doctor wishes to randomly assign
patients a certain drug. To do so, the doctor assigns patients into two waiting rooms, A and B,
where those in the rst one will receive the drug and the others will receive a placebo. If the
treatment assignment rule is known by individuals and they may undo the doctors assignment,
then we would expect room A to be crowded. In this case, because of discontinuities of the
assignment variable, the treatment e¤ect estimated by the RD design will probably be far
from a precise estimation, as Lee (2008) formally shows that if there were manipulation of this
variable, then there could be identication problems of the treatment e¤ect.
McCrary (2008) proposes a formal test in order to analyze whether there are discontinuities,
at the cuto¤, in the assignment variable. This test consists of two steps. First, construct a
detailed histogram grid of the assignment variable. Second, using local linear regressions,
smooth the histogram on both sides of the cuto¤ of the assignment variable and test whether
there is a di¤erence in the density on both sides (of the cuto¤). This applies for the case of a
continuous assignment variable.
In the case of a discrete assignment variable, like the one in this article (number of female
workers), McCrarys (2008) test can also be applied. As Lemieux and Milligan (2008) show,
it is necessary to run local linear regressions on both sides of the cuto¤ and test whether the
predicted outcome (fraction or log fraction of the assignment variable in the bins) of both sides
is the same.
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Calculations of Childcare Cost pass-through on to Workers
In this section we present the calculations of the childcare cost transferred to workers by
the rm, based on our RD estimates. According to our database, in rms that belong to the
commerce, nancial services, or social services industries and that employ 19 female workers,
the average monthly wage for fertile female workers is $378,047 CLP (Chilean pesos), $415,575
CLP for nonfertile female workers, and $443,476 CLP for male workers.25 The average rm
with 19 female workers has 17 fertile female workers, 2 nonfertile female workers, and 25 male
workers. Considering a simple average of the parametric e¤ects of Article 203 on wages and
that the next female worker that the rm will hire is fertile, we nd that the total monthly
penalization on wages is $628,044 CLP. The following table summarizes these calculations:
Table: Cost Transfer Calculations
Type of Worker Average Wage Number in a Firm RD E¤ect Cost Transfer
(CLP) With 20 Females26 (CLP)
Fertile Female $378,047 18* -3.8% $258,584
Non Fertile Female $415,575 2 -3.1% $25,766
Male $443,476 25 -3.1% $343,694
Total $628,044
Note: We consider the average number of workers in a rm with 19 female workers and that the next female
hired is fertile. *We assume that the 20th female worker hired is a fertile one and hence the original number of
fertile female workers is 17. The Regression Discontinuity (RD) e¤ect considers a simple average of the estimated
parametric e¤ects.
According to the CASEN 2009 Survey, 13.9% of working fertile women have a child between
6 and 24 months old and hence are eligible for childcare provided by the employer.27 Thus,
nearly 2.5 fertile female workers of the rm will require the childcare service.28 The monthly
25As of early May 2012, US$1 is nearly $500 CLP.
26We consider the average number of workers in a rm with 19 female workers and that the next female hired
is fertile.
27This data includes fertile female dependent workers from the private sector.
28This result is obtained by multiplying 0.139 (13.9% is the probability of having a child between 6 and 24
months old) by 18 (the number of fertile female workers).
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cost of childcare is variable. Public childcare (through JUNJI) costs nearly $165,000 CLP and
private childcare costs $100,000 to $300,000, with an average that is near the public cost. Hence,
the expected childcare cost for the employer is $412,500 (CLP).29
However, as stated in Articles 203 and 206, other type of expenditures must be paid by the
employer. In particular, travel costs to the childcare facility, time spent travelling back and
forth from the rm to the childcare facility, and time granted to the female worker for feeding
her child are indirect costs. When this database was created (October 2010), one trip on public
transportation cost $500 CLP.30 Hence, the monthly cost of transportation that the employer
has to pay for each mother is $20,000 CLP.31 The cost associated with productivity losses for
the rm due to the time the mother spends feeding her child (1 hour) can be calculated as a
fraction of monthly wages. This cost is approximately $47,256 CLP, one-eighth of the daily
wage.32 In the case of the time travelled, we assume that it takes the mother 1 hour a day to
get from the rm to the childcare facility and back. Thus, the cost is nearly $47,256 CLP. All
the indirect costs (considering the fertile women who will require childcare) add up to $286,280
CLP.33
A summary of the total costs for the employer due to Articles 203 and 206 is presented in
the following table:
Table: Total Costs due to Articles 203 and 206
Item Cost (CLP)
Childcare $412,500
Transport $50,000
Productivity Loss $236,280
Total $698,760
29This result is obtained by multiplying 2.5 (the number of female workers who will require childcare) by
$165,000 CLP (the average childcare cost).
30This is the cost of one ticket on Santiagos public transportation system, Transantiago.
31Assuming that women must travel to the childcare facility twice a day, we multiply $500 (the cost of one
trip on public transportation) by 2 (number of trips per day) by 20 (the average number of working days in the
month), which equals $20,000.
32Eight hours are the normal working daily hours.
33Our analysis is incomplete, in this point, since we do not know the number of rms that have childcare
facilities within them or the exact travel times.
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Note: The average number of female workers that will require childcare is considered.
We see that on average, the employer transfers to her workers approximately 90% of the
total childcare costs.
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Tables
Table 1: Distribution of Workers and Firms by Number of Female Workers
Type of Firm Female Workers Male Workers Firms
(Number) (Number) (Number)
Less than 20 Female workers 475,234 (28.1%) 1,430,388 (50.6%) 287,136 (96.8%)
20 or More Female workers 1,217,994 (71.9%) 1,391,281 (49.4%) 9,358 (3.2%)
Total 1,693,228 2,821,669 296,494
Note: Percentages are presented in parenthesis.
Table 2: Distribution of Fertile Female Workers by Type of Industry
Type of Industry Female Workers % of the Total
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishery 61,333 4.8%
Mines and Quarry 9,592 0.8%
Industry (Manufacturing) 95,801 7.5%
Electricity, Gas and Water 3,585 0.3%
Construction 34,884 2.7%
Commerce 288,208 22.6%
Transport, Storage and Communications 53,960 4.2%
Financial and Business Services 268,824 21.0%
Communal, Personal and Social Services 461,526 36.1%
Total 1,277,713 100%
Note: Not all female workers in the database present type of industry.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Fertile Female Workers
Variable Less than 20 More than 20
Female Workers Female Workers
Log Wage 12.4 12.5
(0.57) (0.65)
Age 34.1 33.3
(8.3) (8.2)
Commerce 0.43 0.24
(0.49) (0.43)
Financial and Business Services 0.25 0.25
(0.43) (0.43)
Communal, Personal and 0.30 0.50
Social Services (0.46) (0.50)
Number of Observations 226,258 690,308
Note: Mean of the variables is presented. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Non Fertile Female Workers
Variable Less than 20 More than 20
Female Workers Female Workers
Log Wage 12.3 12.6
(0.55) (0.67)
Age 54.8 54.7
(3.77) (3.70)
Commerce 0.41 0.15
(0.49) (0.35)
Financial and Business Services 0.24 0.18
(0.43) (0.38)
Communal, Personal and 0.33 0.66
Social Services (0.47) (0.47)
Number of Observations 44,195 113,145
Note: Mean of the variables is presented. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Male Workers
Variable Less than 20 More than 20
Female Workers Female Workers
Log Wage 12.6 12.8
(0.57) (0.64)
Age 39.3 37.2
(11.7) (11.7)
Commerce 0.41 0.28
(0.49) (0.45)
Financial and Business Services 0.35 0.31
(0.47) (0.46)
Communal, Personal and 0.23 0.40
Social Services (0.42) (0.49)
Number of Observations 527,968 672,157
Note: Mean of the variables is presented. Standard deviations in parentheses.
156
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Firms
Variables Less than 20 More than 20
Female Workers Female Workers
Share of Male Workers (%) 0.40 0.41
(0.27) (0.23)
Commerce 0.42 0.30
(0.49) (0.46)
Financial and Business Services 0.25 0.21
(0.43) (0.41)
Communal, Personal and 0.33 0.49
Social Services (0.47) (0.50)
Number of Observations 14,349 2,637
Note: Mean of the variables is presented. Standard deviations in parentheses.
157
Table 7: Impact of Article 203 on Fertile FemalesLog Wages
Specication Estimate
Parametric
Linear  0:039
Quadratic  0:034
Cubic  0:038
Quartic  0:042
Nonparametric LM  0:040
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. In case of the parametric
specication clustered standard errors at the group level were used. For the nonparametric case the triangular
kernel is used and the optimal bandwidth, chosen following Ludwig and Miller (2007), is h= 14.
Table 8: Impact of Article 203 on Non Fertile FemalesLog Wages
Specication Estimate
Parametric
Linear  0:027
Quadratic  0:023
Cubic  0:035
Quartic  0:039
Nonparametric LM  0:038
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. In case of the parametric
specication clustered standard errors at the group level were used. For the nonparametric case the triangular
kernel is used and the optimal bandwidth, chosen following Ludwig and Miller (2007), is h= 14.
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Table 9: Impact of Article 203 on MalesLog Wages
Specication Estimate
Parametric
Linear  0:039
Quadratic  0:028
Cubic  0:029
Quartic  0:026
Nonparametric LM  0:040
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. In case of the parametric
specication clustered standard errors at the group level were used. For the nonparametric case the triangular
kernel is used and the optimal bandwidth, chosen following Ludwig and Miller (2007), is h= 14.
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Table 10: Impact of Article 203 on the Share of Male Workers in the Firm
Specication Estimate
Parametric
Linear 0:006
Quadratic 0:016
Cubic 0:014
Quartic 0:022
Nonparametric LM 0:027
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. In case of the parametric
specication clustered standard errors at the group level were used. For the nonparametric case the triangular
kernel is used and the optimal bandwidth, chosen following Ludwig and Miller (2007), is h= 5.
Table 11: Impact of Article 203 on Fertile Females Log Wages (Alternative
Kernels)
Kernel Bandwidth Method E¤ect
Epanechnikov LM -0:039
Biweight LM -0:040
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The optimal bandwidth,
for the Epanechnikov kernel and for the Biweight kernel is h= 14 (using Ludwig and Miller (2007) approach).
Table 12: Impact of Article 203 on Non Fertile FemalesLog Wages (Alternative
Kernels)
Kernel Bandwidth Method E¤ect
Epanechnikov LM -0:039
Biweight LM -0:036
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The optimal bandwidth,
for the Epanechnikov kernel and for the Biweight kernel is h= 14 (using Ludwig and Miller (2007) approach).
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Table 13: Impact of Article 203 on MalesLog Wages (Alternative Kernels)
Kernel Bandwidth Method E¤ect
Epanechnikov LM -0:031
Biweight LM -0:038
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The optimal bandwidth,
for the Epanechnikov kernel and for the Biweight kernel is h= 14 (using Ludwig and Miller (2007) approach).
Table 14: Impact of Article 203 on the Share of Male Workers in the Firm
(Alternative Kernels)
Kernel Bandwidth Method E¤ect
Epanechnikov LM 0:027
Biweight LM 0:027
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The optimal bandwidth,
for the Epanechnikov kernel and for the Biweight kernel is h= 5 (using Ludwig and Miller (2007) approach).
Table 15: Impact of Article 203 on Di¤erent Outcomes (Alternative Bandwidths)
Di¤erence with Optimal Bandwidth
Outcome +2 +1 -1 -2
Fertile Females (Wages) -0:042 -0:040 -0:040 -0:041
Non Fertile Females (Wages) -0:040 -0:039 -0:036 -0:035
Males (Wages) -0:038 -0:039 -0:042 -0:046
Share of Male Workers 0:022 0:024 0:026 0:037
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The optimal bandwidth
was chosen following Ludwig and Miller (2007).
161
Table 16: Impact of Article 203 on Di¤erent Outcomes (Di¤erent Slopes on Both
Sides of the Discontinuity Allowed)
Polynomial F. Females (Wages) Share of Male Workers
Linear -0:037 0:014
Quadratic -0:039 0:019
Cubic -0:041 0:026
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Table 17: Falsication Test: Threshold at 30 Female Workers
Outcome Estimate
Fertile Females (Wages) -0:012
Non Fertile Females (Wages) -0:007
Males (Wages) -0:001
Share of Male Workers -0:005
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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